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That shouldn't be a surprise.",{"items":230},[231],{"fullName":232,"firstName":233,"jobTitle":234,"profilePicture":235},"Dan Green","Dan","Threat Research",{"url":236},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/7jik1VhFgA3kgzXBXTm2Vw/fcd8c171da644903d0827eafcfbcaad0/Dan_Headshot_2025.png",{"json":238,"links":1169},{"nodeType":239,"data":240,"content":241},"document",{},[242,251,260,280,284,294,301,308,311,319,326,501,508,515,518,526,533,540,547,554,557,565,584,591,600,607,755,774,782,789,924,943,949,952,960,967,974,981,984,992,1033,1064,1071,1077,1080,1088,1095,1102,1109,1112,1120,1127],{"nodeType":243,"data":244,"content":245},"paragraph",{},[246],{"nodeType":247,"value":248,"marks":249,"data":250},"text","On the morning of March 11, employees at Stryker Corporation offices across 79 countries turned on their laptops and found them wiped and unusable. Personal phones enrolled in the company's BYOD program had been factory reset overnight, taking photos, banking apps, and authenticator tokens with them. Login pages had also been defaced with the logo of Handala, a persona operated by Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":253,"content":259},"embedded-entry-block",{"target":254},{"sys":255},{"id":256,"type":257,"linkType":258},"6JtlGFq0RDoW9g6zyAcPvn","Link","Entry",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":261,"content":262},{},[263,267,276],{"nodeType":247,"value":264,"marks":265,"data":266},"In a break from the standard Handala playbook, there was no ransomware, no malware, and no exploit chain. 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action was a legitimate administrative command.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":509,"content":510},{},[511],{"nodeType":247,"value":512,"marks":513,"data":514},"But while the methods were different, the core objective — mass destruction of data — is entirely consistent with previous campaigns, just through a legitimate management plane rather than custom malware.",[],{},{"nodeType":281,"data":516,"content":517},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":519,"content":520},{},[521],{"nodeType":247,"value":522,"marks":523,"data":525},"The kill chain looks different now",[524],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":527,"content":528},{},[529],{"nodeType":247,"value":530,"marks":531,"data":532},"The attack path was devastatingly simple. It didn't require lateral movement because there was nothing to move laterally through. It didn't require privilege escalation because they directly compromised a global administrator account. Every device managed by Intune was already within reach.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":534,"content":535},{},[536],{"nodeType":247,"value":537,"marks":538,"data":539},"The traditional network-centric kill chain collapses into: compromise identity, access management plane, execute objective.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":541,"content":542},{},[543],{"nodeType":247,"value":544,"marks":545,"data":546},"This is not specific to Iran-aligned actors. Russian groups are leveraging AITM phishing kits and abusing Microsoft 365 OAuth tokens via consent attacks. Scattered Spider built an operational model around social engineering and SSO account takeover. And now Handala has demonstrated that a nation-state destructive operation can be executed entirely by abusing legitimate enterprise tooling.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":548,"content":549},{},[550],{"nodeType":247,"value":551,"marks":552,"data":553},"This kind of attack is more direct, faster to execute, and carries a significantly lower barrier to entry. You don't need custom malware and exploit development when you can log in using as-a-Service kits or partner with an access brokering specialist.",[],{},{"nodeType":281,"data":555,"content":556},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":558,"content":559},{},[560],{"nodeType":247,"value":561,"marks":562,"data":564},"The big picture of Iranian cyber TTPs",[563],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":566,"content":567},{},[568,572,580],{"nodeType":247,"value":569,"marks":570,"data":571},"Iran's offensive cyber capability is split between two rival intelligence bureaucracies. 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IRGC groups cover espionage, destructive attacks, influence operations, election interference, ICS targeting across U.S. water and wastewater facilities), and individual surveillance.",[],{},{"nodeType":592,"data":593,"content":594},"heading-2",{},[595],{"nodeType":247,"value":596,"marks":597,"data":599},"IRGC groups have already shifted to identity-first TTPs",[598],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":601,"content":602},{},[603],{"nodeType":247,"value":604,"marks":605,"data":606},"On the IRGC side, the shift toward identity-centric operations is well-documented:",[],{},{"nodeType":608,"data":609,"content":610},"unordered-list",{},[611,663,702,729],{"nodeType":612,"data":613,"content":614},"list-item",{},[615],{"nodeType":243,"data":616,"content":617},{},[618,623,627,635,639,647,651,659],{"nodeType":247,"value":619,"marks":620,"data":622},"APT33/Peach Sandstorm",[621],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":624,"marks":625,"data":626}," shifted decisively toward credential-based initial access starting in early 2023, with Microsoft ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":628,"content":630},{"uri":629},"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/09/14/peach-sandstorm-password-spray-campaigns-enable-intelligence-collection-at-high-value-targets/",[631],{"nodeType":247,"value":632,"marks":633,"data":634},"documenting",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":636,"marks":637,"data":638}," large-scale password spray campaigns targeting thousands of organizations, ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":640,"content":642},{"uri":641},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/iranian-hackers-breach-defense-orgs-in-password-spray-attacks/",[643],{"nodeType":247,"value":644,"marks":645,"data":646},"Golden SAML",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":648,"marks":649,"data":650}," attacks for persistent cloud access, and the use of ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":652,"content":654},{"uri":653},"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/08/28/peach-sandstorm-deploys-new-custom-tickler-malware-in-long-running-intelligence-gathering-operations/",[655],{"nodeType":247,"value":656,"marks":657,"data":658},"fraudulent Azure subscriptions",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":660,"marks":661,"data":662}," for C2 infrastructure.",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":664,"content":665},{},[666],{"nodeType":243,"data":667,"content":668},{},[669,674,678,686,690,698],{"nodeType":247,"value":670,"marks":671,"data":673},"APT42",[672],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":675,"marks":676,"data":677},", ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":679,"content":681},{"uri":680},"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/untangling-iran-apt42-operations",[682],{"nodeType":247,"value":683,"marks":684,"data":685},"assessed by Mandiant to operate on behalf of the IRGC-IO, ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":687,"marks":688,"data":689},"has made credential harvesting and MFA bypass its core competency, operating almost entirely within cloud environments post-compromise and ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":691,"content":693},{"uri":692},"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/apt42-charms-cons-compromises",[694],{"nodeType":247,"value":695,"marks":696,"data":697},"registering its own Microsoft Authenticator",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":699,"marks":700,"data":701}," on compromised accounts for persistent access.",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":703,"content":704},{},[705],{"nodeType":243,"data":706,"content":707},{},[708,713,717,725],{"nodeType":247,"value":709,"marks":710,"data":712},"APT35",[711],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":714,"marks":715,"data":716}," (aka Imperial Kitten/Tortoiseshell) was observed ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":718,"content":720},{"uri":719},"https://www.crowdstrike.com/explore/2026-global-threat-report?utm_medium=org",[721],{"nodeType":247,"value":722,"marks":723,"data":724},"targeting cloud identities in November 2025",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":726,"marks":727,"data":728},", deploying the Evilginx2 AitM toolkit against Microsoft 365 users in Israel.",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":730,"content":731},{},[732],{"nodeType":243,"data":733,"content":734},{},[735,740,744,751],{"nodeType":247,"value":736,"marks":737,"data":739},"CrustyKrill",[738],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":741,"marks":742,"data":743}," (TA455/Smoke Sandstorm) ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":745,"content":746},{"uri":719},[747],{"nodeType":247,"value":748,"marks":749,"data":750},"uses fake Google Meet and Microsoft Teams pages",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":752,"marks":753,"data":754}," with a live operator intercepting 2FA codes in real time, alongside Azure Web Apps for C2.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":756,"content":757},{},[758,762,770],{"nodeType":247,"value":759,"marks":760,"data":761},"A ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":763,"content":765},{"uri":764},"https://media.defense.gov/2024/Oct/16/2003565317/-1/-1/0/CSA-IRAN-CYBER-BRUTE-FORCE-CRITICAL-INFRASTRUCTURE-ORGS.PDF",[766],{"nodeType":247,"value":767,"marks":768,"data":769},"joint advisory from six nations",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":771,"marks":772,"data":773}," (FBI, CISA, NSA, CSE, AFP, ASD, advisory AA24-290A, October 2024) confirmed the pattern at the government level, documenting Iranian actors using brute force, password spraying, and MFA push bombing to compromise critical infrastructure accounts since October 2023, and assessing that the actors sell this access on cybercriminal forums.",[],{},{"nodeType":592,"data":775,"content":776},{},[777],{"nodeType":247,"value":778,"marks":779,"data":781},"MOIS groups are changing their approach too",[780],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":783,"content":784},{},[785],{"nodeType":247,"value":786,"marks":787,"data":788},"On the MOIS side, the documented TTP baseline has historically centred on custom malware, network-level persistence, and exploitation of on-premises infrastructure. But identity compromise, particularly credential theft, has been a consistent thread across broader MOIS groups too:",[],{},{"nodeType":608,"data":790,"content":791},{},[792,831,858,909],{"nodeType":612,"data":793,"content":794},{},[795],{"nodeType":243,"data":796,"content":797},{},[798,803,807,815,819,827],{"nodeType":247,"value":799,"marks":800,"data":802},"APT34 (OilRig) ",[801],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":804,"marks":805,"data":806},"built its reputation on DNS tunnelling and custom backdoors, but its initial access methods include spearphishing and fake VPN portals for credential harvesting. Its 2024 campaigns introduced ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":808,"content":810},{"uri":809},"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/j/earth-simnavaz-cyberattacks.html",[811],{"nodeType":247,"value":812,"marks":813,"data":814},"password filter