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wild.","https://cdn.builder.io/api/v1/image/assets%2Ff3a1111ff5be48cdbb123cd9f5795a05%2F7b4a5ebf81d64e8c9d7fc35f6c96c4a9",{},1776255810913,1776255810900,[],[183,205],{"createdDate":184,"id":185,"name":148,"modelId":186,"published":13,"meta":187,"stageModifiedSincePublish":6,"query":189,"data":190,"variations":200,"lastUpdated":201,"firstPublished":202,"testRatio":23,"createdBy":24,"lastUpdatedBy":24,"folders":203,"rev":204},1776256900280,"1f429607996e4e5fae8fe3f9b9610e55","4829faa81e7c4ee8bd2d000e160e8d3c",{"breakpoints":188,"kind":28,"lastPreviewUrl":29,"hasAutosaves":6},{"xsmall":31,"small":32,"medium":33},[],{"testimonial":191,"link":199,"type":175,"title":148,"description":176,"image":177},{"@type":120,"id":154,"model":117,"value":192},{"query":193,"folders":194,"createdDate":158,"id":154,"name":159,"modelId":127,"published":13,"data":195,"variations":196,"lastUpdated":167,"firstPublished":168,"testRatio":23,"createdBy":100,"lastUpdatedBy":24,"meta":197,"rev":171},[],[],{"video":161,"jobTitle":162,"author":163,"qoute":29,"quote":164,"image":165},{},{"kind":28,"lastPreviewUrl":29,"breakpoints":198,"hasAutosaves":34},{"small":32,"medium":33},{"text":173,"url":174},{},1776256937553,1776256937540,[],"xggsv10v1q9",{"createdDate":206,"id":207,"name":208,"modelId":186,"published":13,"stageModifiedSincePublish":6,"query":209,"data":210,"variations":220,"lastUpdated":221,"firstPublished":222,"testRatio":23,"createdBy":24,"lastUpdatedBy":24,"folders":223,"meta":224,"rev":204},1776256949234,"ce043785b71b4ece98eac811ecf4ba10","inductive-automation",[],{"link":211,"type":117,"testimonial":212,"testimonialLink":118},{},{"@type":120,"id":121,"model":117,"value":213},{"query":214,"folders":215,"createdDate":125,"id":121,"name":126,"modelId":127,"published":13,"data":216,"variations":217,"lastUpdated":133,"firstPublished":134,"testRatio":23,"createdBy":100,"lastUpdatedBy":100,"meta":218,"rev":137},[],[],{"author":129,"jobTitle":130,"quote":126,"image":131},{},{"kind":28,"lastPreviewUrl":29,"breakpoints":219,"hasAutosaves":34},{"small":32,"medium":33},{},1776256974140,1776256974130,[],{"breakpoints":225,"kind":28,"lastPreviewUrl":29,"hasAutosaves":6},{"xsmall":31,"small":32,"medium":33},{"id":227,"title":228,"authorsCollection":229,"content":237,"extension":869,"faqItemsCollection":870,"faqTitle":62,"featured":6,"hashTags":62,"meta":872,"metaTitle":873,"ogImage":62,"publishedDate":874,"relatedBlogPostsCollection":875,"slug":3009,"stem":3010,"subtitle":62,"summary":3011,"synopsis":3022,"sys":3023,"tagsCollection":3026,"__hash__":3032},"blog/blog/verizon-dbir-2026-review.json","What the Verizon DBIR tells us about how breaches happen in 2026",{"items":230},[231],{"fullName":232,"firstName":233,"jobTitle":234,"profilePicture":235},"Mark Orlando","Mark","Field CTO",{"url":236},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/592PMwIQQFaa24k5SKBEKF/a33090d0ad95d1e3081f5d16a46ba826/image__68_.png",{"json":238,"links":790},{"data":239,"content":240,"nodeType":789},{},[241,250,254,264,280,287,294,303,312,319,326,332,352,358,374,382,399,406,413,416,424,440,446,465,471,479,503,510,513,521,528,534,541,560,568,584,587,595,611,618,625,644,647,655,662,669,676,682,690,706,713,731,734,742,749,756,763,770],{"data":242,"content":243,"nodeType":249},{},[244],{"data":245,"marks":246,"value":247,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The headline finding getting the most airtime in 2026 is that vulnerability exploitation has overtaken credential abuse as the top single initial access vector, jumping to 31% from 20% the year before. The vulnerability management crisis driving this statistic is one of the most important stories in this year's data. But reading it as evidence that identity threats are receding would be a mistake, because the DBIR's own data tells a more complicated and more useful story when you look at the full picture.","text","paragraph",{"data":251,"content":252,"nodeType":253},{},[],"hr",{"data":255,"content":256,"nodeType":263},{},[257],{"data":258,"marks":259,"value":262,"nodeType":248},{},[260],{"type":261},"bold","Vulnerability exploitation has caught up with identity — not replaced it","heading-1",{"data":265,"content":266,"nodeType":249},{},[267,271,276],{"data":268,"marks":269,"value":270,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The DBIR's headline comparison pits vulnerability exploitation (31%) against credential abuse (13%) as individual vectors. That comparison is accurate but incomplete, because the DBIR tracks identity-related initial access across ",{"data":272,"marks":273,"value":275,"nodeType":248},{},[274],{"type":261},"three",{"data":277,"marks":278,"value":279,"nodeType":248},{},[]," separate categories: phishing (16%), credential abuse (13%), and pretexting (6%). Before interpreting those numbers, there's a methodological wrinkle worth understanding.",{"data":281,"content":282,"nodeType":249},{},[283],{"data":284,"marks":285,"value":286,"nodeType":248},{},[],"This year's report added pretexting as a newly tracked initial access vector, reclassifying some incidents previously counted as credential abuse. The DBIR is transparent about the effect: without that change, credential abuse would have been 16% rather than 13%. On an apples-to-apples basis, identity-related initial access (phishing 16% + credential abuse 16%) comes to 32% — versus 31% for vulnerability exploitation.",{"data":288,"content":289,"nodeType":249},{},[290],{"data":291,"marks":292,"value":293,"nodeType":248},{},[],"To be precise about what moved: phishing held roughly flat year over year, but credential abuse saw a modest decline even on the adjusted basis (from 22% to 16%). Overall, the identity picture is broadly stable. The reason the two categories have converged is that vulnerability exploitation surged 55%, not that identity attacks meaningfully receded.",{"data":295,"content":301,"nodeType":302},{"target":296},{"sys":297},{"id":298,"type":299,"linkType":300},"5GvSsSY4R6X34ZBMidZ54X","Link","Entry",[],"embedded-entry-block",{"data":304,"content":305,"nodeType":311},{},[306],{"data":307,"marks":308,"value":310,"nodeType":248},{},[309],{"type":261},"The taxonomy gap","heading-2",{"data":313,"content":314,"nodeType":249},{},[315],{"data":316,"marks":317,"value":318,"nodeType":248},{},[],"It's also worth asking how much the DBIR's initial access taxonomy can tell us. The figure that everyone is citing — Figure 10 — is labelled \"select enumerations,\" and the four tracked vectors (vulnerability exploitation, phishing, credential abuse, pretexting) add up to only 66% of initial access. A third of the picture isn't represented in the headline breakdown at all.",{"data":320,"content":321,"nodeType":249},{},[322],{"data":323,"marks":324,"value":325,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The cluster boundaries and where you draw them also changes the story. The DBIR classifies ClickFix under \"baiting\" — a category that covers malicious downloads and SEO poisoning — rather than phishing, even though the end goal is often the same: getting a user to execute something they shouldn't. Pretexting absorbed incidents that were previously credential abuse, shifting the numbers between categories. These are useful analytical clusters, but they aren't clean divisions of a neatly partitioned attack surface.",{"data":327,"content":331,"nodeType":302},{"target":328},{"sys":329},{"id":330,"type":299,"linkType":300},"7t6ZcHDycaPOyLstX4r8zl",[],{"data":333,"content":334,"nodeType":249},{},[335,339,348],{"data":336,"marks":337,"value":338,"nodeType":248},{},[],"These are identity attacks at scale, and it isn't clear where — or whether — they show up in the DBIR's initial access vectors. This lack of depth in identity and in-browser attack vectors is common in many defensive models, which is why we've created our own ",{"data":340,"content":342,"nodeType":347},{"uri":341},"https://pushsecurity.com/resources/browser-identity-attacks-matrix/",[343],{"data":344,"marks":345,"value":346,"nodeType":248},{},[],"Browser and Identity Attacks Matrix","hyperlink",{"data":349,"marks":350,"value":351,"nodeType":248},{},[],".",{"data":353,"content":357,"nodeType":302},{"target":354},{"sys":355},{"id":356,"type":299,"linkType":300},"53U3LHhhHFYnEpShdLmDqs",[],{"data":359,"content":360,"nodeType":249},{},[361,365,370],{"data":362,"marks":363,"value":364,"nodeType":248},{},[],"That convergence at initial access also understates the role credentials play across full breach chains. The DBIR states plainly that credential abuse at any point in the breach progression — not just as the first action — appears in ",{"data":366,"marks":367,"value":369,"nodeType":248},{},[368],{"type":261},"39% of all breaches",{"data":371,"marks":372,"value":373,"nodeType":248},{},[],", making it the single most pervasive technique in the dataset. Credentials don't just open the front door; they unlock lateral movement, privilege escalation, and persistence throughout the attack chain.",{"data":375,"content":376,"nodeType":311},{},[377],{"data":378,"marks":379,"value":381,"nodeType":248},{},[380],{"type":261},"The vulnerability treadmill",{"data":383,"content":384,"nodeType":249},{},[385,389,395],{"data":386,"marks":387,"value":388,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The vulnerability exploitation surge itself is driven by a structural capacity crisis rather than a shift in attacker preference. Edge devices and VPNs now account for 22% of vulnerability-exploitation breaches, up from 3% the prior year — a ",{"data":390,"marks":391,"value":394,"nodeType":248},{},[392],{"type":393},"italic","sevenfold",{"data":396,"marks":397,"value":398,"nodeType":248},{},[]," increase. Organizations face 50% more CISA KEV vulnerabilities to remediate than a year ago, median remediation time has increased from 32 to 43 days, and the volume of vulnerability records in the dataset has grown roughly eightfold.",{"data":400,"content":401,"nodeType":249},{},[402],{"data":403,"marks":404,"value":405,"nodeType":248},{},[],"This trend was already visible in last year's DBIR, when vulnerability exploitation jumped from 15% to 20%. AI-assisted exploit development may be compounding the problem — the DBIR's own data shows 32% of AI-assisted initial access targeting vulnerability exploitation — but the structural capacity crisis was accelerating well before AI became a meaningful factor in the attacker toolkit.",{"data":407,"content":408,"nodeType":249},{},[409],{"data":410,"marks":411,"value":412,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The vulnerability treadmill is accelerating, and the DBIR's remediation data shows defenders losing ground. But this is an additive problem, not a substitution. Both attack surfaces are growing. ",{"data":414,"content":415,"nodeType":253},{},[],{"data":417,"content":418,"nodeType":263},{},[419],{"data":420,"marks":421,"value":423,"nodeType":248},{},[422],{"type":261},"Phishing has left the inbox",{"data":425,"content":426,"nodeType":249},{},[427,431,436],{"data":428,"marks":429,"value":430,"nodeType":248},{},[],"41% percent of social engineering breaches now involve vectors other than email, with approximately a quarter coming from social media or phone-based channels. Voice phishing simulations show a ",{"data":432,"marks":433,"value":435,"nodeType":248},{},[434],{"type":261},"40% higher success rate",{"data":437,"marks":438,"value":439,"nodeType":248},{},[]," than email phishing — a median click rate of 2% versus 1.4%.",{"data":441,"content":445,"nodeType":302},{"target":442},{"sys":443},{"id":444,"type":299,"linkType":300},"7pK8qqIDDNmHmJmlcybNoe",[],{"data":447,"content":448,"nodeType":249},{},[449,453,461],{"data":450,"marks":451,"value":452,"nodeType":248},{},[],"Even within the email channel, the data confirms what ",{"data":454,"content":456,"nodeType":347},{"uri":455},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/the-top-10-security-problems-you-can-solve-in-the-browser-ranked-by-value/",[457],{"data":458,"marks":459,"value":460,"nodeType":248},{},[],"browser-level detection data has been showing",{"data":462,"marks":463,"value":464,"nodeType":248},{},[],": credential harvesting dominates. The DBIR's email security gateway breakdown shows 80% of blocked attacks are credential or session phishing, with only 10% involving malware delivery, 5% callback phishing, and 3% BEC. If you're running an email security gateway, the vast majority of what it catches is credential phishing — and 41% of social engineering is arriving through channels it can't see at all.",{"data":466,"content":470,"nodeType":302},{"target":467},{"sys":468},{"id":469,"type":299,"linkType":300},"6CvwzQA3gJ8B3RFzLrH7Kp",[],{"data":472,"content":473,"nodeType":311},{},[474],{"data":475,"marks":476,"value":478,"nodeType":248},{},[477],{"type":261},"The ClickFix detection gap",{"data":480,"content":481,"nodeType":249},{},[482,486,494,498],{"data":483,"marks":484,"value":485,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The DBIR reports ClickFix at only 2.7% of attacks detected at the browser level. For context, ",{"data":487,"content":489,"nodeType":347},{"uri":488},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/introducing-malicious-copy-paste-detection/",[490],{"data":491,"marks":492,"value":493,"nodeType":248},{},[],"CrowdStrike reported a 563% increase in ClickFix lures",{"data":495,"marks":496,"value":497,"nodeType":248},{},[]," over the same period and Microsoft identified it as the most common initial access point at 47% of observed attacks. Push's own data shows ClickFix at a significantly higher proportion of browser-level detections, ",{"data":499,"marks":500,"value":502,"nodeType":248},{},[501],{"type":261},"with 4 in 5 delivered via search engines specifically.",{"data":504,"content":505,"nodeType":249},{},[506],{"data":507,"marks":508,"value":509,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The gap is striking, and the most likely explanation is a visibility one. ClickFix attacks result in a malware download or script execution on the endpoint — and without browser-layer context, that execution looks like any other malware delivery. If a contributing organization doesn't have visibility into the browser session that preceded the payload, they'd attribute the incident to \"malware download\" or \"user execution\" rather than ClickFix specifically. The DBIR's 2.7% probably reflects how often contributors could trace the chain back to a ClickFix page, not how often ClickFix was actually the delivery mechanism.",{"data":511,"content":512,"nodeType":253},{},[],{"data":514,"content":515,"nodeType":263},{},[516],{"data":517,"marks":518,"value":520,"nodeType":248},{},[519],{"type":261},"Stolen