DLLs",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":816,"marks":817,"data":818}," registered at the domain controller level to intercept plaintext credentials during password change events, with the ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":820,"content":822},{"uri":821},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/oilrig-hackers-now-exploit-windows-flaw-to-elevate-privileges/",[823],{"nodeType":247,"value":824,"marks":825,"data":826},"STEALHOOK backdoor",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":828,"marks":829,"data":830}," exfiltrating stolen domain credentials via compromised Exchange servers. Cloud-based downloaders leveraging OneDrive and Microsoft Graph API were active against Israeli targets from 2022 to 2024.",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":832,"content":833},{},[834],{"nodeType":243,"data":835,"content":836},{},[837,842,846,854],{"nodeType":247,"value":838,"marks":839,"data":841},"APT39 (Chafer) ",[840],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":843,"marks":844,"data":845},"operated through the ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":847,"content":849},{"uri":848},"https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1127",[850],{"nodeType":247,"value":851,"marks":852,"data":853},"sanctioned front company Rana Intelligence Computing",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":855,"marks":856,"data":857},", focuses on surveillance and tracking of individuals, using credential harvesting through spoofed airline and telecom domains across 30+ countries.",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":859,"content":860},{},[861],{"nodeType":243,"data":862,"content":863},{},[864,869,873,881,885,893,897,905],{"nodeType":247,"value":865,"marks":866,"data":868},"MuddyWater",[867],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":870,"marks":871,"data":872},", confirmed by a ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":874,"content":876},{"uri":875},"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-055a",[877],{"nodeType":247,"value":878,"marks":879,"data":880},"joint CISA/FBI/NSA/NCSC advisory",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":882,"marks":883,"data":884}," as a subordinate element of MOIS, functions as an initial access broker within the ecosystem. Its operations rely on spearphishing and abuse of legitimate RMM tools, but the group has developed ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":886,"content":888},{"uri":887},"https://thehackernews.com/2025/12/iran-linked-hackers-hits-israeli_2.html",[889],{"nodeType":247,"value":890,"marks":891,"data":892},"dedicated credential stealers",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":894,"marks":895,"data":896}," including CE-Notes (which bypasses Chrome's app-bound encryption), Blub (a multi-browser credential extractor), and LP-Notes (fake Windows Security dialogs to capture system credentials). A parallel campaign documented by ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":898,"content":900},{"uri":899},"https://www.group-ib.com/blog/muddywater-espionage/",[901],{"nodeType":247,"value":902,"marks":903,"data":904},"Group-IB",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":906,"marks":907,"data":908}," found the group deploying a custom Chromium credential stealer alongside its Phoenix backdoor.",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":910,"content":911},{},[912],{"nodeType":243,"data":913,"content":914},{},[915,920],{"nodeType":247,"value":916,"marks":917,"data":919},"Lyceum (Hexane)",[918],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":921,"marks":922,"data":923}," overlaps operationally with APT34 and uses password spraying and brute-force attacks for initial access, and notably probed Albanian government infrastructure ahead of Handala destructive attacks in 2022, illustrating the collaborative model across MOIS groups.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":925,"content":926},{},[927,931,939],{"nodeType":247,"value":928,"marks":929,"data":930},"Check Point has also ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":932,"content":934},{"uri":933},"https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/iranian-mois-actors-the-cyber-crime-connection/",[935],{"nodeType":247,"value":936,"marks":937,"data":938},"documented",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":940,"marks":941,"data":942}," a broader pattern of MOIS actors engaging directly with the criminal ecosystem, including Handala's adoption of the Rhadamanthys commercial infostealer and Iranian-affiliated operators working through the Qilin ransomware-as-a-service infrastructure.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":944,"content":948},{"target":945},{"sys":946},{"id":947,"type":257,"linkType":258},"2SFtROFuPZ4SPTL87Vpjr9",[],{"nodeType":281,"data":950,"content":951},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":953,"content":954},{},[955],{"nodeType":247,"value":956,"marks":957,"data":959},"The problem with over-indexing on TTPs",[958],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":961,"content":962},{},[963],{"nodeType":247,"value":964,"marks":965,"data":966},"Threat intelligence has real value. Attributing campaigns to named groups, mapping their techniques to MITRE ATT&CK, and generating detection rules gives defenders a meaningful starting point. The problem is treating a specific actor's historical TTP catalogue as the primary basis for detection logic, rather than combining it with the broader trends in attacker behaviour visible across the entire landscape.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":968,"content":969},{},[970],{"nodeType":247,"value":971,"marks":972,"data":973},"Operators are creative and pragmatic. If the path of least resistance is a compromised admin credential and a legitimate MDM feature, no serious attacker is going to deploy custom wiper malware instead because that's what they used last time.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":975,"content":976},{},[977],{"nodeType":247,"value":978,"marks":979,"data":980},"If your threat model says you're a plausible target for an Iranian threat group, and the trend data tells you that identity compromise is the most common initial access method across all actors, the rational response is to evaluate your controls aligned to identity-based initial access, not just deploy signatures for BiBi Wiper. When the specific actor profile crowds out the general trend data, you end up building defences against the last attack and leaving yourself exposed to the shift that every actor is going through.",[],{},{"nodeType":281,"data":982,"content":983},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":985,"content":986},{},[987],{"nodeType":247,"value":988,"marks":989,"data":991},"Evaluating the security guidance",[990],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":993,"content":994},{},[995,999,1007,1011,1019,1023,1029],{"nodeType":247,"value":996,"marks":997,"data":998},"In the wake of the breach, industry guidance has settled around enforcing phishing-resistant MFA on privileged accounts, implementing just-in-time privilege activation via ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1000,"content":1002},{"uri":1001},"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-configure",[1003],{"nodeType":247,"value":1004,"marks":1005,"data":1006},"PIM",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1008,"marks":1009,"data":1010},", enabling ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1012,"content":1014},{"uri":1013},"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/intune-service/fundamentals/multi-admin-approval",[1015],{"nodeType":247,"value":1016,"marks":1017,"data":1018},"Multi Admin Approval ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1020,"marks":1021,"data":1022},"for high-risk Intune operations, configuring anomaly alerting on bulk device actions, and segregating administrative identities from everyday user accounts. This is all sound advice, but these recommendations are designed to limit what an attacker can do ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1024,"marks":1025,"data":1028},"after",[1026],{"type":1027},"italic",{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1030,"marks":1031,"data":1032}," an account has already been compromised — introducing friction, but not blocking them entirely.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1034,"content":1035},{},[1036,1040,1048,1052,1060],{"nodeType":247,"value":1037,"marks":1038,"data":1039},"The detection challenges compound this. Entra ID sign-in logs and ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1041,"content":1043},{"uri":1042},"https://www.a6n.co.uk/2025/11/tracking-device-wipes-in-microsoft.html",[1044],{"nodeType":247,"value":1045,"marks":1046,"data":1047},"Intune audit logs exist in separate systems",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1049,"marks":1050,"data":1051}," with separate correlation IDs. Tracing a sign-in to a subsequent device action requires deliberate log integration that many organizations haven't implemented. The ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1053,"content":1055},{"uri":1054},"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/intune-service/fundamentals/monitor-audit-logs",[1056],{"nodeType":247,"value":1057,"marks":1058,"data":1059},"logs do record",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1061,"marks":1062,"data":1063}," \"wipe ManagedDevice\" events, but may not be linked to real-time alerting. And the underlying action, Intune's Remote Wipe, is a legitimate feature used routinely in enterprise IT. Again, the attack could have succeeded even with these in place.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1065,"content":1066},{},[1067],{"nodeType":247,"value":1068,"marks":1069,"data":1070},"In a world where a compromised account can be rapidly exploited, it's vital to focus on improving detection and prevention as early as possible in the kill chain — combating initial access techniques themselves.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1072,"content":1076},{"target":1073},{"sys":1074},{"id":1075,"type":257,"linkType":258},"4H3AzW7q4QBv7pJawSqQBJ",[],{"nodeType":281,"data":1078,"content":1079},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":1081,"content":1082},{},[1083],{"nodeType":247,"value":1084,"marks":1085,"data":1087},"Closing thoughts",[1086],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1089,"content":1090},{},[1091],{"nodeType":247,"value":1092,"marks":1093,"data":1094},"The Stryker attack reflects what attackers everywhere — from financially motivated criminal groups to more destructive nation-state operators — are already doing. Identity-based initial access, abuse of legitimate tools and services, and living-off-the-land execution are the current standard operating procedure.