credentials are the ransomware on-ramp",{"data":522,"content":523,"nodeType":249},{},[524],{"data":525,"marks":526,"value":527,"nodeType":248},{},[],"One of the most powerful findings in this year's DBIR is the quantification of the relationship between credential compromise and ransomware outcomes. Fifty percent of ransomware victims had a credential or infostealer event occur within 95 days prior to the ransomware attack, drawing a causal line from credential theft to ransomware deployment.",{"data":529,"content":533,"nodeType":302},{"target":530},{"sys":531},{"id":532,"type":299,"linkType":300},"3ZwG5UiweFR4fYiDaxJJDm",[],{"data":535,"content":536,"nodeType":249},{},[537],{"data":538,"marks":539,"value":540,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The infostealer supply chain data reinforces the picture. Infostealers are surfacing an average of 2,362 breached corporate credentials per month from organizational email domains in stealer log datasets, and 54% of devices in Initial Access Broker logs had at least one infostealer installed. The 95-day median window is consistent with the known timeline from credential harvest to ransomware deployment.",{"data":542,"content":543,"nodeType":249},{},[544,548,556],{"data":545,"marks":546,"value":547,"nodeType":248},{},[],"That timeline reinforces an argument we've been making about ",{"data":549,"content":551,"nodeType":347},{"uri":550},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/the-cisos-data-problem-and-how-browser-telemetry-can-help/",[552],{"data":553,"marks":554,"value":555,"nodeType":248},{},[],"where the intervention point needs to be",{"data":557,"marks":558,"value":559,"nodeType":248},{},[],": detecting credential compromise upstream — at the point of credential entry, session creation, or stolen credential reuse — rather than waiting for the ransomware deployment that follows weeks or months later.",{"data":561,"content":562,"nodeType":311},{},[563],{"data":564,"marks":565,"value":567,"nodeType":248},{},[566],{"type":261},"Post-compromise tradecraft is shifting",{"data":569,"content":570,"nodeType":249},{},[571,575,580],{"data":572,"marks":573,"value":574,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The DBIR's post-compromise data adds another dimension. RMM tool abuse by threat actors showed a ",{"data":576,"marks":577,"value":579,"nodeType":248},{},[578],{"type":261},"240% increase",{"data":581,"marks":582,"value":583,"nodeType":248},{},[]," over the prior year, while traditional backdoor and C2 malware usage fell 27%. Attackers are increasingly living off the land with the same remote access tools IT teams use. Post-compromise detection is getting harder, which makes catching the initial credential compromise upstream that much more valuable.",{"data":585,"content":586,"nodeType":253},{},[],{"data":588,"content":589,"nodeType":263},{},[590],{"data":591,"marks":592,"value":594,"nodeType":248},{},[593],{"type":261},"Your vendors are half the problem",{"data":596,"content":597,"nodeType":249},{},[598,602,607],{"data":599,"marks":600,"value":601,"nodeType":248},{},[],"Third-party involvement in breaches reached ",{"data":603,"marks":604,"value":606,"nodeType":248},{},[605],{"type":261},"48%",{"data":608,"marks":609,"value":610,"nodeType":248},{},[]," this year, up from 30% — a 60% increase that follows a prior year where the figure had already doubled.",{"data":612,"content":613,"nodeType":249},{},[614],{"data":615,"marks":616,"value":617,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The DBIR's root cause analysis maps directly to identity security: insecure authentication — absent MFA, improper credential rotation — and lack of least privilege enforcement account for a substantial share of cloud-based third-party incidents. Only 23% of third-party organizations fully remediated missing or improperly secured MFA on cloud accounts, and weak password and permission misconfigurations took a median of 8 months to resolve 50% of findings.",{"data":619,"content":620,"nodeType":249},{},[621],{"data":622,"marks":623,"value":624,"nodeType":248},{},[],"Eight months. That's the median timeline for third-party vendors to resolve the identity hygiene issues that create the attack surface in their environments — environments that your data lives in.",{"data":626,"content":627,"nodeType":249},{},[628,632,640],{"data":629,"marks":630,"value":631,"nodeType":248},{},[],"Extend that posture gap across every vendor and third-party integration, and you start to see why the third-party breach figure keeps climbing. Visibility into ",{"data":633,"content":635,"nodeType":347},{"uri":634},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/unpacking-the-vercel-breach/",[636],{"data":637,"marks":638,"value":639,"nodeType":248},{},[],"OAuth consent flows and third-party integration sprawl",{"data":641,"marks":642,"value":643,"nodeType":248},{},[]," is the starting point for getting ahead of a supply chain problem that is structurally getting worse.",{"data":645,"content":646,"nodeType":253},{},[],{"data":648,"content":649,"nodeType":263},{},[650],{"data":651,"marks":652,"value":654,"nodeType":248},{},[653],{"type":261},"AI is scaling known techniques — and creating new blind spots from the inside",{"data":656,"content":657,"nodeType":249},{},[658],{"data":659,"marks":660,"value":661,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The DBIR's AI analysis this year is grounded in a collaboration with Anthropic covering 793 threat actors who received enforcement action for violating acceptable use policy between March 2025 and February 2026. The findings are measured rather than alarmist: in the median case, actors sought AI assistance across about 15 distinct ATT&CK techniques, 44% of AI-assisted initial access was phishing-related, and less than 2.5% of techniques observed were classified as rare.",{"data":663,"content":664,"nodeType":249},{},[665],{"data":666,"marks":667,"value":668,"nodeType":248},{},[],"AI is currently an operational tool for attackers — automating and scaling known techniques rather than unlocking novel ones. Despite heavy AI-assisted focus on phishing, the DBIR's own incident dataset shows phishing as an initial access vector has barely changed year over year — suggesting AI may be uplifting less-experienced attackers to a higher baseline of lure quality without meaningfully increasing success rates against organizations that already have detection in place.",{"data":670,"content":671,"nodeType":249},{},[672],{"data":673,"marks":674,"value":675,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The more concerning number is the 32% of AI-assisted initial access targeting vulnerability exploitation — compounding the patching capacity crisis discussed earlier in a trend that was already accelerating before AI entered the picture.",{"data":677,"content":681,"nodeType":302},{"target":678},{"sys":679},{"id":680,"type":299,"linkType":300},"4bFTnVx1SXMQzZSaICCJOn",[],{"data":683,"content":684,"nodeType":311},{},[685],{"data":686,"marks":687,"value":689,"nodeType":248},{},[688],{"type":261},"Shadow AI is the bigger problem",{"data":691,"content":692,"nodeType":249},{},[693,697,702],{"data":694,"marks":695,"value":696,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The sharper AI risk for most organizations, though, is internal. Forty-five percent of employees are now regular AI users on corporate devices — up from 15%, a threefold increase — and ",{"data":698,"marks":699,"value":701,"nodeType":248},{},[700],{"type":261},"67% of them use non-corporate accounts",{"data":703,"marks":704,"value":705,"nodeType":248},{},[],". Shadow AI has become the third most common non-malicious insider action in DLP data, a fourfold increase over the prior year, with source code as the leading data type submitted to unauthorized AI platforms by a wide margin.",{"data":707,"content":708,"nodeType":249},{},[709],{"data":710,"marks":711,"value":712,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The browser extension angle is particularly relevant. More than 15% of users had unauthorized AI browser extensions installed, and the DBIR specifically notes that these extensions collect and retain browsing context from internal sites — creating a data exfiltration pathway that operates independently of traditional DLP controls.",{"data":714,"content":715,"nodeType":249},{},[716,720,728],{"data":717,"marks":718,"value":719,"nodeType":248},{},[],"This is moving faster than any previous shadow IT wave, and the data loss vector is the browser — where users interact with AI tools, where extensions collect context, and where OAuth consent grants connect AI services to corporate data. Visibility and control at that layer isn't a nice-to-have for AI governance; ",{"data":721,"content":723,"nodeType":347},{"uri":722},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/browser-extension-management-guide/",[724],{"data":725,"marks":726,"value":727,"nodeType":248},{},[],"it's the minimum viable starting point",{"data":729,"marks":730,"value":351,"nodeType":248},{},[],{"data":732,"content":733,"nodeType":253},{},[],{"data":735,"content":736,"nodeType":263},{},[737],{"data":738,"marks":739,"value":741,"nodeType":248},{},[740],{"type":261},"What this means for defenders",{"data":743,"content":744,"nodeType":249},{},[745],{"data":746,"marks":747,"value":748,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The DBIR's 2026 data paints a picture of converging pressures rather than shifting priorities. Vulnerability exploitation surged, but identity-related initial access is broadly stable and credential abuse at 39% across full breach chains remains the single most pervasive technique in the dataset. Phishing is arriving through channels that email gateways can't see. The infostealer-to-ransomware pipeline now has longitudinal data behind it. Third-party involvement keeps climbing because vendor identity hygiene takes months to remediate. And shadow AI is creating data exposure pathways that most security stacks weren't designed to see.",{"data":750,"content":751,"nodeType":249},{},[752],{"data":753,"marks":754,"value":755,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The common thread across all of these findings is that the browser — where credentials are entered, sessions are created, OAuth consent is granted, AI tools are accessed, and extensions collect data — is the layer where these risks converge and where defenders need visibility and control if they're going to address them at the point of risk rather than after the fact.",{"data":757,"content":758,"nodeType":249},{},[759],{"data":760,"marks":761,"value":762,"nodeType":248},{},[],"Push Security is the most powerful AI-native security tool in the browser. Think EDR, but for the browser — high-fidelity telemetry and real-time control across every session, on every device, with no browser migration required.",{"data":764,"content":765,"nodeType":249},{},[766],{"data":767,"marks":768,"value":769,"nodeType":248},{},[],"Security teams use Push to detect and stop advanced browser-based attacks like AiTM phishing, ClickFix, and session hijacking; gain visibility and control over AI tool usage across their workforce; harden identities by surfacing credential reuse, SSO gaps, and shadow IT; and support data loss and insider investigations with browser-layer telemetry that other tools can't see.",{"data":771,"content":772,"nodeType":249},{},[773,776,786],{"data":774,"marks":775,"value":29,"nodeType":248},{},[],{"data":777,"content":779,"nodeType":347},{"uri":778},"https://pushsecurity.com/demo",[780],{"data":781,"marks":782,"value":785,"nodeType":248},{},[783],{"type":784},"underline","Book a live demo to learn more.",{"data":787,"marks":788,"value":29,"nodeType":248},{},[],"document",{"entries":791},{"hyperlink":792,"inline":793,"block":794},[],[],[795,803,830,838,852,857,864],{"sys":796,"__typename":797,"title":798,"caption":798,"layoutMode":62,"file":799},{"id":298},"Image","DBIR Figure 10 (p.15) — Initial access vectors, select enumerations",{"url":800,"width":801,"height":802},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/18rPvZ4Sw11UCHE7MxzXkd/17d059302242b4034686b13ee3044c8e/image4.png",1999,1521,{"sys":804,"__typename":805,"content":806,"name":829,"title":62},{"id":330},"InsightTextBlockComponent",{"json":807},{"nodeType":789,"data":808,"content":809},{},[810],{"nodeType":249,"data":811,"content":812},{},[813,817,825],{"nodeType":248,"value":814,"marks":815,"data":816},"Some of the ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":818,"content":820},{"uri":819},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/analyzing-the-instructure-breach",[821],{"nodeType":248,"value":822,"marks":823,"data":824},"most consequential identity-based campaigns of the past 12 months",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":826,"marks":827,"data":828}," don't map cleanly to any of these categories — the mass Salesforce campaign that compromised over 1,000 organizations via device code phishing, the Anodot breach chain that pivoted through stored OAuth tokens to reach Snowflake customers, ConsentFix abusing Azure CLI's OAuth flow to bypass MFA entirely.",[],{},"DBIR 2026 IB1",{"sys":831,"__typename":797,"title":832,"caption":833,"layoutMode":62,"file":834},{"id":356},"Browser & Identity Attacks Matrix","Browser and identity-based techniques have exploded since we first launched our attack matrix",{"url":835,"width":836,"height":837},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/L0Yc77y9vzrKVD72BQGX2/4ffe0bf61bd62f025262b8efd74394b7/Browser___Identity_Attacks_Matrix__1_.png",6160,4432,{"sys":839,"__typename":805,"content":840,"name":851,"title":62},{"id":444},{"json":841},{"data":842,"content":843,"nodeType":789},{},[844],{"data":845,"content":846,"nodeType":249},{},[847],{"data":848,"marks":849,"value":850,"nodeType":248},{},[],"The data is a little confusing. The DBIR draws a line between Phishing (asynchronous — send a message and hope for a click) and Pretexting (synchronous — someone interacting with you in real time). Voice phishing over a phone call is Pretexting in VERIS, not Phishing, even though most practitioners would call it phishing. Browser-based credential harvesting delivered via SEO poisoning or malicious downloads falls under \"Baiting.