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1096,"content":1097},{},[1098],{"nodeType":247,"value":1099,"marks":1100,"data":1101},"Even with a perfectly hardened environment, most public breaches today involve attackers hijacking SSO mechanisms to move into connected applications, exfiltrating data for resale or extortion, and in some cases leveraging cloud services and admin platforms to deploy ransomware (the Scattered Spider playbook of dropping ransomware via VMware management portal being a well-documented example).",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1103,"content":1104},{},[1105],{"nodeType":247,"value":1106,"marks":1107,"data":1108},"The majority of attackers will have no interest in destructively wiping an Intune environment — that's difficult to monetize. But the techniques that enabled the Stryker wipe are the same as those that enable financially motivated breaches at scale, pointing to a challenge that extends well beyond Iran-nexus threat actors and MDM hardening.",[],{},{"nodeType":281,"data":1110,"content":1111},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":1113,"content":1114},{},[1115],{"nodeType":247,"value":1116,"marks":1117,"data":1119},"About Push Security",[1118],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1121,"content":1122},{},[1123],{"nodeType":247,"value":1124,"marks":1125,"data":1126},"Push Security's browser-based security platform provides comprehensive detection and response capabilities against the leading cause of breaches. Push blocks browser-based attacks like AiTM phishing, credential stuffing, malicious browser extensions, ClickFix, and session hijacking. You don't need to wait until it all goes wrong — you can also use Push to proactively find and fix vulnerabilities across the apps that your employees use, like ghost logins, SSO coverage gaps, MFA gaps, vulnerable passwords, and more to harden your identity attack surface.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1128,"content":1129},{},[1130,1134,1142,1145,1153,1157,1165],{"nodeType":247,"value":1131,"marks":1132,"data":1133},"To learn more about Push, ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1135,"content":1137},{"uri":1136},"https://pushsecurity.com/resources/product-brochure",[1138],{"nodeType":247,"value":1139,"marks":1140,"data":1141},"check out our latest product overview",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":675,"marks":1143,"data":1144},[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1146,"content":1148},{"uri":1147},"https://pushsecurity.com/product-demo/",[1149],{"nodeType":247,"value":1150,"marks":1151,"data":1152},"view our demo library",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1154,"marks":1155,"data":1156},", or ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1158,"content":1160},{"uri":1159},"https://pushsecurity.com/demo",[1161],{"nodeType":247,"value":1162,"marks":1163,"data":1164},"book some time with one of our team for a live demo",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1166,"marks":1167,"data":1168},".",[],{},{"entries":1170},{"hyperlink":1171,"inline":1172,"block":1173},[],[],[1174,1189,1207],{"sys":1175,"__typename":1176,"content":1177,"name":1188,"title":62},{"id":256},"InsightTextBlockComponent",{"json":1178},{"nodeType":239,"data":1179,"content":1180},{},[1181],{"nodeType":243,"data":1182,"content":1183},{},[1184],{"nodeType":247,"value":1185,"marks":1186,"data":1187},"Handala is a public-facing \"faketivist\" persona, also known as Handala Hack Team, Void Manticore, Storm-0842, Dune, Red Sandstorm, and Banished Kitten. The group also operates under regional personas like Karma and Homeland Justice. We'll refer to them as Handala in this piece.",[],{},"Handala blog insight box 1",{"sys":1190,"__typename":1176,"content":1191,"name":1206,"title":62},{"id":947},{"json":1192},{"nodeType":239,"data":1193,"content":1194},{},[1195],{"nodeType":243,"data":1196,"content":1197},{},[1198,1202],{"nodeType":247,"value":1199,"marks":1200,"data":1201},"So, t",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1203,"marks":1204,"data":1205},"he Stryker attack path is operationally consistent with the direction the Iranian threat ecosystem has been moving, even though it departs from Handala's own documented TTPs. Many of Handala's previous methods — targeting managed service providers and IT vendors, malware spearphishing, VPN credential stuffing — can also be repurposed in identity-focused social engineering attacks, particularly when boosted with widely available tools already powering criminal campaigns.",[],{},"Handala blog insight box 3",{"sys":1208,"__typename":1209,"type":1210,"ctaText":1211,"buttonLabel":1212,"buttonColour":1213,"buttonUrl":17},{"id":1075},"CtaWidget","Custom","Learn about the browser attack techniques security teams must contend with in 2026","Get the Report","sunny orange","json",{"items":1216},[],{},"Analyzing Iran-nexus TTP evolution in 2026","2026-03-19T00:00:00.000Z",{"items":1221},[1222,2199,3072],{"__typename":1223,"sys":1224,"content":1226,"title":2181,"synopsis":2182,"hashTags":62,"publishedDate":2183,"slug":2184,"tagsCollection":2185,"authorsCollection":2195},"BlogPosts",{"id":1225},"2sFCww9xnI8okIxhtOaiY1",{"json":1227},{"nodeType":239,"data":1228,"content":1229},{},[1230,1237,1244,1251,1254,1262,1269,1276,1282,1289,1295,1316,1323,1335,1338,1346,1353,1369,1376,1388,1394,1397,1405,1413,1419,1428,1448,1457,1464,1473,1492,1501,1508,1517,1550,1559,1566,1575,1593,1599,1608,1615,1624,1667,1670,1678,1687,1707,1716,1723,1732,1765,1771,1780,1787,1793,1796,1804,1813,1820,1880,1886,1889,1897,1906,1913,1919,1922,1930,1937,1944,2014,2021,2084,2091,2094,2102,2109,2116,2122,2125,2133,2140,2147,2154],{"nodeType":243,"data":1231,"content":1232},{},[1233],{"nodeType":247,"value":1234,"marks":1235,"data":1236},"The biggest cybersecurity story this year (so far) has been the emergence of “Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters” and their record-breaking worldwide hacking spree. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1238,"content":1239},{},[1240],{"nodeType":247,"value":1241,"marks":1242,"data":1243},"Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters is part of “The Com”, the name for the broad community of English-speaking cybercriminals with international criminal connections — including with nation-state sponsored groups. They are also known to collaborate with a range of cybercrime “as-a-Service” organizations for phishing, initial access, ransomware, and more. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1245,"content":1246},{},[1247],{"nodeType":247,"value":1248,"marks":1249,"data":1250},"It’s difficult to pin down exactly who the individuals are that make up this criminal collective. But what is known is their MO — making money through extortion by means of account takeover, mass data theft, and ransomware deployment. ",[],{},{"nodeType":281,"data":1252,"content":1253},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":1255,"content":1256},{},[1257],{"nodeType":247,"value":1258,"marks":1259,"data":1261},"How did we get here? ",[1260],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1263,"content":1264},{},[1265],{"nodeType":247,"value":1266,"marks":1267,"data":1268},"Earlier this year, the threat group known to most analysts as Scattered Spider (also tracked as 0ktapus, Octo Tempest, Scatter Swine, Muddled Libra, and UNC3944) re-emerged after a series of arrests in late 2024. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1270,"content":1271},{},[1272],{"nodeType":247,"value":1273,"marks":1274,"data":1275},"This group has been active in peaks and troughs over the years, but are mainly known for high-profile ransomware attacks on Caesars and MGM Resorts in 2024. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1277,"content":1281},{"target":1278},{"sys":1279},{"id":1280,"type":257,"linkType":258},"1Vt269d7n6IGMzOrJs1FDx",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1283,"content":1284},{},[1285],{"nodeType":247,"value":1286,"marks":1287,"data":1288},"Scattered Spider hit the headlines again in April 2025 with attacks on UK retailers Marks & Spencer and Co-op, which resulted in significant, prolonged disruption, and a serious downstream impact on the retail supply chain. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1290,"content":1294},{"target":1291},{"sys":1292},{"id":1293,"type":257,"linkType":258},"3kvcGV2zZZUPnM8IK04Y1O",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1296,"content":1297},{},[1298,1302,1312],{"nodeType":247,"value":1299,"marks":1300,"data":1301},"It didn’t stop there, though. What followed was a wide-scale campaign targeting Salesforce customers, with the attackers claiming to have stolen ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1303,"content":1305},{"uri":1304},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/shinyhunters-claims-15-billion-salesforce-records-stolen-in-drift-hacks/",[1306],{"nodeType":247,"value":1307,"marks":1308,"data":1311},"over 1.5 billion records from 1000+ companies",[1309],{"type":1310},"underline",{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1313,"marks":1314,"data":1315}," across multiple verticals, including heavyweights like Google, Cloudflare, Workday, Adidas, FedEx, Disney, LVMH, and many more.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1317,"content":1318},{},[1319],{"nodeType":247,"value":1320,"marks":1321,"data":1322},"Around this time, the attackers began to refer to themselves as part of a wider collective, assuming the moniker “Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters” (a mash-up of names given by analysts and self-adopted by attackers — Scattered Spider, ShinyHunters, and Lapsus$).",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1324,"content":1325},{},[1326,1330],{"nodeType":247,"value":1327,"marks":1328,"data":1329},"The most significant breach this year to-date impacted Jaguar Land Rover. A ransomware attack resulted in months of disruption that directly impacted the UK’s GDP, with the government underwriting a $1.5B loan to alleviate the supply chain impact. ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1331,"marks":1332,"data":1334},"In fact, this was the most economically consequential cyber attack yet recorded in a G7 economy. ",[1333],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":281,"data":1336,"content":1337},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":1339,"content":1340},{},[1341],{"nodeType":247,"value":1342,"marks":1343,"data":1345},"2025 wasn’t a one-off",[1344],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1347,"content":1348},{},[1349],{"nodeType":247,"value":1350,"marks":1351,"data":1352},"The developments through 2025 have presented a stronger picture than ever before that cybercriminal operations are heavily interlinked. Groups overlap considerably, and individuals freely move between different cells. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1354,"content":1355},{},[1356,1360,1365],{"nodeType":247,"value":1357,"marks":1358,"data":1359},"When we scratch beneath the surface, this is evident in the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by these attackers — even stretching as far back as 2021 with the initial rise of Lapsus$. This is not an accident. ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1361,"marks":1362,"data":1364},"The TTPs used show a conscious move by attackers to move away from environments that are well-protected by traditional security tools. ",[1363],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1366,"marks":1367,"data":1368},"This means avoiding targeting endpoints with malware, and not relying on software-based exploits. Instead, these attackers look to take over apps and services directly over the internet. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1370,"content":1371},{},[1372],{"nodeType":247,"value":1373,"marks":1374,"data":1375},"Most of the time, this is as simple as logging in to a SaaS app, or an enterprise SSO account (e.g. Microsoft, Okta, or Google) and dumping the data. For attackers that want to take it further, they can abuse the sprawl of interconnected apps that make up modern business IT, seeking out specific data or exploitable functionality. Or, they can leverage internet-accessible management portals to chart a path back to your on-premise assets, giving them everything they need to pivot toward more conventional methods such as ransomware deployment. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1377,"content":1378},{},[1379,1383],{"nodeType":247,"value":1380,"marks":1381,"data":1382},"When we look at historical breaches, the pattern is clear. ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1384,"marks":1385,"data":1387},"Not one of the attacks attributed to Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters, or its predecessors, started with an endpoint or network attack — they all began with account takeover. ",[1386],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1389,"content":1393},{"target":1390},{"sys":1391},{"id":1392,"type":257,"linkType":258},"6poP5VM2ARrEvwKEG42HgK",[],{"nodeType":281,"data":1395,"content":1396},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":1398,"content":1399},{},[1400],{"nodeType":247,"value":1401,"marks":1402,"data":1404},"TTP breakdown: Analyzing the top “Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters” breaches since 2021",[1403],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":592,"data":1406,"content":1407},{},[1408],{"nodeType":247,"value":1409,"marks":1410,"data":1412},"Phishing and stolen credentials",[1411],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1414,"content":1418},{"target":1415},{"sys":1416},{"id":1417,"type":257,"linkType":258},"4SNOanDIdGZsvRRnMYQVSo",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1420,"content":1421},{},[1422],{"nodeType":247,"value":1423,"marks":1424,"data":1427},"EA Games (2021)",[1425,1426],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1429,"content":1430},{},[1431,1435,1444],{"nodeType":247,"value":1432,"marks":1433,"data":1434},"Attackers used stolen session cookies to log into EA’s Slack instance, purchased on a criminal forum. Combined with ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1436,"content":1438},{"uri":1437},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/phishing-slack-persistence/",[1439],{"nodeType":247,"value":1440,"marks":1441,"data":1443},"social engineering via Slack",[1442],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1445,"marks":1446,"data":1447},", this was used to steal 750GB of data, including video game source code. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1449,"content":1450},{},[1451],{"nodeType":247,"value":1452,"marks":1453,"data":1456},"Nvidia (2022)",[1454,1455],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1458,"content":1459},{},[1460],{"nodeType":247,"value":1461,"marks":1462,"data":1463},"Attackers used stolen credentials to steal 1TB of data from Nvidia’s internal shares, including a significant amount of sensitive information about the designs of Nvidia graphics cards, source code, and the usernames and passwords of more than 71,000 Nvidia employees.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1465,"content":1466},{},[1467],{"nodeType":247,"value":1468,"marks":1469,"data":1472},"Microsoft (2022)",[1470,1471],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1474,"content":1475},{},[1476,1480,1488],{"nodeType":247,"value":1477,"marks":1478,"data":1479},"Attackers used stolen credentials combined with SIM swapping and ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1481,"content":1483},{"uri":1482},"https://github.com/pushsecurity/saas-attacks/blob/main/techniques/mfa_fatigue/description.md",[1484],{"nodeType":247,"value":1485,"marks":1486,"data":1487},"MFA fatigue",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1489,"marks":1490,"data":1491}," attacks to steal Azure DevOps source code — leaked a 9GB archive of Microsoft source code – including ~90% of Bing and 45% of Cortana code. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1493,"content":1494},{},[1495],{"nodeType":247,"value":1496,"marks":1497,"data":1500},"T-Mobile (2022)",[1498,1499],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1502,"content":1503},{},[1504],{"nodeType":247,"value":1505,"marks":1506,"data":1507},"Attackers used stolen credentials to establish initial access, coupled with social engineering T-Mobile staff into approving the attacker’s device for VPN access. This resulted in source code being stolen from over 30,000 repositories. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1509,"content":1510},{},[1511],{"nodeType":247,"value":1512,"marks":1513,"data":1516},"Snowflake (165 customers) (2024)",[1514,1515],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1518,"content":1519},{},[1520,1524,1533,1537,1546],{"nodeType":247,"value":1521,"marks":1522,"data":1523},"Attackers targeted ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1525,"content":1527},{"uri":1526},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/snowflake-retro/",[1528],{"nodeType":247,"value":1529,"marks":1530,"data":1532},"165 Snowflake customers",[1531],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1534,"marks":1535,"data":1536}," using stolen credentials from credential breaches dating back as far as 2020. Due to widespread MFA gaps and the presence of ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1538,"content":1540},{"uri":1539},"https://github.com/pushsecurity/saas-attacks/blob/main/techniques/ghost_logins/description.md",[1541],{"nodeType":247,"value":1542,"marks":1543,"data":1545},"ghost logins",[1544],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1547,"marks":1548,"data":1549},", attackers were able to simply log in to individual customer tenants, dump the data, and use it to extort the companies. In total, 9 public victims were named following the breach, with over 1B breached customer records. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1551,"content":1552},{},[1553],{"nodeType":247,"value":1554,"marks":1555,"data":1558},"PowerSchool (2024)",[1556,1557],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1560,"content":1561},{},[1562],{"nodeType":247,"value":1563,"marks":1564,"data":1565},"Attackers gained access to a community-focused customer support portal, PowerSource, using compromised credentials and stole data using an \"export data manager\" customer support tool, stealing the data of 62.4 million students and 9.5 million teachers. PowerSchool paid an undisclosed ransom fee, but hackers returned later to extort schools and individuals separately anyway.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1567,"content":1568},{},[1569],{"nodeType":247,"value":1570,"marks":1571,"data":1574},"Red Hat (2025)",[1572,1573],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1576,"content":1577},{},[1578,1582,1589],{"nodeType":247,"value":1579,"marks":1580,"data":1581},"Attackers breached Red Hat’s GitLab instance via a compromised account — the result of ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1583,"content":1584},{"uri":1539},[1585],{"nodeType":247,"value":1542,"marks":1586,"data":1588},[1587],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1590,"marks":1591,"data":1592}," providing a backdoor to access an otherwise secure, SSO-connected account. Stolen data included approximately 800 Customer Engagement Reports (CERs), authentication tokens, full database URIs, and other private information in Red Hat code and CERs, which they claimed to use to gain access to downstream customer infrastructure. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1594,"content":1598},{"target":1595},{"sys":1596},{"id":1597,"type":257,"linkType":258},"G1V7d5Dvevmr9p0YXElPX",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1600,"content":1601},{},[1602],{"nodeType":247,"value":1603,"marks":1604,"data":1607},"Discord (2025)",[1605,1606],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1609,"content":1610},{},[1611],{"nodeType":247,"value":1612,"marks":1613,"data":1614},"Attackers compromised a Zendesk customer support account, stealing 1.6TB of data. The hackers say this consisted of roughly 8.4 million tickets affecting 5.5 million unique users, and that about 580,000 users contained payment information.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1616,"content":1617},{},[1618],{"nodeType":247,"value":1619,"marks":1620,"data":1623},"SoundCloud, MatchGroup, Crunchbase, Betterment... (2026)",[1621,1622],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1625,"content":1626},{},[1627,1631,1639,1643,1651,1655,1663],{"nodeType":247,"value":1628,"marks":1629,"data":1630},"Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters have already claimed several public victims in 2026, with over 60 million breached records. ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1632,"content":1634},{"uri":1633},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/shinyhunters-claim-to-be-behind-sso-account-data-theft-attacks/",[1635],{"nodeType":247,"value":1636,"marks":1637,"data":1638},"SoundCloud, Betterment, Crunchbase",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1640,"marks":1641,"data":1642}," and ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1644,"content":1646},{"uri":1645},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/match-group-breach-exposes-data-from-hinge-tinder-okcupid-and-match/",[1647],{"nodeType":247,"value":1648,"marks":1649,"data":1650},"MatchGroup",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1652,"marks":1653,"data":1654}," have all reported breaches this month, powered by a brand ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1656,"content":1658},{"uri":1657},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/unpacking-the-latest-slh-campaign/",[1659],{"nodeType":247,"value":1660,"marks":1661,"data":1662},"new real-time-operated AiTM phishing kit",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1664,"marks":1665,"data":1666}," targeting Okta, Entra, and Google SSO accounts. This is a developing situation, with more victims expected to be announced publicly soon.",[],{},{"nodeType":281,"data":1668,"content":1669},{},[],{"nodeType":592,"data":1671,"content":1672},{},[1673],{"nodeType":247,"value":1674,"marks":1675,"data":1677},"Vishing and help desk scams",[1676],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1679,"content":1680},{},[1681],{"nodeType":247,"value":1682,"marks":1683,"data":1686},"MGM Resorts & Caesars (2023)",[1684,1685],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1688,"content":1689},{},[1690,1694,1703],{"nodeType":247,"value":1691,"marks":1692,"data":1693},"MGM Resorts and Caesars were hit with twin breaches in 2023. Attackers socially engineered help desk personnel to take over accounts with Super Administrator privileges within MGM Resorts’ Okta tenant, which they then used to register a second, attacker-controlled IdP via ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1695,"content":1697},{"uri":1696},"https://github.com/pushsecurity/saas-attacks/blob/main/techniques/inbound_federation/description.md",[1698],{"nodeType":247,"value":1699,"marks":1700,"data":1702},"inbound federation",[1701],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1704,"marks":1705,"data":1706}," — granting comprehensive access that was used to deploy ransomware. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1708,"content":1709},{},[1710],{"nodeType":247,"value":1711,"marks":1712,"data":1715},"Transport for London (2024)",[1713,1714],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1717,"content":1718},{},[1719],{"nodeType":247,"value":1720,"marks":1721,"data":1722},"Attackers socially engineered the Transport for London help desk to gain privileged access to the IT environment, resulting in prolonged disruption to key online services underpinning London’s public transport network, theft of 5,000 users bank details, and all 30,000 staff members having to reset their online credentials in person.