\" So the 16% phishing figure probably understates the full scope of credential-harvesting social engineering as most defenders would define it.","DBIR IB2",{"sys":853,"__typename":797,"title":854,"caption":854,"layoutMode":62,"file":855},{"id":469},"DBIR Figure 54 (p.49) — Median percentage of email attack types by month",{"url":856,"width":801,"height":802},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/4eWtJSz2QhM6QgXXjNuBNs/e6a33a088b7b0fb0dd1649c5d9164b53/image1.png",{"sys":858,"__typename":797,"title":859,"caption":859,"layoutMode":62,"file":860},{"id":532},"DBIR Figure 48 (p.45) — Credential leakage events prior to ransomware",{"url":861,"width":862,"height":863},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/26NpMQ31lpHgp5x8FrDumz/f022f1ede66b171dd756d28009a7d4a5/image2.png",1772,776,{"sys":865,"__typename":797,"title":866,"caption":866,"layoutMode":62,"file":867},{"id":680},"DBIR Figure 65 (p.60) — Select data types in DLP events targeting generative AI tools",{"url":868,"width":801,"height":802},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/584Txvap6FW9GlFlin9GwB/f5f5488251d9faee7fedc3030d2390b1/image5.png","json",{"items":871},[],{},"What the Verizon DBIR tells us about breaches in 2026","2026-05-20T00:00:00.000Z",{"items":876},[877,1483,2480],{"__typename":878,"sys":879,"content":881,"title":1461,"synopsis":1462,"hashTags":62,"publishedDate":1463,"slug":1464,"tagsCollection":1465,"authorsCollection":1475},"BlogPosts",{"id":880},"217s8zu5idSdX25TUgbPQ1",{"json":882},{"nodeType":789,"data":883,"content":884},{},[885,904,911,918,924,927,935,951,958,964,971,1056,1063,1069,1076,1082,1085,1093,1105,1112,1124,1127,1135,1151,1158,1165,1168,1176,1183,1199,1205,1221,1228,1235,1242,1258,1265,1268,1276,1283,1299,1306,1309,1317,1333,1340,1360,1372,1375,1383,1399,1406,1413,1420,1427,1430,1437,1443],{"nodeType":249,"data":886,"content":887},{},[888,892,900],{"nodeType":248,"value":889,"marks":890,"data":891},"The ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":893,"content":895},{"uri":894},"https://research.esg-global.com/reportaction/515202191/Marketing",[896],{"nodeType":248,"value":897,"marks":898,"data":899},"Omdia Browser Management and Security report",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":901,"marks":902,"data":903},", based on a survey of 400 IT and security professionals across North America fielded in late 2025, is the most comprehensive industry data to date on how organizations are experiencing, prioritizing, and investing in the secure enterprise browser (SEB) market. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":905,"content":906},{},[907],{"nodeType":248,"value":908,"marks":909,"data":910},"For us at Push, it externally validates what we've known to be true for some time — the browser is where work happens, where attacks land, and where defenders need to be if they want to detect and stop threats before damage is done.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":912,"content":913},{},[914],{"nodeType":248,"value":915,"marks":916,"data":917},"We pulled out seven findings that matter most for security teams evaluating their approach.",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":919,"content":923},{"target":920},{"sys":921},{"id":922,"type":299,"linkType":300},"4aM879egIFYmDvOhzyNI9A",[],{"nodeType":253,"data":925,"content":926},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":928,"content":929},{},[930],{"nodeType":248,"value":931,"marks":932,"data":934},"1. The attacks driving concern are the ones happening inside the browser session",[933],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":936,"content":937},{},[938,942,947],{"nodeType":248,"value":939,"marks":940,"data":941},"The threat picture is driving everything else in this report, so it's the right place to start. ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":943,"marks":944,"data":946},"49% of organizations suffered a successful browser-based attack in the last 12 months.",[945],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":948,"marks":949,"data":950}," Among those affected, browser-originated incidents account for roughly 37% of all security incidents — and 68% say that share has grown over the past two years. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":952,"content":953},{},[954],{"nodeType":248,"value":955,"marks":956,"data":957},"The browser is not an emerging threat vector. It’s worth noting here that these numbers are also likely lower than the reality, since many are only identified later in the kill chain. Without browser-level telemetry they can be difficult to trace back their source — which in the vast majority of cases, even for malware-driven attacks, is the browser. ",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":959,"content":963},{"target":960},{"sys":961},{"id":962,"type":299,"linkType":300},"6Kcz8oILKVHmhQIo5Du6V",[],{"nodeType":249,"data":965,"content":966},{},[967],{"nodeType":248,"value":968,"marks":969,"data":970},"What stands out is that every one of the top attack categories plays out inside the browser session itself — not against the browser as a piece of software, but within the sessions where users interact with applications:",[],{},{"nodeType":972,"data":973,"content":974},"unordered-list",{},[975,986,996,1006,1016,1026,1036,1046],{"nodeType":976,"data":977,"content":978},"list-item",{},[979],{"nodeType":249,"data":980,"content":981},{},[982],{"nodeType":248,"value":983,"marks":984,"data":985},"Phishing (40%)",[],{},{"nodeType":976,"data":987,"content":988},{},[989],{"nodeType":249,"data":990,"content":991},{},[992],{"nodeType":248,"value":993,"marks":994,"data":995},"Data loss or leakage (38%)",[],{},{"nodeType":976,"data":997,"content":998},{},[999],{"nodeType":249,"data":1000,"content":1001},{},[1002],{"nodeType":248,"value":1003,"marks":1004,"data":1005},"Malicious browser extensions (34%)",[],{},{"nodeType":976,"data":1007,"content":1008},{},[1009],{"nodeType":249,"data":1010,"content":1011},{},[1012],{"nodeType":248,"value":1013,"marks":1014,"data":1015},"Vulnerable browser extensions (33%)",[],{},{"nodeType":976,"data":1017,"content":1018},{},[1019],{"nodeType":249,"data":1020,"content":1021},{},[1022],{"nodeType":248,"value":1023,"marks":1024,"data":1025},"Malicious scripts (31%)",[],{},{"nodeType":976,"data":1027,"content":1028},{},[1029],{"nodeType":249,"data":1030,"content":1031},{},[1032],{"nodeType":248,"value":1033,"marks":1034,"data":1035},"Credential theft via browser (28%)",[],{},{"nodeType":976,"data":1037,"content":1038},{},[1039],{"nodeType":249,"data":1040,"content":1041},{},[1042],{"nodeType":248,"value":1043,"marks":1044,"data":1045},"Cookie theft (22%)",[],{},{"nodeType":976,"data":1047,"content":1048},{},[1049],{"nodeType":249,"data":1050,"content":1051},{},[1052],{"nodeType":248,"value":1053,"marks":1054,"data":1055},"AiTM attacks (17%)",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1057,"content":1058},{},[1059],{"nodeType":248,"value":1060,"marks":1061,"data":1062},"Phishing, credential theft, cookie theft, and AiTM are attacks that target the user's interaction with a web page — the credential entry, the session creation, the token exchange. Malicious and vulnerable extensions are supply chain risks that operate inside the browser's own execution environment. Data loss happens through the browser when employees upload files, paste data into AI tools, or share information with unsanctioned applications. ",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":1064,"content":1068},{"target":1065},{"sys":1066},{"id":1067,"type":299,"linkType":300},"5Kw2kSrL8u4VyslxK8HCtR",[],{"nodeType":249,"data":1070,"content":1071},{},[1072],{"nodeType":248,"value":1073,"marks":1074,"data":1075},"None of these are attacks where network-layer traffic inspection, endpoint monitoring, or email scanning provides complete coverage, because the attack surface is the browser session itself.",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":1077,"content":1081},{"target":1078},{"sys":1079},{"id":1080,"type":299,"linkType":300},"5kI5h4Z31ByD73er7voayF",[],{"nodeType":253,"data":1083,"content":1084},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":1086,"content":1087},{},[1088],{"nodeType":248,"value":1089,"marks":1090,"data":1092},"2. Browser security is now a board-level priority",[1091],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1094,"content":1095},{},[1096,1101],{"nodeType":248,"value":1097,"marks":1098,"data":1100},"88% of respondents rank browser security as at least a top-five security priority",[1099],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1102,"marks":1103,"data":1104},", with more than a quarter (26%) calling it their single top priority. For context, this is a survey that covers the full spectrum of security concerns — cloud, supply chain, AI, insider risk — and browser security has risen above most of them.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1106,"content":1107},{},[1108],{"nodeType":248,"value":1109,"marks":1110,"data":1111},"This is not aspirational interest. The correlation between priority level and investment is sharp: among those who rank browser security as their top priority, 72% have significantly increased their investment due to emerging threats. Among those who rank it in their top five, that figure is 26%. The organizations that care most are spending the most.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1113,"content":1114},{},[1115,1120],{"nodeType":248,"value":1116,"marks":1117,"data":1119},"86% of respondents have increased their browser security investment in response to emerging threats",[1118],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1121,"marks":1122,"data":1123},", with 36% saying the increase was significant. When you ask what's driving that spend, the answer is the threat landscape: the attacks cataloged in the previous section are the reason budgets are moving.",[],{},{"nodeType":253,"data":1125,"content":1126},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":1128,"content":1129},{},[1130],{"nodeType":248,"value":1131,"marks":1132,"data":1134},"3. Real budget is being allocated — and it's growing",[1133],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1136,"content":1137},{},[1138,1142,1147],{"nodeType":248,"value":1139,"marks":1140,"data":1141},"Secure enterprise browser solutions already take up ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1143,"marks":1144,"data":1146},"12.6% of the average security budget",[1145],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1148,"marks":1149,"data":1150}," — a substantial allocation for a category that didn't exist as a standalone line item a few years ago. And 85% of respondents expect to increase that spend over the next 12–24 months, with a quarter expecting significant increases.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1152,"content":1153},{},[1154],{"nodeType":248,"value":1155,"marks":1156,"data":1157},"Where the money comes from tells its own story. The most common funding model is a discrete line item within security program budgets (31%) or a dedicated secure browsing budget (30%). When organizations pull from an existing program budget, web security (26%) and endpoint security (21%) are the most common sources — while SASE/SSE accounts for just 9%, despite SASE vendors being the second most popular vendor category. That disconnect between vendor preference and budget origin suggests the SASE-bundled buying motion may be more aspirational than operational.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1159,"content":1160},{},[1161],{"nodeType":248,"value":1162,"marks":1163,"data":1164},"IT operations leadership is the top stakeholder in 82% of evaluations, with CISO and security leadership at 64% and CIOs at 42%. Day-to-day management sits primarily with IT Ops (77%) and SecOps (50%). This dual stakeholder picture — IT operations driving evaluation, security leadership providing strategic direction — shapes the competitive landscape in ways we'll come back to.",[],{},{"nodeType":253,"data":1166,"content":1167},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":1169,"content":1170},{},[1171],{"nodeType":248,"value":1172,"marks":1173,"data":1175},"4. AI is accelerating both the threat and the use case",[1174],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1177,"content":1178},{},[1179],{"nodeType":248,"value":1180,"marks":1181,"data":1182},"AI shows up in this report from two directions, mirroring how it is reshaping the security landscape itself.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1184,"content":1185},{},[1186,1190,1195],{"nodeType":248,"value":1187,"marks":1188,"data":1189},"On the threat side, ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1191,"marks":1192,"data":1194},"AI-powered targeted phishing and social engineering is the top emerging concern",[1193],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1196,"marks":1197,"data":1198},", cited by 75% of respondents as either very concerning or concerning. Data leakage via unsanctioned AI applications comes second at 71%, followed by deepfake/AI-generated malicious content at 69% and credential harvesting via fake AI or SaaS login pages at 66%. Every one of these threat categories involves the browser — AI-enhanced phishing lands in the browser, AI data leakage happens through browser-based AI tools, and fake AI login pages are browser-based credential harvesting.",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":1200,"content":1204},{"target":1201},{"sys":1202},{"id":1203,"type":299,"linkType":300},"2ajv2i5wn2GzKuyynQGlvq",[],{"nodeType":249,"data":1206,"content":1207},{},[1208,1212,1217],{"nodeType":248,"value":1209,"marks":1210,"data":1211},"On the adoption side, the picture is almost universal — and almost universally under-governed. ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1213,"marks":1214,"data":1216},"92% of organizations now allow employees to use public GenAI applications",[1215],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1218,"marks":1219,"data":1220},", and virtually every organization has some kind of policy position: 37% have sanctioned one public app (with everything else unsanctioned), 39% have sanctioned multiple public apps (with others unsanctioned), and 23% restrict employees to a corporate instance while the public versions are unsanctioned. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1222,"content":1223},{},[1224],{"nodeType":248,"value":1225,"marks":1226,"data":1227},"Even the 8% who don't allow GenAI at all have taken a policy position. Essentially 100% of organizations have a GenAI policy — but for the vast majority, that policy designates a large portion of public AI tool usage as unsanctioned, which raises the immediate question of whether they have the tooling to actually enforce it.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1229,"content":1230},{},[1231],{"nodeType":248,"value":1232,"marks":1233,"data":1234},"The answer, based on the current tooling landscape, appears to be: not quite. When Omdia asked how organizations currently secure GenAI usage, 58% rely on secure web gateways — tools that see traffic metadata but cannot observe what a user actually does inside a GenAI session — while 57% use secure browsing solutions and 57% use SaaS security solutions. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1236,"content":1237},{},[1238],{"nodeType":248,"value":1239,"marks":1240,"data":1241},"An SWG can tell you that a user visited ChatGPT, but it cannot tell you whether they pasted your company's source code into the prompt. That distinction — between knowing where data went and knowing what the user actually did — is the fundamental gap that browser-layer visibility exists to close, and it is exactly the gap that makes GenAI policies unenforceable without browser-layer tooling.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1243,"content":1244},{},[1245,1249,1254],{"nodeType":248,"value":1246,"marks":1247,"data":1248},"The use case data reflects this. When Omdia asked about the most important use cases for a secure browsing solution, ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1250,"marks":1251,"data":1253},"generative AI application security came in first at 59%",[1252],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1255,"marks":1256,"data":1257},", followed by data loss prevention at 51% and general web security enhancement at 42%. The feature priorities tell a consistent story: AI-powered threat detection and response (52%) and advanced GenAI usage controls and monitoring (41%) were the top two capabilities organizations said would be most important in a purchase decision. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1259,"content":1260},{},[1261],{"nodeType":248,"value":1262,"marks":1263,"data":1264},"AI is both the top threat concern and the top use case for browser security — and it is a browser problem at both ends, because every LLM interaction, every prompt containing sensitive data, and every AI agent authorization happens inside a browser session.",[],{},{"nodeType":253,"data":1266,"content":1267},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":1269,"content":1270},{},[1271],{"nodeType":248,"value":1272,"marks":1273,"data":1275},"5. Organizations that have deployed secure enterprise browser solutions are seeing real results",[1274],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1277,"content":1278},{},[1279],{"nodeType":248,"value":1280,"marks":1281,"data":1282},"One of the most useful sections in Omdia's report is the benefits data — what organizations that have deployed SEB solutions are actually getting out of them.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1284,"content":1285},{},[1286,1290,1295],{"nodeType":248,"value":1287,"marks":1288,"data":1289},"The top realized benefit is ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1291,"marks":1292,"data":1294},"improved data security, cited by 58% of respondents",[1293],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1296,"marks":1297,"data":1298},", followed by fewer security incidents (49%), better visibility and auditing (47%), improved user experience (44%), and simplified configuration and policy management (41%). The picture that emerges is not just a security story but an operational one: organizations are seeing fewer incidents, better visibility, and simpler management alongside the security outcomes.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1300,"content":1301},{},[1302],{"nodeType":248,"value":1303,"marks":1304,"data":1305},"The 49% who cite fewer security incidents as a realized benefit is the number that matters most here, because it directly connects SEB deployment to measurable risk reduction. Organizations aren't just buying tools and hoping — they're deploying them and seeing fewer successful attacks as a result.",[],{},{"nodeType":253,"data":1307,"content":1308},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":1310,"content":1311},{},[1312],{"nodeType":248,"value":1313,"marks":1314,"data":1316},"6. The market wants protection in existing browsers, not migration",[1315],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1318,"content":1319},{},[1320,1324,1329],{"nodeType":248,"value":1321,"marks":1322,"data":1323},"When Omdia asked what attributes matter most in a secure enterprise browser solution, ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1325,"marks":1326,"data":1328},"\"ability to use existing browsers\" ranked as the fourth most important attribute at 48%",[1327],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1330,"marks":1331,"data":1332}," — behind only integration with other security tools (57%), controls over generative AI application usage (53%), and centralized policy enforcement (52%). ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1334,"content":1335},{},[1336],{"nodeType":248,"value":1337,"marks":1338,"data":1339},"That 48% figure, combined with 80% of respondents saying they expect to use an SEB solution as an integrated or alongside component rather than a replacement for existing tools, points to a clear market preference: organizations want browser security that works with their existing browser estate, not a migration to a new one.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1341,"content":1342},{},[1343,1347,1356],{"nodeType":248,"value":1344,"marks":1345,"data":1346},"This is consistent with what we hear from security leaders directly. As ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1348,"content":1350},{"uri":1349},"https://pushsecurity.com/customer-stories",[1351],{"nodeType":248,"value":1352,"marks":1353,"data":1355},"Josh Lemos put it: ",[1354],{"type":784},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1357,"marks":1358,"data":1359},"\"We looked at the full-stack enterprise browser approach, but converging on a single platform was tough. Push gave me the security instrumentation and context I needed without onerous headwinds.\" The deployment model matters because it determines adoption velocity — and a tool that requires browser migration introduces friction that delays time to value.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1361,"content":1362},{},[1363,1367],{"nodeType":248,"value":1364,"marks":1365,"data":1366},"Push was built around this insight from day one. As the secure enterprise browser extension for security teams, Push turns any browser — managed or unmanaged, including agentic browsers — into a telemetry source and control point the moment it's installed. It has been rolled out to 100,000 users in under an hour during normal office hours with zero downtime. ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1368,"marks":1369,"data":1371},"That is a deployment model that matches what Omdia's respondents are asking for.",[1370],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":253,"data":1373,"content":1374},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":1376,"content":1377},{},[1378],{"nodeType":248,"value":1379,"marks":1380,"data":1382},"7. Dedicated vendors lead over platform plays",[1381],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1384,"content":1385},{},[1386,1390,1395],{"nodeType":248,"value":1387,"marks":1388,"data":1389},"When Omdia asked which category of vendor organizations primarily use or expect to use for secure enterprise browsing, ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1391,"marks":1392,"data":1394},"36% chose a dedicated SEB vendor",[1393],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1396,"marks":1397,"data":1398}," — the largest single category. SASE/network security vendors came second at 29%, followed by traditional VDI/desktop virtualization vendors at 19% and endpoint platform vendors at 15%.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1400,"content":1401},{},[1402],{"nodeType":248,"value":1403,"marks":1404,"data":1405},"The dedicated category leads, and the reason isn't just first-mover advantage — it's architectural. The alternative paths each come with structural constraints. SASE and SSE platforms are network-centric: they see traffic metadata and enforce URL categorization, but they can't observe the rendered page inside a browser tab — the DOM structure, the script behavior, the credential entry that distinguishes a legitimate login from an AiTM reverse-proxy kit. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1407,"content":1408},{},[1409],{"nodeType":248,"value":1410,"marks":1411,"data":1412},"Endpoint platforms that bolt on browser visibility are still anchored to the OS layer, solving for browser exploit prevention rather than in-session behavioral detection of the attacks that actually dominate — phishing, credential theft, session hijacking, extension compromise. And when large platform vendors acquire browser security capabilities, the integration work takes years rather than months, during which detection depth sits in a transitional state. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1414,"content":1415},{},[1416],{"nodeType":248,"value":1417,"marks":1418,"data":1419},"Dedicated browser-native vendors start from a different premise entirely: the browser isn't a supplementary signal feeding into someone else's SASE pipeline or XDR correlation engine — it is the telemetry source and the control point. The browser is the only place where you get simultaneous visibility into both the attacker's technique and the employee's action within the same session, because the phishing page, the credential submission, the token exchange, and the data exfiltration all happen inside the same tab. No network appliance, endpoint agent, or identity provider log can see all of that, because none of them are present where the interaction occurs.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1421,"content":1422},{},[1423],{"nodeType":248,"value":1424,"marks":1425,"data":1426},"For security teams evaluating SEB solutions, the architecture matters more than the vendor category label. The capabilities Omdia's respondents ranked highest — integration with existing tools, GenAI controls, centralized policy enforcement, and the ability to use existing browsers — all point toward solutions that deliver detection depth through a lightweight deployment model, without browser migration and without the integration debt of a platform acquisition.",[],{},{"nodeType":253,"data":1428,"content":1429},{},[],{"nodeType":249,"data":1431,"content":1432},{},[1433],{"nodeType":248,"value":1434,"marks":1435,"data":1436},"Push Security is the most powerful AI-native security tool in the browser. Think EDR, but for the browser — high-fidelity telemetry and real-time control across every session, on every device, with no browser migration required. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1438,"content":1439},{},[1440],{"nodeType":248,"value":769,"marks":1441,"data":1442},[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1444,"content":1445},{},[1446,1449,1457],{"nodeType":248,"value":29,"marks":1447,"data":1448},[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1450,"content":1451},{"uri":778},[1452],{"nodeType":248,"value":1453,"marks":1454,"data":1456},"Book a live demo",[1455],{"type":784},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1458,"marks":1459,"data":1460}," to learn more.",[],{},"7 things Omdia's latest report tells us about the secure enterprise browser market","Unpacking the latest research report from Omdia and what it means for the secure enterprise browser market.","2026-05-13T00:00:00.000Z","7-things-omdias-latest-report-tells-us-about-the-secure-enterprise-browser-market",{"items":1466},[1467,1471],{"sys":1468,"name":1470},{"id":1469},"3pjES4THCIfSAwhGdNwBcy","Browser security",{"sys":1472,"name":1474},{"id":1473},"1gZi8NrRy2v9OqPV7C4dwD","Risk management",{"items":1476},[1477],{"fullName":1478,"firstName":1479,"jobTitle":1480,"profilePicture":1481},"Dan Green","Dan","Threat Research",{"url":1482},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/7jik1VhFgA3kgzXBXTm2Vw/fcd8c171da644903d0827eafcfbcaad0/Dan_Headshot_2025.png",{"__typename":878,"sys":1484,"content":1486,"title":2462,"synopsis":2463,"hashTags":62,"publishedDate":2464,"slug":2465,"tagsCollection":2466,"authorsCollection":2476},{"id":1485},"3jF1fypt08TNlSoWuoMWhj",{"json":1487},{"nodeType":789,"data":1488,"content":1489},{},[1490,1518,1549,1592,1635,1641,1653,1656,1664,1717,1724,1747,1753,1756,1764,1793,1800,1808,1814,1817,1825,1832,1850,1857,1899,1906,1909,1917,1936,1991,1994,2002,2021,2040,2048,2055,2067,2079,2091,2103,2120,2128,2135,2138,2145,2151,2167,2170,2178,2196,2456],{"nodeType":249,"data":1491,"content":1492},{},[1493,1497,1505,1509,1514],{"nodeType":248,"value":1494,"marks":1495,"data":1496},"ShinyHunters and the broader SLH (",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1498,"content":1500},{"uri":1499},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/scattered-lapsus-hunters/",[1501],{"nodeType":248,"value":1502,"marks":1503,"data":1504},"Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1506,"marks":1507,"data":1508},") collective have claimed breaches at thousands of organizations over the past twelve months across retail, technology, aviation, financial services, media, gaming, and education, in what amounts to the most sustained data theft and extortion operation in recent cybercrime history. SLH's genealogy traces through a merger of Scattered Spider, Lapsus$, and ShinyHunters, all parts of ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1510,"marks":1511,"data":1513},"the Com",[1512],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1515,"marks":1516,"data":1517},", a broader community of English-speaking cybercriminals with international links. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1519,"content":1520},{},[1521,1525,1533,1537,1545],{"nodeType":248,"value":1522,"marks":1523,"data":1524},"The confirmed victim list reads like a Fortune 500 directory: Coca-Cola, Cisco, Qantas, Coinbase, ADT, Aflac, SoundCloud, Rockstar Games, Charter Communications, and recently ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1526,"content":1528},{"uri":1527},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/instructure-confirms-data-breach-shinyhunters-claims-attack/",[1529],{"nodeType":248,"value":1530,"marks":1531,"data":1532},"Instructure",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1534,"marks":1535,"data":1536}," — whose breach ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1538,"content":1540},{"uri":1539},"https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/05/canvas-breach-disrupts-schools-colleges-nationwide/",[1541],{"nodeType":248,"value":1542,"marks":1543,"data":1544},"disrupted schools and universities nationwide",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1546,"marks":1547,"data":1548}," during final exams — among dozens more named publicly and likely many more that haven't been (breaches settled quickly behind closed doors don't always make it into the public eye). ShinyHunters alone claimed over 1.5 billion stolen Salesforce records from a single campaign targeting more than 1,000 organizations.