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1724,"content":1725},{},[1726],{"nodeType":247,"value":1727,"marks":1728,"data":1731},"Marks & Spencer (2025)",[1729,1730],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1733,"content":1734},{},[1735,1739,1748,1752,1761],{"nodeType":247,"value":1736,"marks":1737,"data":1738},"Attackers compromised a Microsoft Entra account belonging to a privileged user via a ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1740,"content":1742},{"uri":1741},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/scattered-spider-defending-against-help-desk-scams/",[1743],{"nodeType":247,"value":1744,"marks":1745,"data":1747},"help desk scam",[1746],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1749,"marks":1750,"data":1751},", which enabled them to steal sensitive data from cloud environments, as well as pivot to deploy ransomware via the ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1753,"content":1755},{"uri":1754},"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/vsphere-active-directory-integration-risks",[1756],{"nodeType":247,"value":1757,"marks":1758,"data":1760},"VMware admin console",[1759],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1762,"marks":1763,"data":1764},". This enabled ransomware to be deployed at the hypervisor layer, evading host-based protections like EDR. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1766,"content":1770},{"target":1767},{"sys":1768},{"id":1769,"type":257,"linkType":258},"7hBdHG74NaA3bQfOMpYA9o",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1772,"content":1773},{},[1774],{"nodeType":247,"value":1775,"marks":1776,"data":1779},"Jaguar Land Rover (2025)",[1777,1778],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1781,"content":1782},{},[1783],{"nodeType":247,"value":1784,"marks":1785,"data":1786},"Attackers compromised highly privileged admin accounts via a help desk scam, which they leveraged to access and deploy ransomware to all aspects of Jaguar’s business, from CAD and engineering software, to payments tracking, to customer car delivery, using similar techniques to the Marks & Spencer breach. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1788,"content":1792},{"target":1789},{"sys":1790},{"id":1791,"type":257,"linkType":258},"6s1X2fo4K9EeVLBmHm4YXb",[],{"nodeType":281,"data":1794,"content":1795},{},[],{"nodeType":592,"data":1797,"content":1798},{},[1799],{"nodeType":247,"value":1800,"marks":1801,"data":1803},"Malicious OAuth integrations",[1802],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1805,"content":1806},{},[1807],{"nodeType":247,"value":1808,"marks":1809,"data":1812},"Salesforce & Salesloft (1000+ customers) (2025)",[1810,1811],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1814,"content":1815},{},[1816],{"nodeType":247,"value":1817,"marks":1818,"data":1819},"A vast campaign against Salesforce customers resulted in the compromise of 1000+ Salesforce tenants (according to the attacker) with more than 1.5 billion records stolen. This campaign can consisted of three phases:",[],{},{"nodeType":608,"data":1821,"content":1822},{},[1823,1838,1853],{"nodeType":612,"data":1824,"content":1825},{},[1826],{"nodeType":243,"data":1827,"content":1828},{},[1829,1834],{"nodeType":247,"value":1830,"marks":1831,"data":1833},"Phase 1:",[1832],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1835,"marks":1836,"data":1837}," The attacker conducted a large-scale vishing campaign against Salesforce customers, calling up users and socially engineering them into connecting a malicious version of the “Data Loader” app into their tenant. This was in fact an attacker-controlled app that enabled data to be mass-exfiltrated via API. ",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":1839,"content":1840},{},[1841],{"nodeType":243,"data":1842,"content":1843},{},[1844,1849],{"nodeType":247,"value":1845,"marks":1846,"data":1848},"Phase 2: ",[1847],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1850,"marks":1851,"data":1852},"The attacker conducted a supply-chain compromise against customers of Salesloft. Users of Salesloft’s “Drift” integration were impacted by attackers stealing access tokens from Salesloft’s AWS environment. This integration allowed the attacker to steal data from customers that had deployed Drift to connected environments — namely, Salesforce, and Google Workspace. ",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":1854,"content":1855},{},[1856],{"nodeType":243,"data":1857,"content":1858},{},[1859,1864,1868,1876],{"nodeType":247,"value":1860,"marks":1861,"data":1863},"Phase 3:",[1862],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1865,"marks":1866,"data":1867}," The attacker then conducted a separate supply-chain compromise involving Gainsight (allegedly using OAuth tokens stolen in the Salesloft attack) which enabled them to ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1869,"content":1871},{"uri":1870},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/salesforce-investigates-customer-data-theft-via-gainsight-breach/",[1872],{"nodeType":247,"value":1873,"marks":1874,"data":1875},"breach a further 285 Salesforce instances",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1877,"marks":1878,"data":1879}," using stolen OAuth tokens from Gainsight's integrations. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1881,"content":1885},{"target":1882},{"sys":1883},{"id":1884,"type":257,"linkType":258},"3TwjpVKQ42SwQRhvGFbZdn",[],{"nodeType":281,"data":1887,"content":1888},{},[],{"nodeType":592,"data":1890,"content":1891},{},[1892],{"nodeType":247,"value":1893,"marks":1894,"data":1896},"Malicious browser extensions",[1895],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1898,"content":1899},{},[1900],{"nodeType":247,"value":1901,"marks":1902,"data":1905},"CyberHaven (2024)",[1903,1904],{"type":292},{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1907,"content":1908},{},[1909],{"nodeType":247,"value":1910,"marks":1911,"data":1912},"Hackers phished a CyberHaven extension developer and uploaded a malicious version of the CyberHaven extension to the Chrome Web Store, leading to customer data breaches where installed in user browsers, impacting CyberHaven’s estimated ~400 business customers. This was part of a broader campaign that targeted 35 Chrome extensions, collectively impacting over 2.5 million users.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1914,"content":1918},{"target":1915},{"sys":1916},{"id":1917,"type":257,"linkType":258},"4ErDI0xi0Vj2Zrk8Qsb2NB",[],{"nodeType":281,"data":1920,"content":1921},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":1923,"content":1924},{},[1925],{"nodeType":247,"value":1926,"marks":1927,"data":1929},"The bigger picture",[1928],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1931,"content":1932},{},[1933],{"nodeType":247,"value":1934,"marks":1935,"data":1936},"Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters are dominating the headlines right now, but they aren’t the only attackers using these modern techniques and consciously evading established security controls. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":1938,"content":1939},{},[1940],{"nodeType":247,"value":1941,"marks":1942,"data":1943},"Threat reports agree that attackers are steering away from traditional exploit and malware-driven breaches towards identities:",[],{},{"nodeType":608,"data":1945,"content":1946},{},[1947,1970,1992],{"nodeType":612,"data":1948,"content":1949},{},[1950],{"nodeType":243,"data":1951,"content":1952},{},[1953,1957,1966],{"nodeType":247,"value":1954,"marks":1955,"data":1956},"Identity-based attacks surged 32% in the last year, while 97% of identity attacks are password-based, driven by credential leaks and infostealer malware. (",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1958,"content":1960},{"uri":1959},"https://cdn-dynmedia-1.microsoft.com/is/content/microsoftcorp/microsoft/msc/documents/presentations/CSR/Microsoft-Digital-Defense-Report-2025.pdf#page=1",[1961],{"nodeType":247,"value":1962,"marks":1963,"data":1965},"Microsoft",[1964],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1967,"marks":1968,"data":1969},")",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":1971,"content":1972},{},[1973],{"nodeType":243,"data":1974,"content":1975},{},[1976,1980,1989],{"nodeType":247,"value":1977,"marks":1978,"data":1979},"79% of detections were malware-free in the last year, up from 40% in 2019. (",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":1981,"content":1983},{"uri":1982},"https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-gb/global-threat-report/",[1984],{"nodeType":247,"value":1985,"marks":1986,"data":1988},"CrowdStrike",[1987],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1967,"marks":1990,"data":1991},[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":1993,"content":1994},{},[1995],{"nodeType":243,"data":1996,"content":1997},{},[1998,2002,2011],{"nodeType":247,"value":1999,"marks":2000,"data":2001},"Credential abuse and phishing combined accounted for 38% of breaches, making identity the primary breach vector observed. (",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":2003,"content":2005},{"uri":2004},"https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/reports/dbir/",[2006],{"nodeType":247,"value":2007,"marks":2008,"data":2010},"Verizon",[2009],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1967,"marks":2012,"data":2013},[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2015,"content":2016},{},[2017],{"nodeType":247,"value":2018,"marks":2019,"data":2020},"And other public breaches from this year alone demonstrate similar TTPs from outside of the Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters orbit:",[],{},{"nodeType":608,"data":2022,"content":2023},{},[2024,2039,2054,2069],{"nodeType":612,"data":2025,"content":2026},{},[2027],{"nodeType":243,"data":2028,"content":2029},{},[2030,2035],{"nodeType":247,"value":2031,"marks":2032,"data":2034},"Nikkei",[2033],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2036,"marks":2037,"data":2038},": Japanese publishing giant Nikkei’s Slack messaging platform was compromised using stolen credentials, leaking the names, email addresses, and chat histories for 17,368 individuals registered on Slack.",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2040,"content":2041},{},[2042],{"nodeType":243,"data":2043,"content":2044},{},[2045,2050],{"nodeType":247,"value":2046,"marks":2047,"data":2049},"Evertec",[2048],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2051,"marks":2052,"data":2053},": Hackers tried to steal $130 million from Evertec’s Brazilian subsidiary Sinqia S.A.after gaining unauthorized access to its environment on the central bank’s real-time payment system (Pix) using stolen credentials.",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2055,"content":2056},{},[2057],{"nodeType":243,"data":2058,"content":2059},{},[2060,2065],{"nodeType":247,"value":2061,"marks":2062,"data":2064},"Hy-Vee:",[2063],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2066,"marks":2067,"data":2068}," Was hit with a data breach after hackers logged in with stolen credentials, exposing 53GB of sensitive data.",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2070,"content":2071},{},[2072],{"nodeType":243,"data":2073,"content":2074},{},[2075,2080],{"nodeType":247,"value":2076,"marks":2077,"data":2079},"Scania: ",[2078],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2081,"marks":2082,"data":2083},"Automotive giant Scania confirmed it suffered a cybersecurity incident where threat actors used compromised credentials to breach its Financial Services systems and steal insurance claim documents.