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1550,"content":1551},{},[1552,1556,1564,1568,1576,1580,1588],{"nodeType":248,"value":1553,"marks":1554,"data":1555},"Additional operating clusters, including Cordial Spider and Snarky Spider (which CrowdStrike ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1557,"content":1559},{"uri":1558},"https://cyberscoop.com/crowdstrike-cordial-spider-snarky-spider-extortion-attacks/",[1560],{"nodeType":248,"value":1561,"marks":1562,"data":1563},"characterizes as the new generation of Scattered Spider",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1565,"marks":1566,"data":1567},") run parallel campaigns against different target sectors, unified not by shared infrastructure but by a shared playbook of techniques that exploit the structural weakness in modern SaaS-first organizations. ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1569,"content":1571},{"uri":1570},"https://github.com/PaloAltoNetworks/Unit42-timely-threat-intel/blob/main/2026-03-12-Vishing-Campaigns-Lead-to-Data-Theft-and-Extortion.txt",[1572],{"nodeType":248,"value":1573,"marks":1574,"data":1575},"Unit 42 documented",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1577,"marks":1578,"data":1579}," these groups moving from initial compromise to complete data exfiltration in under an hour — faster than most organizations can even begin to respond. Newer groups with links to the SLH ecosystem like CoinbaseCartel have also continued the tradition of weaponizing stolen credentials from the infostealer economy at scale, as ShinyHunters did in the ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1581,"content":1583},{"uri":1582},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/shinyhunters-claims-15-billion-salesforce-records-stolen-in-drift-hacks/",[1584],{"nodeType":248,"value":1585,"marks":1586,"data":1587},"2024 Snowflake breach",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1589,"marks":1590,"data":1591}," that compromised over 165 customer environments (and claimed another billion-plus records).",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1593,"content":1594},{},[1595,1599,1607,1611,1619,1623,1631],{"nodeType":248,"value":1596,"marks":1597,"data":1598},"Not every SLH breach is browser-based — the Instructure breach (275 million individuals, ~330 school login portals defaced) began with a Salesforce tenant compromise in September 2025, but resurfaced in May 2026 after attackers exploited a ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1600,"content":1602},{"uri":1601},"https://www.bitdefender.com/en-gb/blog/businessinsights/technical-advisory-shinyhunters-breach-instructure-canvas-lms",[1603],{"nodeType":248,"value":1604,"marks":1605,"data":1606},"vulnerability affecting Canvas's Free-For-Teacher program",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1608,"marks":1609,"data":1610}," (it's now been confirmed that Instructure \"",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1612,"content":1614},{"uri":1613},"https://www.instructure.com/incident_update",[1615],{"nodeType":248,"value":1616,"marks":1617,"data":1618},"reached a settlement",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1620,"marks":1621,"data":1622},"\" for the deletion of the data, and shut down the free account tier), while the Coinbase breach cost ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1624,"content":1626},{"uri":1625},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coinbase-discloses-breach-faces-up-to-400-million-in-losses/",[1627],{"nodeType":248,"value":1628,"marks":1629,"data":1630},"$180M–400M through insider bribery",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1632,"marks":1633,"data":1634}," — but these are the exceptions that prove the rule. ",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":1636,"content":1640},{"target":1637},{"sys":1638},{"id":1639,"type":299,"linkType":300},"4qNrbDyMJIumQfdbh9YVkU",[],{"nodeType":249,"data":1642,"content":1643},{},[1644,1649],{"nodeType":248,"value":1645,"marks":1646,"data":1648},"The vast majority of SLH campaigns over the past year converge on three browser-based attack vectors: vishing combined with AiTM phishing, device code phishing exploiting account authorization flows, and OAuth supply chain attacks through compromised third-party integrators.",[1647],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1650,"marks":1651,"data":1652}," Each is well-documented, each has produced confirmed victims at scale, and each is detectable or preventable through browser-layer security controls.",[],{},{"nodeType":253,"data":1654,"content":1655},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":1657,"content":1658},{},[1659],{"nodeType":248,"value":1660,"marks":1661,"data":1663},"Vector 1: Vishing combined with AiTM phishing",[1662],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1665,"content":1666},{},[1667,1671,1679,1683,1691,1695,1702,1706,1714],{"nodeType":248,"value":1668,"marks":1669,"data":1670},"The most visible campaign right now pairs targeted voice calls with adversary-in-the-middle phishing pages — an approach that ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1672,"content":1674},{"uri":1673},"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/expansion-shinyhunters-saas-data-theft",[1675],{"nodeType":248,"value":1676,"marks":1677,"data":1678},"Mandiant",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1680,"marks":1681,"data":1682},",",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1684,"content":1686},{"uri":1685},"https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/defending-against-cordial-spider-and-snarky-spider-with-falcon-shield/",[1687],{"nodeType":248,"value":1688,"marks":1689,"data":1690}," CrowdStrike",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1692,"marks":1693,"data":1694},", and",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1696,"content":1697},{"uri":1570},[1698],{"nodeType":248,"value":1699,"marks":1700,"data":1701}," Unit 42",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1703,"marks":1704,"data":1705}," have all documented from the incident response side, and which Push has ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1707,"content":1709},{"uri":1708},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/inside-criminal-phishing-panel/",[1710],{"nodeType":248,"value":1711,"marks":1712,"data":1713},"documented from inside the attacker's own operator panels",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":351,"marks":1715,"data":1716},[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1718,"content":1719},{},[1720],{"nodeType":248,"value":1721,"marks":1722,"data":1723},"An attacker impersonating IT support calls the target employee, establishes urgency — often citing a \"mandatory passkey rollout\" or a \"security compliance update\" — and directs them to a victim-branded AiTM phishing page (typically at a domain like \u003Ccompany>sso.com or \u003Ccompany>internal.com). The attack is processed by a live human in real time, relaying credentials and MFA codes to the legitimate identity provider as they are entered, capturing the resulting session token, and granting the attacker an authenticated session. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1725,"content":1726},{},[1727,1731,1738,1742],{"nodeType":248,"value":1728,"marks":1729,"data":1730},"One of the reasons that this method is becoming so widespread is the commoditization of effective tools. Push's ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1732,"content":1733},{"uri":1708},[1734],{"nodeType":248,"value":1735,"marks":1736,"data":1737},"infiltration of the criminal phishing panels",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1739,"marks":1740,"data":1741}," identified over 400 linked domains across four distinct infrastructure clusters. ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1743,"marks":1744,"data":1746},"This mirrors the pattern that turned AiTM phishing from a specialist capability into an industrialized market with competing PhaaS platforms, but with the added complication that voice phishing as the delivery vector makes the attack invisible to traditional anti-phishing controls at the email layer.",[1745],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":302,"data":1748,"content":1752},{"target":1749},{"sys":1750},{"id":1751,"type":299,"linkType":300},"1Yhthl0PILGW7EmCcZUrNv",[],{"nodeType":253,"data":1754,"content":1755},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":1757,"content":1758},{},[1759],{"nodeType":248,"value":1760,"marks":1761,"data":1763},"Vector 2: Vishing combined with device code phishing",[1762],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1765,"content":1766},{},[1767,1770,1778,1782,1789],{"nodeType":248,"value":889,"marks":1768,"data":1769},[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1771,"content":1773},{"uri":1772},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/unpacking-the-latest-slh-campaign/",[1774],{"nodeType":248,"value":1775,"marks":1776,"data":1777},"ShinyHunters Salesforce campaign",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1779,"marks":1780,"data":1781}," that ran through 2025 and into 2026 used device code phishing as one of its core methods, ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1783,"content":1784},{"uri":1582},[1785],{"nodeType":248,"value":1786,"marks":1787,"data":1788},"compromising over 1,000 organizations and claiming 1.5 billion stolen records",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1790,"marks":1791,"data":1792}," — including an attempted extortion of Salesforce itself. The attack involved registering an attacker-controlled \"DataLoader\" application mimicking a legitimate Salesforce tool, configuring it to request broad OAuth scopes including full API access and refresh token generation, and guiding victims through the device authorization flow via vishing calls.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1794,"content":1795},{},[1796],{"nodeType":248,"value":1797,"marks":1798,"data":1799},"Device code phishing exploits the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant — a flow designed for devices without browsers, like smart TVs, but used in a wide range of scenarios including CLI logins — by tricking users into entering a code on Microsoft's (or another identity provider's) legitimate verification page. Since the victim is usually signed into the app in their browser, there’s no login at all. They simply navigate to the app’s device code login page and enter an attacker-provided code to grant the attacker an access token. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1801,"content":1802},{},[1803],{"nodeType":248,"value":1804,"marks":1805,"data":1807},"This is what makes device code phishing structurally different from AiTM: it defeats all MFA (including passkeys) because the attack doesn’t target the login, but the authorization layer instead.",[1806],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":302,"data":1809,"content":1813},{"target":1810},{"sys":1811},{"id":1812,"type":299,"linkType":300},"3ElQz8sLATnR8RY5nVlBGM",[],{"nodeType":253,"data":1815,"content":1816},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":1818,"content":1819},{},[1820],{"nodeType":248,"value":1821,"marks":1822,"data":1824},"Vector 3: OAuth supply chain attacks through compromised integrators",[1823],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1826,"content":1827},{},[1828],{"nodeType":248,"value":1829,"marks":1830,"data":1831},"The third vector does not require the attacker to phish the victim organization's employees at all. Instead, it exploits the OAuth trust relationships that organizations create when they connect third-party SaaS vendors into their environments — and the consequence is that every organization that authorized one of these integrations effectively extended its security boundary to include the vendor's own security posture.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1833,"content":1834},{},[1835,1838,1846],{"nodeType":248,"value":889,"marks":1836,"data":1837},[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1839,"content":1841},{"uri":1840},"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/data-theft-salesforce-instances-via-salesloft-drift",[1842],{"nodeType":248,"value":1843,"marks":1844,"data":1845},"Salesloft/Drift supply chain attack",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1847,"marks":1848,"data":1849}," demonstrated this at scale in 2025: in an extension of the previously mentioned device code phishing campaign, the attacker compromised Salesloft's GitHub environment, used TruffleHog to find secrets, stole Drift OAuth tokens, and used them to access downstream Salesforce environments. The same pattern was later repeated at Gainsight. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1851,"content":1852},{},[1853],{"nodeType":248,"value":1854,"marks":1855,"data":1856},"Along with the previously mentioned device code phishing attacks,  more than 1000 organizations were breached. The attackers then harvested AWS keys, Snowflake credentials, and stored passwords from breached Salesforce instances, compounding the access into progressively wider reach.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1858,"content":1859},{},[1860,1864,1872,1876,1884,1888,1895],{"nodeType":248,"value":1861,"marks":1862,"data":1863},"The same structural pattern has continued into 2026 with the Anodot supply chain compromise, which has produced confirmed breaches at ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1865,"content":1867},{"uri":1866},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/vimeo-data-breach-exposes-personal-information-of-119-000-people/",[1868],{"nodeType":248,"value":1869,"marks":1870,"data":1871},"Vimeo",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1873,"marks":1874,"data":1875}," (119,000 users), Rockstar Games (78.6 million records), and ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1877,"content":1879},{"uri":1878},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/zara-data-breach-exposed-personal-information-of-197-000-people/",[1880],{"nodeType":248,"value":1881,"marks":1882,"data":1883},"Zara/Inditex",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1885,"marks":1886,"data":1887}," (197,000 people), with further downstream victims likely still emerging. The ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1889,"content":1890},{"uri":634},[1891],{"nodeType":248,"value":1892,"marks":1893,"data":1894},"Vercel breach",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1896,"marks":1897,"data":1898},", which involved compromised OAuth tokens from Context.ai cascading into Google Workspace, also reinforces the same attack pattern (though it was likely not a ShinyHunters operation despite being claimed by someone pretending to be them).",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1900,"content":1901},{},[1902],{"nodeType":248,"value":1903,"marks":1904,"data":1905},"A forgotten SaaS integration can easily become the pivot point for downstream compromise. The moment you authorize a third-party integration, your security boundary extends to include that vendor. If the third-party is compromised, every downstream customer organization with an active integration is exposed.",[],{},{"nodeType":253,"data":1907,"content":1908},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":1910,"content":1911},{},[1912],{"nodeType":248,"value":1913,"marks":1914,"data":1916},"The infostealer credential playbook sits alongside these attacks",[1915],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1918,"content":1919},{},[1920,1924,1932],{"nodeType":248,"value":1921,"marks":1922,"data":1923},"Alongside the three vectors above, ShinyHunters has a track record of exploiting the infostealer credential economy at scale — and it predates any of them. The 2024 Snowflake campaign — 165+ customer environments compromised, over a billion records stolen from AT&T, Ticketmaster, Santander, and Advance Auto Parts among others — was built entirely on infostealer-harvested credentials replayed against MFA-less tenants, with ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1925,"content":1927},{"uri":1926},"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc5537-snowflake-data-theft-extortion",[1928],{"nodeType":248,"value":1929,"marks":1930,"data":1931},"Mandiant's investigation",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1933,"marks":1934,"data":1935}," finding that 80% of compromised accounts had prior breach exposure in datasets dating back to 2020. The credentials were already circulating in criminal marketplaces; ShinyHunters simply purchased and operationalized them at industrial scale.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":1937,"content":1938},{},[1939,1943,1951,1955,1963,1967,1975,1979,1987],{"nodeType":248,"value":1940,"marks":1941,"data":1942},"The same methodology powered the ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1944,"content":1946},{"uri":1945},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/why-attackers-are-targeting-jira-with-stolen-credentials/",[1947],{"nodeType":248,"value":1948,"marks":1949,"data":1950},"HellCat Jira campaign",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1952,"marks":1953,"data":1954}," through 2024–2025, and has now been industrialized as a standalone operation by ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1956,"content":1958},{"uri":1957},"https://www.halcyon.ai/jp/threat-group/coinbasecartel",[1959],{"nodeType":248,"value":1960,"marks":1961,"data":1962},"CoinbaseCartel",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1964,"marks":1965,"data":1966},", another criminal group reported to be an offshoot of SLH. CoinbaseCartel's model is familiar: purchase old infostealer credentials, use them to access cloud and development environments, exfiltrate data, and demand ransom. ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1968,"content":1970},{"uri":1969},"https://www.infostealers.com/article/inside-the-coinbase-cartel-how-infostealer-credentials-fueled-a-100-company-ransomware-spree/",[1971],{"nodeType":248,"value":1972,"marks":1973,"data":1974},"Hudson Rock's analysis",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1976,"marks":1977,"data":1978}," of the group's 170+ claimed victims confirms that roughly 80% had prior infostealer infections predating the attacks. The most recent named victim is ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":1980,"content":1982},{"uri":1981},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/grafana-says-stolen-github-token-let-hackers-steal-codebase/",[1983],{"nodeType":248,"value":1984,"marks":1985,"data":1986},"Grafana",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1988,"marks":1989,"data":1990},", where a GitHub token compromised via the TanStack npm supply chain attack and missed during credential rotation was used to download the codebase and attempt extortion. ",[],{},{"nodeType":253,"data":1992,"content":1993},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":1995,"content":1996},{},[1997],{"nodeType":248,"value":1998,"marks":1999,"data":2001},"These attacks all happen in the browser",[2000],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2003,"content":2004},{},[2005,2009,2017],{"nodeType":248,"value":2006,"marks":2007,"data":2008},"Every one of these attack chains is a browser-based attack that either occurs in the browser (AiTM phishing, device code phishing) or could have been prevented at the browser layer (OAuth consent governance). The techniques are interchangeable — the",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2010,"content":2012},{"uri":2011},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/device-code-phishing/",[2013],{"nodeType":248,"value":2014,"marks":2015,"data":2016}," same criminal kits now offer AiTM and device code phishing side by side",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2018,"marks":2019,"data":2020},", and the same threat actor (ShinyHunters) has used all three vectors across different campaigns within the same twelve-month period.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2022,"content":2023},{},[2024,2028,2036],{"nodeType":248,"value":2025,"marks":2026,"data":2027},"Additionally, infostealer infections themselves are increasingly delivered through browser-based methods like ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2029,"content":2031},{"uri":2030},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/introducing-malicious-copy-paste-detection",[2032],{"nodeType":248,"value":2033,"marks":2034,"data":2035},"ClickFix",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2037,"marks":2038,"data":2039},", closing the loop between the credential supply side and the browser-layer detection point.",[],{},{"nodeType":311,"data":2041,"content":2042},{},[2043],{"nodeType":248,"value":2044,"marks":2045,"data":2047},"How Push can help",[2046],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2049,"content":2050},{},[2051],{"nodeType":248,"value":2052,"marks":2053,"data":2054},"Push operates at the exact point in each of these attack chains where automated intervention can still prevent the compromise. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2056,"content":2057},{},[2058,2063],{"nodeType":248,"value":2059,"marks":2060,"data":2062},"For vishing + AiTM attacks, ",[2061],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2064,"marks":2065,"data":2066},"Push's behavioral phishing detection analyzes and blocks the phishing page in real time by detecting it from the user's browser — regardless of the domains used, hosting infrastructure, or where the URL was delivered.  ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2068,"content":2069},{},[2070,2075],{"nodeType":248,"value":2071,"marks":2072,"data":2074},"For device code phishing,",[2073],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2076,"marks":2077,"data":2078}," Push detects the phishing pages associated with device code phishing kits — including generic, technique-class detections that catch new kits without requiring kit-specific signatures. Second, Push provides an additional layer of protection on the legitimate device code authentication pages themselves, preventing users from entering attacker-supplied codes into them. Together, these detections cover both the kit-operated phishing infrastructure and the legitimate auth pages that the attack flow depends on.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2080,"content":2081},{},[2082,2087],{"nodeType":248,"value":2083,"marks":2084,"data":2086},"For OAuth supply chain attacks,",[2085],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2088,"marks":2089,"data":2090}," Push's detects and controls OAuth consent flows at the browser layer — capturing which application is requesting access, what scopes it's requesting, and whether the grant should be permitted under organizational policy. Push customers can also block OAuth connection requests as they transit the browser, enabling security teams to stop unwanted integrations being added in the first place. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2092,"content":2093},{},[2094,2099],{"nodeType":248,"value":2095,"marks":2096,"data":2098},"For the infostealer credential playbook,",[2097],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2100,"marks":2101,"data":2102}," Push's stolen credential detection identifies when employees are using credentials that have appeared in breach datasets or dark web feeds — catching the moment a dormant infostealer credential surfaces at a browser-based login, as well as surfacing insecure login methods missing mitigating controls like MFA and enforcing them through in-browser guardrails. And on the supply side, Push's ClickFix detection addresses the browser-based delivery vector that is now the primary method for distributing infostealer malware in the first place.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2104,"content":2105},{},[2106,2109,2117],{"nodeType":248,"value":29,"marks":2107,"data":2108},[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2110,"content":2112},{"uri":2111},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/guide-how-to-use-push-controls-to-protect-your-users-from-modern-attacks/",[2113],{"nodeType":248,"value":2114,"marks":2115,"data":2116},"Learn more about how you can use Push controls to protect your users from in-browser threats here. ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":29,"marks":2118,"data":2119},[],{},{"nodeType":311,"data":2121,"content":2122},{},[2123],{"nodeType":248,"value":2124,"marks":2125,"data":2127},"Closing thoughts",[2126],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2129,"content":2130},{},[2131],{"nodeType":248,"value":2132,"marks":2133,"data":2134},"The campaigns documented in this post are not historical — they are ongoing, with new victims surfacing weekly and the underlying criminal infrastructure still actively developing. But the defensive strategy does not require anticipating which specific group, vector, or target sector comes next, because all of them converge on the same control point: the browser, where the attack begins or the integration decision is made. Organizations with browser-layer detection and OAuth governance in place have defense-in-depth against the full range of techniques these groups employ, regardless of which specific vector any given campaign uses.",[],{},{"nodeType":253,"data":2136,"content":2137},{},[],{"nodeType":249,"data":2139,"content":2140},{},[2141],{"nodeType":248,"value":2142,"marks":2143,"data":2144},"Push Security is the most powerful AI-native security tool in the browser. Think EDR, but for the browser — high-fidelity telemetry and real-time control across every session, on every device, with no browser migration required. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2146,"content":2147},{},[2148],{"nodeType":248,"value":769,"marks":2149,"data":2150},[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2152,"content":2153},{},[2154,2157,2164],{"nodeType":248,"value":29,"marks":2155,"data":2156},[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2158,"content":2160},{"uri":2159},"https://pushsecurity.com/demo/",[2161],{"nodeType":248,"value":785,"marks":2162,"data":2163},[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":29,"marks":2165,"data":2166},[],{},{"nodeType":253,"data":2168,"content":2169},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":2171,"content":2172},{},[2173],{"nodeType":248,"value":2174,"marks":2175,"data":2177},"Appendix: named ShinyHunters victims since May 2025",[2176],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2179,"content":2180},{},[2181,2185,2192],{"nodeType":248,"value":2182,"marks":2183,"data":2184},"To give an indication of the scale, the following table documents all publicly named victims attributed to ShinyHunters specifically since the Salesforce campaign began in May 2025. It is not exhaustive: ShinyHunters has claimed over 1,000 organizations in aggregate across its Salesforce campaigns alone, and many victims have not been publicly named. This list also doesn’t include the billion-plus records compromised in the 2024 Snowflake breaches. The major ransomware attacks executed against M&S, Co-op, and Jaguar Land Rover claimed by the ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2186,"content":2187},{"uri":1499},[2188],{"nodeType":248,"value":2189,"marks":2190,"data":2191},"Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters \"brand\"",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2193,"marks":2194,"data":2195}," also aren't listed below. ",[],{},{"nodeType":2197,"data":2198,"content":2199},"table",{},[2200,2249,2313,2361,2409],{"nodeType":2201,"data":2202,"content":2203},"table-row",{},[2204,2216,2227,2238],{"nodeType":2205,"data":2206,"content":2207},"table-cell",{},[2208],{"nodeType":249,"data":2209,"content":2210},{},[2211],{"nodeType":248,"value":2212,"marks":2213,"data":2215},"Campaign",[2214],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2217,"content":2218},{},[2219],{"nodeType":249,"data":2220,"content":2221},{},[2222],{"nodeType":248,"value":2223,"marks":2224,"data":2226},"Began",[2225],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2228,"content":2229},{},[2230],{"nodeType":249,"data":2231,"content":2232},{},[2233],{"nodeType":248,"value":2234,"marks":2235,"data":2237},"Named victims",[2236],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2239,"content":2240},{},[2241],{"nodeType":249,"data":2242,"content":2243},{},[2244],{"nodeType":248,"value":2245,"marks":2246,"data":2248},"Confirmed impact",[2247],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":2201,"data":2250,"content":2251},{},[2252,2276,2286,2296],{"nodeType":2205,"data":2253,"content":2254},{},[2255],{"nodeType":249,"data":2256,"content":2257},{},[2258,2263,2267,2272],{"nodeType":248,"value":2259,"marks":2260,"data":2262},"ShinyHunters Salesforce Vishing",[2261],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2264,"marks":2265,"data":2266}," (vishing + device code phishing → Salesforce connected app authorization) \n\n& ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2268,"marks":2269,"data":2271},"Salesloft/Drift Supply Chain",[2270],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2273,"marks":2274,"data":2275}," (stolen OAuth tokens → downstream Salesforce access)",[],{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2277,"content":2278},{},[2279],{"nodeType":249,"data":2280,"content":2281},{},[2282],{"nodeType":248,"value":2283,"marks":2284,"data":2285},"May 2025",[],{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2287,"content":2288},{},[2289],{"nodeType":249,"data":2290,"content":2291},{},[2292],{"nodeType":248,"value":2293,"marks":2294,"data":2295},"Coca-Cola Europacific Partners, Cisco, Qantas, LVMH, Adidas, Google, Chanel, Pandora, Allianz Life, Air France-KLM, Farmers Insurance, Workday, TransUnion, Stellantis, Kering, Odido, Hallmark, Salesloft (origin), Toast, Avalara, Fastly, Cato Networks, Cloudflare, Palo Alto Networks, Zscaler, Tenable, Elastic, JFrog, CyberArk, Rubrik, BeyondTrust, Proofpoint, Workiva, Mercer Advisors, Beacon Pointe, Ameriprise, Kemper, Udemy, 7-Eleven, Mytheresa, Marcus & Millichap, Carnival, Pitney Bowes, Alert 360, Amtrak, McGraw-Hill, Canada Life, Charter Communications",[],{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2297,"content":2298},{},[2299,2306],{"nodeType":249,"data":2300,"content":2301},{},[2302],{"nodeType":248,"value":2303,"marks":2304,"data":2305},"49 named victims. Confirmed individual impact includes 23M+ records (Coca-Cola), 5.7M records (Qantas), 6.2M customers (Odido), 4.4M consumers (TransUnion), up to 18M records (Stellantis), 13.5M emails (McGraw-Hill), 8.2M emails (Pitney Bowes), 7.5M emails (Carnival), 7-Eleven: 185K confirmed by HIBP (SSNs, driver's licenses; franchisee data), Charter Communications: millions of records claimed (company disputes scope). ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2307,"content":2308},{},[2309],{"nodeType":248,"value":2310,"marks":2311,"data":2312},"ShinyHunters claims 1.5B+ Salesforce records across 1,000+ organizations total.",[],{},{"nodeType":2201,"data":2314,"content":2315},{},[2316,2331,2341,2351],{"nodeType":2205,"data":2317,"content":2318},{},[2319],{"nodeType":249,"data":2320,"content":2321},{},[2322,2327],{"nodeType":248,"value":2323,"marks":2324,"data":2326},"Vishing + AiTM SSO",[2325],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2328,"marks":2329,"data":2330}," (vishing → AiTM phishing page → SSO session capture → SaaS data exfiltration)",[],{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2332,"content":2333},{},[2334],{"nodeType":249,"data":2335,"content":2336},{},[2337],{"nodeType":248,"value":2338,"marks":2339,"data":2340},"Aug 2025",[],{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2342,"content":2343},{},[2344],{"nodeType":249,"data":2345,"content":2346},{},[2347],{"nodeType":248,"value":2348,"marks":2349,"data":2350},"SoundCloud, GrubHub, Panera Bread, Match Group, Crunchbase, Betterment, CarMax, Edmunds, CarGurus, Hims & Hers, University of Pennsylvania, Harvard University, Optimizely, TELUS Digital, Crunchyroll, ADT",[],{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2352,"content":2353},{},[2354],{"nodeType":249,"data":2355,"content":2356},{},[2357],{"nodeType":248,"value":2358,"marks":2359,"data":2360},"16 named victims. Confirmed individual impact includes ~30M records (SoundCloud), ~14M records (Panera), 10M+ records (Match Group), ~20M records (Betterment), 5.5M people (ADT), 1M+ records (UPenn), ~1PB stolen from TELUS Digital ($65M ransom refused).",[],{},{"nodeType":2201,"data":2362,"content":2363},{},[2364,2379,2389,2399],{"nodeType":2205,"data":2365,"content":2366},{},[2367],{"nodeType":249,"data":2368,"content":2369},{},[2370,2375],{"nodeType":248,"value":2371,"marks":2372,"data":2374},"Anodot Supply Chain",[2373],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2376,"marks":2377,"data":2378}," (stolen OAuth tokens → downstream Snowflake/BigQuery access)",[],{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2380,"content":2381},{},[2382],{"nodeType":249,"data":2383,"content":2384},{},[2385],{"nodeType":248,"value":2386,"marks":2387,"data":2388},"Apr 2026",[],{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2390,"content":2391},{},[2392],{"nodeType":249,"data":2393,"content":2394},{},[2395],{"nodeType":248,"value":2396,"marks":2397,"data":2398},"Anodot/Glassbox (origin), Rockstar Games, Vimeo, Zara/Inditex",[],{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2400,"content":2401},{},[2402],{"nodeType":249,"data":2403,"content":2404},{},[2405],{"nodeType":248,"value":2406,"marks":2407,"data":2408},"4 named victims (12+ total claimed). 78.6M records (Rockstar Games), 197K individuals (Zara), 119K individuals (Vimeo).",[],{},{"nodeType":2201,"data":2410,"content":2411},{},[2412,2427,2436,2446],{"nodeType":2205,"data":2413,"content":2414},{},[2415],{"nodeType":249,"data":2416,"content":2417},{},[2418,2423],{"nodeType":248,"value":2419,"marks":2420,"data":2422},"Other SLH-attributed",[2421],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2424,"marks":2425,"data":2426}," (misc. vectors including infostealer chains, CI/CD supply chain, SaaS platform compromise)",[],{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2428,"content":2429},{},[2430],{"nodeType":249,"data":2431,"content":2432},{},[2433],{"nodeType":248,"value":2283,"marks":2434,"data":2435},[],{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2437,"content":2438},{},[2439],{"nodeType":249,"data":2440,"content":2441},{},[2442],{"nodeType":248,"value":2443,"marks":2444,"data":2445},"UK Legal Aid Agency, Mixpanel, Wynn Resorts, Woflow, Vercel, European Commission, Mercor, Medtronic, Instructure",[],{},{"nodeType":2205,"data":2447,"content":2448},{},[2449],{"nodeType":249,"data":2450,"content":2451},{},[2452],{"nodeType":248,"value":2453,"marks":2454,"data":2455},"10 named victims across varied vectors. Notable: Vercel (Lumma Stealer → Context.ai OAuth app → Google Workspace), European Commission (poisoned Trivy GitHub Action → 340GB across 71 EU entities)",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2457,"content":2458},{},[2459],{"nodeType":248,"value":29,"marks":2460,"data":2461},[],{},"The three attack techniques behind ShinyHunters' 2026 campaigns ","ShinyHunters' breach of Instructure is the latest in a long series of attacks. Here's our view of the big picture. ","2026-05-08T00:00:00.000Z","analyzing-the-instructure-breach",{"items":2467},[2468,2472],{"sys":2469,"name":2471},{"id":2470},"6A5RXS31ZQx3PwryGb1IMy","Browser-based attacks",{"sys":2473,"name":2475},{"id":2474},"4ksQNCFeBf8H4QIORqpRLw","Detection & response",{"items":2477},[2478],{"fullName":1478,"firstName":1479,"jobTitle":1480,"profilePicture":2479},{"url":1482},{"__typename":878,"sys":2481,"content":2483,"title":2995,"synopsis":2996,"hashTags":62,"publishedDate":2997,"slug":2998,"tagsCollection":2999,"authorsCollection":3005},{"id":2482},"2MWicW07sNEBp59wxYtAiC",{"json":2484},{"nodeType":789,"data":2485,"content":2486},{},[2487,2495,2526,2532,2539,2558,2573,2576,2584,2599,2619,2644,2650,2666,2697,2703,2709,2725,2728,2736,2743,2751,2769,2785,2793,2819,2826,2834,2865,2872,2880,2887,2893,2896,2904,2911,2919,2925,2928,2936,2943,2950,2957,2969,2972,2978],{"nodeType":263,"data":2488,"content":2489},{},[2490],{"nodeType":248,"value":2491,"marks":2492,"data":2494},"The quantification problem nobody talks about",[2493],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2496,"content":2497},{},[2498,2502,2510,2514,2522],{"nodeType":248,"value":2499,"marks":2500,"data":2501},"I was recently teaching ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2503,"content":2505},{"uri":2504},"https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-courses/cybersecurity-leaders/",[2506],{"nodeType":248,"value":2507,"marks":2508,"data":2509},"SANS LDR551",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2511,"marks":2512,"data":2513},", where we cover some of the flawed approaches used in risk measurement and prioritization — for example, presenting ordinal data in a risk matrix as ratio data, implying that the matrix represents quantitative analysis when it’s more of a best guess. We then look at modeling using ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2515,"content":2517},{"uri":2516},"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loss_exceedance_curve",[2518],{"nodeType":248,"value":2519,"marks":2520,"data":2521},"Loss Exceedance Curves",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2523,"marks":2524,"data":2525}," as a more accurate, if much more difficult, approach to quantitative risk assessment.",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":2527,"content":2531},{"target":2528},{"sys":2529},{"id":2530,"type":299,"linkType":300},"4S1wJUm6E1qvyZzwrl2DL",[],{"nodeType":249,"data":2533,"content":2534},{},[2535],{"nodeType":248,"value":2536,"marks":2537,"data":2538},"The only problem is, we rarely have the time or the data to construct such models. Ask a CISO how they measure risk for credential compromise and other account takeover attacks, and the answer will probably include one or more of the following: a risk assessment, a whiteboard, and a room full of smart people making educated guesses about attack frequency and control strength. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2540,"content":2541},{},[2542,2546,2554],{"nodeType":248,"value":2543,"marks":2544,"data":2545},"That isn't a criticism — for most risk scenarios, expert elicitation is the best (and most convenient) available method. Breach cost data is sparse, threat actor behavior is unpredictable, and internal incident history is (ideally!) a limited sample. Quantitative risk frameworks like ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2547,"content":2549},{"uri":2548},"https://www.fairinstitute.org/",[2550],{"nodeType":248,"value":2551,"marks":2552,"data":2553},"FAIR",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2555,"marks":2556,"data":2557}," give structure to that uncertainty, but they can't conjure data that just doesn't exist.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2559,"content":2560},{},[2561,2565,2570],{"nodeType":248,"value":2562,"marks":2563,"data":2564},"The results are usually estimates with wide confidence intervals and loss distributions that appear precise, but are hard to defend to a CFO or a board. Finance leaders have seen Monte Carlo simulations before; the capable ones will challenge the quality of the outputs if they doubt the quality of the inputs. ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2566,"marks":2567,"data":2569},"But with the right telemetry, we can get both",[2568],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":351,"marks":2571,"data":2572},[],{},{"nodeType":253,"data":2574,"content":2575},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":2577,"content":2578},{},[2579],{"nodeType":248,"value":2580,"marks":2581,"data":2583},"Why the identity attack surface is uniquely measurable",[2582],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2585,"content":2586},{},[2587,2591,2596],{"nodeType":248,"value":2588,"marks":2589,"data":2590},"We've written extensively about the shift to identity as a primary attack vector — and the evidence continues to stack up. Credential phishing, device code phishing, ClickFix, adversary-in-the-middle attacks, session hijacking, and SaaS account compromise now account for the majority of breach entry points in most enterprise environments. But the silver lining here is that this shift has created something valuable for risk quantification: ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2592,"marks":2593,"data":2595},"a highly observable threat surface",[2594],{"type":393},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":351,"marks":2597,"data":2598},[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2600,"content":2601},{},[2602,2606,2615],{"nodeType":248,"value":2603,"marks":2604,"data":2605},"Identity attacks execute ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2607,"content":2609},{"uri":2608},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/introducing-the-browser-and-identity-attacks-matrix/",[2610],{"nodeType":248,"value":2611,"marks":2612,"data":2614},"in the browser",[2613],{"type":784},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2616,"marks":2617,"data":2618},". They leave traces in authentication flows, login behaviors, OAuth integrations, extension activity, and SaaS access patterns — all of which are captured in real time by the Push extension. Unlike network or endpoint attacks, where the signal is often binary and retroactive, browser-based identity threats generate continuous, high-frequency telemetry that maps directly onto the inputs that drive quantitative risk models.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2620,"content":2621},{},[2622,2626,2631,2635,2640],{"nodeType":248,"value":2623,"marks":2624,"data":2625},"This telemetry directly informs the hardest inputs in any quantitative risk model. One is ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2627,"marks":2628,"data":2630},"Threat Event Frequency (TEF)",[2629],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2632,"marks":2633,"data":2634},": how often a threat agent acts against an asset in a given period. For identity risks, this can be answered in how many credential phishing attempts reached your users across all delivery channels (social media, email, malvertising, etc.), or how frequently your users authorize malicious or compromised SaaS apps. Browser-level telemetry can answer these questions with ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2636,"marks":2637,"data":2639},"observed",[2638],{"type":393},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2641,"marks":2642,"data":2643}," data rather than industry lookups and general benchmarks. ",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":2645,"content":2649},{"target":2646},{"sys":2647},{"id":2648,"type":299,"linkType":300},"EvjT68MCWW7nz5q86xe8S",[],{"nodeType":249,"data":2651,"content":2652},{},[2653,2657,2662],{"nodeType":248,"value":2654,"marks":2655,"data":2656},"The other input to risk modeling that's difficult to express in concrete terms is ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2658,"marks":2659,"data":2661},"vulnerability",[2660],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2663,"marks":2664,"data":2665},": the probability a threat becomes a loss event or, more specifically, how likely it is that your controls will fail. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2667,"content":2668},{},[2669,2673,2681,2685,2693],{"nodeType":248,"value":2670,"marks":2671,"data":2672},"This is where browser telemetry gets especially concrete. ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2674,"content":2676},{"uri":2675},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/how-many-vulnerable-identities-do-you-have/",[2677],{"nodeType":248,"value":2678,"marks":2679,"data":2680},"Analysis of login telemetry across Push-monitored environments",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2682,"marks":2683,"data":2684}," shows that 1 in 4 logins are still password-only (not SSO), 2 in 5 are not protected by MFA, and 1 in 5 use a weak, breached, or reused password. Many of these logins occur outside the visibility of a central IdP platform like Microsoft, Google or Okta — the result of downstream ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2686,"content":2688},{"uri":2687},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/ghost-logins-when-forgotten-identities-come-back-to-haunt-you/",[2689],{"nodeType":248,"value":2690,"marks":2691,"data":2692},"ghost logins",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2694,"marks":2695,"data":2696},". ",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":2698,"content":2702},{"target":2699},{"sys":2700},{"id":2701,"type":299,"linkType":300},"5GctExdVGjHRwKifiP00Fp",[],{"nodeType":302,"data":2704,"content":2708},{"target":2705},{"sys":2706},{"id":2707,"type":299,"linkType":300},"2mWToHCJcuB9FMwxxzd67F",[],{"nodeType":249,"data":2710,"content":2711},{},[2712,2716,2721],{"nodeType":248,"value":2713,"marks":2714,"data":2715},"In a FAIR-based model, TEF and vulnerability together determine ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2717,"marks":2718,"data":2720},"loss event frequency",[2719],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2722,"marks":2723,"data":2724},": the foundational driver of the entire risk calculation. Using telemetry from your own environment as the basis for these calculations makes them far more accurate, and more likely to stand up to scrutiny.",[],{},{"nodeType":253,"data":2726,"content":2727},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":2729,"content":2730},{},[2731],{"nodeType":248,"value":2732,"marks":2733,"data":2735},"The attack surface is bigger than most models assume",[2734],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2737,"content":2738},{},[2739],{"nodeType":248,"value":2740,"marks":2741,"data":2742},"One of the consistent failures in identity risk modeling is the tendency to model risks defenders can see, and leave the rest off the balance sheet. These omissions create a systematic understatement of exposure that browser-based telemetry can offset.",[],{},{"nodeType":311,"data":2744,"content":2745},{},[2746],{"nodeType":248,"value":2747,"marks":2748,"data":2750},"Shadow AI and OAuth sprawl",[2749],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2752,"content":2753},{},[2754,2757,2765],{"nodeType":248,"value":29,"marks":2755,"data":2756},[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2758,"content":2759},{"uri":634},[2760],{"nodeType":248,"value":2761,"marks":2762,"data":2764},"The Vercel breach in April 2026",[2763],{"type":784},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2766,"marks":2767,"data":2768}," was the result of an OAuth connection to a third-party AI SaaS tool a developer connected into the organization's Google Workspace tenant (without admin approval). When the AI vendor was compromised, the attacker leveraged stored OAuth tokens to access downstream accounts, ultimately reaching internal dashboards, API keys, and source code. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2770,"content":2771},{},[2772,2776,2781],{"nodeType":248,"value":2773,"marks":2774,"data":2775},"Push telemetry across customer environments shows an average of ",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2777,"marks":2778,"data":2780},"17 unique AI app integrations per organization in Microsoft and Google alone",[2779],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2782,"marks":2783,"data":2784},", most of which security teams would describe as unapproved. These generally don't appear in a conventional risk model that isn't looking for them.",[],{},{"nodeType":311,"data":2786,"content":2787},{},[2788],{"nodeType":248,"value":2789,"marks":2790,"data":2792},"Browser extensions",[2791],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2794,"content":2795},{},[2796,2800,2810,2815],{"nodeType":248,"value":29,"marks":2797,"data":2799},[2798],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2801,"content":2803},{"uri":2802},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/why-browser-extension-risk-scoring-wont-predict-your-next-breach/",[2804],{"nodeType":248,"value":2805,"marks":2806,"data":2809},"Analysis of 20,000 unique extensions deployed across Push customer environments",[2807,2808],{"type":784},{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2811,"marks":2812,"data":2814}," found that 46.76% have the permission combinations required for account takeover without user interaction. ",[2813],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2816,"marks":2817,"data":2818},"The extensions carrying these permissions aren't flagged by risk scoring systems because the same permissions are used by ad blockers, password managers, and translation tools (the downside of relying on tools that rely on dubious scoring to assess extensions, but I digress). ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2820,"content":2821},{},[2822],{"nodeType":248,"value":2823,"marks":2824,"data":2825},"What matters for risk quantification isn't the permission set or an arbitrary score assigned by a vendor; it's whether the monitoring exists to detect when a previously-clean extension changes ownership, escalates permissions, or behaves anomalously. Without that monitoring, the exposure is real but unquantified.",[],{},{"nodeType":311,"data":2827,"content":2828},{},[2829],{"nodeType":248,"value":2830,"marks":2831,"data":2833},"ClickFix and non-email delivery channels",[2832],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2835,"content":2836},{},[2837,2841,2849,2853,2861],{"nodeType":248,"value":2838,"marks":2839,"data":2840},"ClickFix — where a malicious page silently writes a PowerShell or mshta command into the victim's clipboard and instructs them to paste it — was ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2842,"content":2844},{"uri":2843},"https://cdn-dynmedia-1.microsoft.com/is/content/microsoftcorp/microsoft/msc/documents/presentations/CSR/Microsoft-Digital-Defense-Report-2025.pdf",[2845],{"nodeType":248,"value":2846,"marks":2847,"data":2848},"the most common initial access vector observed by Microsoft in 2025",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2850,"marks":2851,"data":2852},", and CrowdStrike reported a",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2854,"content":2856},{"uri":2855},"https://www.crowdstrike.com/explore/2026-global-threat-report",[2857],{"nodeType":248,"value":2858,"marks":2859,"data":2860}," 563% increase in fake CAPTCHA lures",[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2862,"marks":2863,"data":2864}," (one of the most common ClickFix styles in which the user has to \"verify they're human\" by running a command on their machine). ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2866,"content":2867},{},[2868],{"nodeType":248,"value":2869,"marks":2870,"data":2871},"What makes this particularly relevant for risk quantification is the delivery channel: 4 in 5 ClickFix payloads intercepted by Push arrive via search engines, not email. A risk model that estimates threat event frequency from email-based phishing telemetry alone is structurally blind to an entire category of attack that has become one of the most prevalent initial access methods in the landscape.",[],{},{"nodeType":311,"data":2873,"content":2874},{},[2875],{"nodeType":248,"value":2876,"marks":2877,"data":2879},"Authorization attacks",[2878],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2881,"content":2882},{},[2883],{"nodeType":248,"value":2884,"marks":2885,"data":2886},"Device code phishing and OAuth consent abuse represent a slightly separate category of identity attack that most risk models don't account for because they operate after the authentication flow has already completed — meaning password strength, MFA coverage, and SSO adoption are irrelevant to whether the attack succeeds. ",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":2888,"content":2892},{"target":2889},{"sys":2890},{"id":2891,"type":299,"linkType":300},"7qtHmxCzBm5664jD6HsCwN",[],{"nodeType":253,"data":2894,"content":2895},{},[],{"nodeType":263,"data":2897,"content":2898},{},[2899],{"nodeType":248,"value":2900,"marks":2901,"data":2903},"The key lesson for CISOs",[2902],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2905,"content":2906},{},[2907],{"nodeType":248,"value":2908,"marks":2909,"data":2910},"A risk model that measures identity vulnerability purely in terms of authentication hygiene at the IdP layer — how many accounts have MFA, how many use SSO — will correctly quantify one dimension of exposure while completely missing another that is growing faster and is structurally immune to the controls being measured.",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2912,"content":2913},{},[2914],{"nodeType":248,"value":2915,"marks":2916,"data":2918},"For a CISO building a risk model, these aren't edge cases. They represent a real attack surface that doesn't show up in models built on conventional network, endpoint, and cloud telemetry. We aren't just talking about better inputs to risk modeling — we're talking about entirely new risk scenarios that aren't being modeled at all, supported by live data.",[2917],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":302,"data":2920,"content":2924},{"target":2921},{"sys":2922},{"id":2923,"type":299,"linkType":300},"2ObEcO1gqz8lrOLCZzfpNw",[],{"nodeType":253,"data":2926,"content":2927},{},[],{"nodeType":311,"data":2929,"content":2930},{},[2931],{"nodeType":248,"value":2932,"marks":2933,"data":2935},"Browser telemetry makes a CISO's life easier",[2934],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2937,"content":2938},{},[2939],{"nodeType":248,"value":2940,"marks":2941,"data":2942},"Browser-based telemetry changes the conversation a CISO can have with a CFO or board. Instead of \"industry benchmarks suggest our expected annual loss from account compromise is somewhere in this range,\" the answer is, \"We can see how often these attacks are attempted against our users, and we can measure what percentage of our accounts have the controls in place to stop them,\" or \"We know how many shadow AI apps our users self-provision and share data with each month.\" ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2944,"content":2945},{},[2946],{"nodeType":248,"value":2947,"marks":2948,"data":2949},"Identity risk is only a piece of the quantification problem. Loss magnitude, regulatory exposure, and reputational impact are still extremely hard to estimate regardless of how good your frequency inputs are. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2951,"content":2952},{},[2953],{"nodeType":248,"value":2954,"marks":2955,"data":2956},"But the identity attack surface is one of the few areas in security where measurement is genuinely achievable right now, and the gap between what most organizations are modeling and what's actually observable is significant. Shadow SaaS integrations, unapproved AI connections, browser extensions with excessive privileges — these are enumerable risks that don't appear in models built on network, endpoint, and cloud access telemetry alone. ",[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2958,"content":2959},{},[2960,2965],{"nodeType":248,"value":2961,"marks":2962,"data":2964},"The lesson for CISOs serious about quantitative risk management is this: the frameworks exist, the talent is available, and the bottleneck is almost always data quality. ",[2963],{"type":261},{},{"nodeType":248,"value":2966,"marks":2967,"data":2968},"Browser telemetry is a good example of the kind of high-fidelity, environment-specific measurement that closes that gap.",[],{},{"nodeType":253,"data":2970,"content":2971},{},[],{"nodeType":249,"data":2973,"content":2974},{},[2975],{"nodeType":248,"value":2142,"marks":2976,"data":2977},[],{},{"nodeType":249,"data":2979,"content":2980},{},[2981,2985,2992],{"nodeType":248,"value":2982,"marks":2983,"data":2984},"Security teams use Push to detect and stop advanced browser-based attacks like AiTM phishing, ClickFix, and session hijacking; gain visibility and control over AI tool usage across their workforce; harden identities by surfacing credential reuse, SSO gaps, and shadow IT; and support data loss and insider investigations with browser-layer telemetry that other tools can't see. ",[],{},{"nodeType":347,"data":2986,"content":2988},{"uri":2987},"https://pushsecurity.com/book-demo/",[2989],{"nodeType":248,"value":1453,"marks":2990,"data":2991},[],{},{"nodeType":248,"value":1458,"marks":2993,"data":2994},[],{},"The CISO's data problem (and how browser telemetry can help)","How CISOs can use browser telemetry to support cyber risk quantification in areas where traditional data points fall short. ","2026-05-11T00:00:00.000Z","the-cisos-data-problem-and-how-browser-telemetry-can-help",{"items":3000},[3001,3003],{"sys":3002,"name":1474},{"id":1473},{"sys":3004,"name":2475},{"id":2474},{"items":3006},[3007],{"fullName":232,"firstName":233,"jobTitle":234,"profilePicture":3008},{"url":236},"verizon-dbir-2026-review","blog/verizon-dbir-2026-review",{"json":3012},{"nodeType":789,"data":3013,"content":3014},{},[3015],{"nodeType":249,"data":3016,"content":3017},{},[3018],{"nodeType":248,"value":3019,"marks":3020,"data":3021},"Verizon's 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report landed this week with the largest dataset in the report's 19-year history — more than 22,000 confirmed breaches across 145 countries, nearly double last year's count.",[],{},"What we can learn from 2026's installment of the Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report.",{"id":3024,"publishedAt":3025},"7sZs2lHCTN8oYc2OIGCIQG","2026-06-30T14:22:27.069Z",{"items":3027},[3028,3030],{"sys":3029,"name":1470},{"id":1469},{"sys":3031,"name":2471},{"id":2470},"JGDLKoBbuBJQ2Ys_yu480jj3_bz28RzNz4tKeEM1M40",1784196718319]