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2085,"content":2086},{},[2087],{"nodeType":247,"value":2088,"marks":2089,"data":2090},"Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters may be grabbing the headlines — but this a huge movement in a vast and flexible community of attackers. And criminals around the world are learning from their success. ",[],{},{"nodeType":281,"data":2092,"content":2093},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":2095,"content":2096},{},[2097],{"nodeType":247,"value":2098,"marks":2099,"data":2101},"Lessons learned",[2100],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2103,"content":2104},{},[2105],{"nodeType":247,"value":2106,"marks":2107,"data":2108},"The common thread with all of these attacks is that they are evading established security controls by targeting applications directly, over the internet, via account takeover.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2110,"content":2111},{},[2112],{"nodeType":247,"value":2113,"marks":2114,"data":2115},"Clearly, the success of these attacks shows the limitations of multiple control layers. Endpoint and network layer controls have no visibility of this attack surface. Identity-focused controls are being undermined by ghost logins and shadow IT. And the limitations of cloud security controls in their ability to encompass all apps, and detect and stop malicious actions in real-time (that often blend in seamlessly with normal user activity). ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":2117,"content":2121},{"target":2118},{"sys":2119},{"id":2120,"type":257,"linkType":258},"4Dg3fZEGf7ShyQJ8jlNDME",[],{"nodeType":281,"data":2123,"content":2124},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":2126,"content":2127},{},[2128],{"nodeType":247,"value":2129,"marks":2130,"data":2132},"How Push can help",[2131],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2134,"content":2135},{},[2136],{"nodeType":247,"value":2137,"marks":2138,"data":2139},"Stopping attacks that are designed to evade established controls is in our DNA — it’s the reason Push was founded. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2141,"content":2142},{},[2143],{"nodeType":247,"value":2144,"marks":2145,"data":2146},"The browser is the gateway to to the apps and identities that attackers are now targeting, with many attacks taking place inside the user’s browser — whether that’s entering credentials onto a phishing page, approving a malicious OAuth grant, installing a risky browser extension, or insecurely accessing an app with a weak password and no MFA. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2148,"content":2149},{},[2150],{"nodeType":247,"value":2151,"marks":2152,"data":2153},"Push’s browser-based security platform provides comprehensive detection and response capabilities against attacks like AiTM phishing, credential stuffing, malicious browser extensions, malicious OAuth grants, ClickFix, and session hijacking. You don’t need to wait until it all goes wrong either — you can use Push to proactively find and fix vulnerabilities across the apps that your employees use, like ghost logins, SSO coverage gaps, MFA gaps, vulnerable passwords, and more to harden your attack surface.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2155,"content":2156},{},[2157,2160,2167,2171,2178],{"nodeType":247,"value":1131,"marks":2158,"data":2159},[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":2161,"content":2162},{"uri":1136},[2163],{"nodeType":247,"value":1139,"marks":2164,"data":2166},[2165],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2168,"marks":2169,"data":2170}," or ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":2172,"content":2173},{"uri":1159},[2174],{"nodeType":247,"value":1162,"marks":2175,"data":2177},[2176],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1166,"marks":2179,"data":2180},[],{},"\"Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters\" — how modern attackers exploit the gaps in your security stack ","How Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters breaches demonstrate the evolution of attacker TTPs, shaping the future of cyber attacks.","2025-11-13T00:00:00.000Z","scattered-lapsus-hunters",{"items":2186},[2187,2191],{"sys":2188,"name":2190},{"id":2189},"6A5RXS31ZQx3PwryGb1IMy","Browser-based attacks",{"sys":2192,"name":2194},{"id":2193},"4ksQNCFeBf8H4QIORqpRLw","Detection & response",{"items":2196},[2197],{"fullName":232,"firstName":233,"jobTitle":234,"profilePicture":2198},{"url":236},{"__typename":1223,"sys":2200,"content":2202,"title":3054,"synopsis":3055,"hashTags":62,"publishedDate":3056,"slug":3057,"tagsCollection":3058,"authorsCollection":3064},{"id":2201},"71EaaK7lfl6bQBbkAU0qjv",{"json":2203},{"nodeType":239,"data":2204,"content":2205},{},[2206,2214,2221,2228,2235,2247,2254,2260,2266,2269,2277,2284,2291,2297,2317,2324,2330,2337,2343,2350,2393,2399,2405,2412,2419,2422,2430,2450,2457,2463,2482,2488,2508,2515,2518,2526,2533,2578,2590,2593,2601,2620,2627,2643,2650,2657,2663,2670,2673,2681,2688,2741,2748,2751,2759,2765,2772,2779,2785,2792,2825,2832,2839,2845,2852,2858,2866,2886,2893,2926,2933,2966,2969,2977,2984,2990,3009,3016,3042,3048],{"nodeType":285,"data":2207,"content":2208},{},[2209],{"nodeType":247,"value":2210,"marks":2211,"data":2213},"Introducing “ConsentFix” — a new kind of phishing attack",[2212],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2215,"content":2216},{},[2217],{"nodeType":247,"value":2218,"marks":2219,"data":2220},"The Push browser agent recently detected and blocked a new attack technique seen targeting several Push customers. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2222,"content":2223},{},[2224],{"nodeType":247,"value":2225,"marks":2226,"data":2227},"This is a new kind of browser-based attack technique that takes over user accounts with a simple copy and paste. If you’re already logged into the app in your browser, you don’t even need to supply creds, or pass an MFA check — meaning it effectively circumvents phishing-resistant auth like passkeys too.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2229,"content":2230},{},[2231],{"nodeType":247,"value":2232,"marks":2233,"data":2234},"This is so different from the AiTM phish kits we usually come up against that we felt it deserved a new name. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2236,"content":2237},{},[2238,2243],{"nodeType":247,"value":2239,"marks":2240,"data":2242},"Enter: ConsentFix. ",[2241],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2244,"marks":2245,"data":2246},"This attack shares a lot of similarities with ClickFix/FileFix, AiTM phishing, and OAuth Consent Phishing. You can think of this as a browser-native ClickFix attack that phishes an OAuth token on a target app by getting the victim to copy and paste a URL containing OAuth key material into a phishing page. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2248,"content":2249},{},[2250],{"nodeType":247,"value":2251,"marks":2252,"data":2253},"The campaign we detected looks to be specifically targeting Microsoft accounts by abusing the Azure CLI OAuth app. Essentially, the attacker tricks the victim into logging into Azure CLI, by generating an OAuth authorization code — visible in a localhost URL — and then pasting that URL (including the code) into an attacker-controlled page. This then creates an OAuth connection between the victim’s Microsoft account and the attacker’s Azure CLI instance. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":2255,"content":2259},{"target":2256},{"sys":2257},{"id":2258,"type":257,"linkType":258},"5GTnqWIbmraz8HZeHMybrP",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":2261,"content":2265},{"target":2262},{"sys":2263},{"id":2264,"type":257,"linkType":258},"1lcjX5q3b1bsuhyOXKvJpW",[],{"nodeType":281,"data":2267,"content":2268},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":2270,"content":2271},{},[2272],{"nodeType":247,"value":2273,"marks":2274,"data":2276},"How ConsentFix works",[2275],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2278,"content":2279},{},[2280],{"nodeType":247,"value":2281,"marks":2282,"data":2283},"In all of the examples we saw, the victim accessed a malicious or compromised webpage via Google Search. The vast majority of the sites we’ve seen associated with the campaign are legitimate, compromised websites with high domain reputation that are easily findable via search engines.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2285,"content":2286},{},[2287],{"nodeType":247,"value":2288,"marks":2289,"data":2290},"The attacker had injected a fake Cloudflare Turnstile into the compromised websites, requiring an email address to be supplied in order to proceed. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":2292,"content":2296},{"target":2293},{"sys":2294},{"id":2295,"type":257,"linkType":258},"39jEjeLqOYIkGc4o9w3MuX",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2298,"content":2299},{},[2300,2304,2313],{"nodeType":247,"value":2301,"marks":2302,"data":2303},"This acted as a form of ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":2305,"content":2307},{"uri":2306},"https://phishing-techniques.pushsecurity.com/techniques/conditional-loading/",[2308],{"nodeType":247,"value":2309,"marks":2310,"data":2312},"conditional loading",[2311],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2314,"marks":2315,"data":2316}," that would only continue if a valid email address and domain was supplied, designed to prevent the page from being analyzed by security bots, analysts, and low-value accounts that run the risk of exposing the campaign before the intended recipient(s) can be phished. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2318,"content":2319},{},[2320],{"nodeType":247,"value":2321,"marks":2322,"data":2323},"If a domain not on the target list was provided, the victim was passed back to the original website and the attack did not progress to the next stage. Further, once the check has concluded per IP, the phishing page will no longer activate, even a different email is provided.  ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":2325,"content":2329},{"target":2326},{"sys":2327},{"id":2328,"type":257,"linkType":258},"7ttmGnTzi9j87tBXfyFcOA",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2331,"content":2332},{},[2333],{"nodeType":247,"value":2334,"marks":2335,"data":2336},"After entering an approved email address, the next stage was loaded, prompting the victim to complete a set of instructions on the page to continue.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":2338,"content":2342},{"target":2339},{"sys":2340},{"id":2341,"type":257,"linkType":258},"2oHYNoMgAz6MdgLlcWjbaB",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2344,"content":2345},{},[2346],{"nodeType":247,"value":2347,"marks":2348,"data":2349},"To complete the attack, the victim must:",[],{},{"nodeType":608,"data":2351,"content":2352},{},[2353,2363,2373,2383],{"nodeType":612,"data":2354,"content":2355},{},[2356],{"nodeType":243,"data":2357,"content":2358},{},[2359],{"nodeType":247,"value":2360,"marks":2361,"data":2362},"Click the “Sign In” button. This opens a new tab that loads a legitimate Microsoft URL associated with the user account/email used to access the page.",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2364,"content":2365},{},[2366],{"nodeType":243,"data":2367,"content":2368},{},[2369],{"nodeType":247,"value":2370,"marks":2371,"data":2372},"If the user is already logged into Microsoft in their browser, they simply need to select their MS account from the dropdown. Otherwise, they will be required to login via the legitimate Microsoft login URL (no phishing takes place at this stage). ",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2374,"content":2375},{},[2376],{"nodeType":243,"data":2377,"content":2378},{},[2379],{"nodeType":247,"value":2380,"marks":2381,"data":2382},"Once logged into legit Microsoft or the account is selected from the dropdown, the user is redirected to localhost, which generates a URL containing a code associated with the user’s Microsoft account. ",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2384,"content":2385},{},[2386],{"nodeType":243,"data":2387,"content":2388},{},[2389],{"nodeType":247,"value":2390,"marks":2391,"data":2392},"To complete the phish, the victim copies the URL and pastes it onto the original page. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":2394,"content":2398},{"target":2395},{"sys":2396},{"id":2397,"type":257,"linkType":258},"7zendMbmCViGwtEpUQvq6y",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":2400,"content":2404},{"target":2401},{"sys":2402},{"id":2403,"type":257,"linkType":258},"1eZOs7hXi9FzCE92QEP6xh",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2406,"content":2407},{},[2408],{"nodeType":247,"value":2409,"marks":2410,"data":2411},"Once the steps are completed, the victim has granted the attacker access to their Microsoft account via Azure CLI. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2413,"content":2414},{},[2415],{"nodeType":247,"value":2416,"marks":2417,"data":2418},"At this point, the attacker has effective control of the victim’s Microsoft account, but without ever needing to phish a password, or pass an MFA check. In fact, if the user was already logged in to their Microsoft account (i.e. they had an active session) no login is required at all. ",[],{},{"nodeType":281,"data":2420,"content":2421},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":2423,"content":2424},{},[2425],{"nodeType":247,"value":2426,"marks":2427,"data":2429},"The next evolution of ClickFix?",[2428],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2431,"content":2432},{},[2433,2437,2446],{"nodeType":247,"value":2434,"marks":2435,"data":2436},"When we presented ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":2438,"content":2440},{"uri":2439},"https://pushsecurity.com/webinar/clickfix",[2441],{"nodeType":247,"value":2442,"marks":2443,"data":2445},"our last webinar on ClickFix",[2444],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2447,"marks":2448,"data":2449},", we predicted that the next evolution of the attack would happen entirely within the browser context. This is because any attack that touches the endpoint (a traditionally much better protected surface) is way more likely to be detected. And with many ClickFix attacks being used to deliver infostealer malware, these attacks are really trying to get back into the browser anyway — to steal credentials and sessions stored there. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2451,"content":2452},{},[2453],{"nodeType":247,"value":2454,"marks":2455,"data":2456},"Let’s take a closer look at the page — if you follow Push research, you might be getting déjà vu. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":2458,"content":2462},{"target":2459},{"sys":2460},{"id":2461,"type":257,"linkType":258},"1vMZCJ92IxFdR1EzzCOOvb",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2464,"content":2465},{},[2466,2470,2479],{"nodeType":247,"value":2467,"marks":2468,"data":2469},"We’ve seen this kind of embedded video player before (albeit a slicker looking one) that we blogged about as ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":2471,"content":2473},{"uri":2472},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/the-most-advanced-clickfix-yet/",[2474],{"nodeType":247,"value":2475,"marks":2476,"data":2478},"the most advanced ClickFix we’d seen",[2477],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1166,"marks":2480,"data":2481},[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":2483,"content":2487},{"target":2484},{"sys":2485},{"id":2486,"type":257,"linkType":258},"ID7VKJNOZk729P5zBOBjZ",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2489,"content":2490},{},[2491,2495,2504],{"nodeType":247,"value":2492,"marks":2493,"data":2494},"Another similarity with ClickFix campaigns we’ve investigated is the use of Google Search as a delivery vector. 4 in 5 ClickFix attacks intercepted by Push came via Google Search, with attackers using ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":2496,"content":2498},{"uri":2497},"https://phishing-techniques.pushsecurity.com/techniques/malvertising/",[2499],{"nodeType":247,"value":2500,"marks":2501,"data":2503},"malvertising",[2502],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2505,"marks":2506,"data":2507}," and either compromised or custom vibe-coded websites to intercept users as they browse the internet. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2509,"content":2510},{},[2511],{"nodeType":247,"value":2512,"marks":2513,"data":2514},"So it seems highly likely that this is a kind of browser-native evolution of ClickFix that shares many elements with typical ClickFix attacks, and is probably used by the same groups of attackers.",[],{},{"nodeType":281,"data":2516,"content":2517},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":2519,"content":2520},{},[2521],{"nodeType":247,"value":2522,"marks":2523,"data":2525},"OAuth shenanigans via Azure CLI",[2524],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2527,"content":2528},{},[2529],{"nodeType":247,"value":2530,"marks":2531,"data":2532},"The clever use of Azure CLI and OAuth consent abuse is another clever iteration on previous techniques. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2534,"content":2535},{},[2536,2540,2549,2552,2561,2565,2574],{"nodeType":247,"value":2537,"marks":2538,"data":2539},"We’ve previously seen ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":2541,"content":2543},{"uri":2542},"https://phishing-techniques.pushsecurity.com/techniques/consent-phishing/",[2544],{"nodeType":247,"value":2545,"marks":2546,"data":2548},"consent phishing",[2547],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1640,"marks":2550,"data":2551},[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":2553,"content":2555},{"uri":2554},"https://phishing-techniques.pushsecurity.com/techniques/device-code-phishing/",[2556],{"nodeType":247,"value":2557,"marks":2558,"data":2560},"device code phishing",[2559],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2562,"marks":2563,"data":2564}," attacks where attackers have tricked victims into connecting malicious external apps into their tenant via OAuth, but this is becoming increasingly difficult in core enterprise cloud environments like Azure due to ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":2566,"content":2568},{"uri":2567},"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/misc/user-consent?view=o365-worldwide",[2569],{"nodeType":247,"value":2570,"marks":2571,"data":2573},"stricter default configs",[2572],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2575,"marks":2576,"data":2577},". However, since Azure CLI is a first-party Microsoft app, it is implicitly trusted in Entra ID, and is excluded from these restrictions. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2579,"content":2580},{},[2581,2585],{"nodeType":247,"value":2582,"marks":2583,"data":2584},"First-party apps like Azure CLI are trusted by default in all tenants, allowed to request permissions without admin approval, and cannot be deleted or blocked. They can also be granted special permissions, such as tenant-wide service permissions (without needing admin approval), use of legacy or undocumented graph scopes, internal scopes for Microsoft client operations, and permissions for Office/Entra admin functions. ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2586,"marks":2587,"data":2589},"This makes Azure CLI a prime target for attackers, and significantly more exploitable than when connecting a third-party app. ",[2588],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":281,"data":2591,"content":2592},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":2594,"content":2595},{},[2596],{"nodeType":247,"value":2597,"marks":2598,"data":2600},"Advanced detection evasion techniques",[2599],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2602,"content":2603},{},[2604,2608,2616],{"nodeType":247,"value":2605,"marks":2606,"data":2607},"This campaign features some of the most advanced ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":2609,"content":2611},{"uri":2610},"https://phishing-techniques.pushsecurity.com/",[2612],{"nodeType":247,"value":2613,"marks":2614,"data":2615},"detection evasion techniques",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2617,"marks":2618,"data":2619}," we've seen in the wild. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2621,"content":2622},{},[2623],{"nodeType":247,"value":2624,"marks":2625,"data":2626},"As well as the use of Google Search to deliver the lure, and bot protection to prevent security tools from analyzing the page, there were multiple layers of anti-analysis techniques to navigate.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2628,"content":2629},{},[2630,2634,2639],{"nodeType":247,"value":2631,"marks":2632,"data":2633},"We already mentioned the use of selective targeting based on email addresses and domain names. But all sites involved in the campaign also have synchronized IP blocking — meaning if you visit one site and are served one of the associated phishing pages, the phish will never be served again, ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2635,"marks":2636,"data":2638},"across any of the sites linked to the campaign",[2637],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2640,"marks":2641,"data":2642},". When you visit any of the sites again, the phish won't trigger, and it can be browsed as normal. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2644,"content":2645},{},[2646],{"nodeType":247,"value":2647,"marks":2648,"data":2649},"On the backend, there are multiple checks based on your IP and identifiers unique to your session. Unless all of the conditions are met, certain JavaScript packages won't be served — preventing full inspection of the page to detect malicious elements. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2651,"content":2652},{},[2653],{"nodeType":247,"value":2654,"marks":2655,"data":2656},"If the conditions aren't met, the page may not load the Cloudflare Turnstile check at all, or will redirect you back to the site to continue browsing as normal.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":2658,"content":2662},{"target":2659},{"sys":2660},{"id":2661,"type":257,"linkType":258},"5v0zDoscA6pYLBfkXrNtIH",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2664,"content":2665},{},[2666],{"nodeType":247,"value":2667,"marks":2668,"data":2669},"All of these make it incredibly hard to detect and block these attacks ahead of time when relying on URL-based checks and traffic analysis.",[],{},{"nodeType":281,"data":2671,"content":2672},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":2674,"content":2675},{},[2676],{"nodeType":247,"value":2677,"marks":2678,"data":2680},"Key takeaways",[2679],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2682,"content":2683},{},[2684],{"nodeType":247,"value":2685,"marks":2686,"data":2687},"ConsentFix is a dangerous evolution of ClickFix and consent phishing that is incredibly hard for traditional security tools to detect and block, as:",[],{},{"nodeType":608,"data":2689,"content":2690},{},[2691,2701,2711,2721,2731],{"nodeType":612,"data":2692,"content":2693},{},[2694],{"nodeType":243,"data":2695,"content":2696},{},[2697],{"nodeType":247,"value":2698,"marks":2699,"data":2700},"The attack happens entirely inside the browser context, removing one of the key detection opportunities for ClickFix (because it doesn’t touch the endpoint).",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2702,"content":2703},{},[2704],{"nodeType":243,"data":2705,"content":2706},{},[2707],{"nodeType":247,"value":2708,"marks":2709,"data":2710},"Delivering the lure via a Google Search watering hole attack completely circumvents email-based anti-phishing controls.",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2712,"content":2713},{},[2714],{"nodeType":243,"data":2715,"content":2716},{},[2717],{"nodeType":247,"value":2718,"marks":2719,"data":2720},"Targeting a first-party app like Azure CLI means that many of the mitigating controls available for third-party app integrations do not apply — making this attack way harder to prevent.",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2722,"content":2723},{},[2724],{"nodeType":243,"data":2725,"content":2726},{},[2727],{"nodeType":247,"value":2728,"marks":2729,"data":2730},"Because there’s no login required, phishing-resistant authentication controls like passkeys have no impact on this attack. ",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2732,"content":2733},{},[2734],{"nodeType":243,"data":2735,"content":2736},{},[2737],{"nodeType":247,"value":2738,"marks":2739,"data":2740},"The use of advanced detection evasion techniques makes this attack difficult to investigate, meaning these attacks are going undetected. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2742,"content":2743},{},[2744],{"nodeType":247,"value":2745,"marks":2746,"data":2747},"We’re sure to see more examples of ConsentFix in future. We’ll be monitoring to see how attackers adapt in terms of integrating these capabilities with common as-a-Service offerings to make them more widespread, and whether the scope extends further beyond Microsoft / Azure CLI targets in the future to target other enterprise cloud ecosystems. ",[],{},{"nodeType":281,"data":2749,"content":2750},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":2752,"content":2753},{},[2754],{"nodeType":247,"value":2755,"marks":2756,"data":2758},"Recommendations",[2757],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":252,"data":2760,"content":2764},{"target":2761},{"sys":2762},{"id":2763,"type":257,"linkType":258},"3aBCwdB2aNnLRxRN5RrshC",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2766,"content":2767},{},[2768],{"nodeType":247,"value":2769,"marks":2770,"data":2771},"On the backend, exploitation of this attack will lead to login events being observed to the Microsoft Azure CLI app. It’s likely that any legitimate use of this will most likely be limited to system administrators and possibly developers. Therefore, logins outside of these groups will be inherently more suspicious.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2773,"content":2774},{},[2775],{"nodeType":247,"value":2776,"marks":2777,"data":2778},"Additionally, it’s possible that aspects of the logins themselves will be different between legitimate Azure CLI use and exploitation of this attack. For example, see the following logs from a lab environment. The login events with an application of  “Microsoft Azure CLI” and a resource of “Azure Resource Manager” was legitimate use of the Azure CLI using the powershell CLI framework. Conversely, the login event with the Resource of “Windows Azure Active Directory” was produced by logging in using the method used by the phishing kit.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":2780,"content":2784},{"target":2781},{"sys":2782},{"id":2783,"type":257,"linkType":258},"6ie0nkk6XbgwidfwmiGwL4",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2786,"content":2787},{},[2788],{"nodeType":247,"value":2789,"marks":2790,"data":2791},"There is no guarantee this can be used to differentiate between legitimate and malicious examples, but it’s another data point to consider. If searching logs you may wish to use the respective GUIDs for these:",[],{},{"nodeType":608,"data":2793,"content":2794},{},[2795,2810],{"nodeType":612,"data":2796,"content":2797},{},[2798],{"nodeType":243,"data":2799,"content":2800},{},[2801,2806],{"nodeType":247,"value":2802,"marks":2803,"data":2805},"Application ID",[2804],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2807,"marks":2808,"data":2809}," = 04b07795-8ddb-461a-bbee-02f9e1bf7b46",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2811,"content":2812},{},[2813],{"nodeType":243,"data":2814,"content":2815},{},[2816,2821],{"nodeType":247,"value":2817,"marks":2818,"data":2820},"Resource ID",[2819],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2822,"marks":2823,"data":2824}," = 00000002-0000-0000-c000-000000000000",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2826,"content":2827},{},[2828],{"nodeType":247,"value":2829,"marks":2830,"data":2831},"For interactive logins, like above, you cannot rely on looking for logins from suspicious IP addresses or locations. The login itself occurs from the victims browser directly to Microsoft, and so the IP addresses associated with these events will be the legitimate IP used by the target user, not by the threat actor. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2833,"content":2834},{},[2835],{"nodeType":247,"value":2836,"marks":2837,"data":2838},"However, for non-interactive logins and other audit logs for actions taken, you may be able to uncover unusual IP addresses that differ from the original interactive login. For example, here are some non-interactive logins that were observed immediately after compromise that came from different IP addresses in both the US and Indonesia.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":2840,"content":2844},{"target":2841},{"sys":2842},{"id":2843,"type":257,"linkType":258},"TD3YeWqgGIWIWM8FRHU4o",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2846,"content":2847},{},[2848],{"nodeType":247,"value":2849,"marks":2850,"data":2851},"Interestingly, they differ in which resources they accessed, with one accessing the Windows Azure Active Directory resource ID like the interactive login, but two others accessing the Microsoft Intune Checkin resource ID. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":2853,"content":2857},{"target":2854},{"sys":2855},{"id":2856,"type":257,"linkType":258},"57PqDQiAiwzqkspVpROQXb",[],{"nodeType":592,"data":2859,"content":2860},{},[2861],{"nodeType":247,"value":2862,"marks":2863,"data":2865},"IoCs",[2864],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2867,"content":2868},{},[2869,2873,2882],{"nodeType":247,"value":2870,"marks":2871,"data":2872},"Short-lived IoCs are of limited value when tackling modern phishing attacks due to the rate at which attackers are able to ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":2874,"content":2876},{"uri":2875},"https://phishing-techniques.pushsecurity.com/techniques/domain-rotation-redirection/",[2877],{"nodeType":247,"value":2878,"marks":2879,"data":2881},"quickly spin up and rotate the sites used",[2880],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2883,"marks":2884,"data":2885}," in the attack chain, often dynamically serving different URLs to site visitors. ",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2887,"content":2888},{},[2889],{"nodeType":247,"value":2890,"marks":2891,"data":2892},"That said, the domains used to deliver the final phishing payload were:",[],{},{"nodeType":608,"data":2894,"content":2895},{},[2896,2906,2916],{"nodeType":612,"data":2897,"content":2898},{},[2899],{"nodeType":243,"data":2900,"content":2901},{},[2902],{"nodeType":247,"value":2903,"marks":2904,"data":2905},"hxxps://trustpointassurance.com/",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2907,"content":2908},{},[2909],{"nodeType":243,"data":2910,"content":2911},{},[2912],{"nodeType":247,"value":2913,"marks":2914,"data":2915},"hxxps://fastwaycheck.com/",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2917,"content":2918},{},[2919],{"nodeType":243,"data":2920,"content":2921},{},[2922],{"nodeType":247,"value":2923,"marks":2924,"data":2925},"hxxps://previewcentral.com",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2927,"content":2928},{},[2929],{"nodeType":247,"value":2930,"marks":2931,"data":2932},"In addition, we recommend hunting for connections from the following IPs in Azure logs:",[],{},{"nodeType":608,"data":2934,"content":2935},{},[2936,2946,2956],{"nodeType":612,"data":2937,"content":2938},{},[2939],{"nodeType":243,"data":2940,"content":2941},{},[2942],{"nodeType":247,"value":2943,"marks":2944,"data":2945},"12.75.216.90",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2947,"content":2948},{},[2949],{"nodeType":243,"data":2950,"content":2951},{},[2952],{"nodeType":247,"value":2953,"marks":2954,"data":2955},"182.3.36.223",[],{},{"nodeType":612,"data":2957,"content":2958},{},[2959],{"nodeType":243,"data":2960,"content":2961},{},[2962],{"nodeType":247,"value":2963,"marks":2964,"data":2965},"12.75.116.137",[],{},{"nodeType":281,"data":2967,"content":2968},{},[],{"nodeType":285,"data":2970,"content":2971},{},[2972],{"nodeType":247,"value":2973,"marks":2974,"data":2976},"How Push stopped the attack",[2975],{"type":292},{},{"nodeType":243,"data":2978,"content":2979},{},[2980],{"nodeType":247,"value":2981,"marks":2982,"data":2983},"Even though this was a brand new technique, Push intercepted this attack and shut it down before customers could interact with it. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":2985,"content":2989},{"target":2986},{"sys":2987},{"id":2988,"type":257,"linkType":258},"5YzpiQH974EYA5iPPZMXkV",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2991,"content":2992},{},[2993,2997,3005],{"nodeType":247,"value":2994,"marks":2995,"data":2996},"Push doesn’t detect the redirect tricks or rely on outdated domain TI feeds. The reason we detect these attacks (which make it through all the other layers of phishing protection) is that Push sees what your users see. It doesn’t matter what ",[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":2998,"content":2999},{"uri":2610},[3000],{"nodeType":247,"value":3001,"marks":3002,"data":3004},"delivery channel or camouflage methods are used",[3003],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":3006,"marks":3007,"data":3008},", Push shuts the attack down in real time, as the user loads the malicious page in their web browser.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":3010,"content":3011},{},[3012],{"nodeType":247,"value":3013,"marks":3014,"data":3015},"This isn’t all we do: Push’s browser-based security platform provides comprehensive detection and response capabilities against the leading cause of breaches. Push blocks browser-based attacks like AiTM phishing, credential stuffing, malicious browser extensions, ClickFix, and session hijacking. You don’t need to wait until it all goes wrong — you can also use Push to proactively find and fix vulnerabilities across the apps that your employees use, like ghost logins, SSO coverage gaps, MFA gaps, vulnerable passwords, and more to harden your identity attack surface.",[],{},{"nodeType":243,"data":3017,"content":3018},{},[3019,3022,3029,3032,3039],{"nodeType":247,"value":1131,"marks":3020,"data":3021},[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":3023,"content":3024},{"uri":1136},[3025],{"nodeType":247,"value":1139,"marks":3026,"data":3028},[3027],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2168,"marks":3030,"data":3031},[],{},{"nodeType":268,"data":3033,"content":3034},{"uri":1159},[3035],{"nodeType":247,"value":1162,"marks":3036,"data":3038},[3037],{"type":1310},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1166,"marks":3040,"data":3041},[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":3043,"content":3047},{"target":3044},{"sys":3045},{"id":3046,"type":257,"linkType":258},"6QzB0BlVC5mstXwXHvy2c3",[],{"nodeType":243,"data":3049,"content":3050},{},[3051],{"nodeType":247,"value":29,"marks":3052,"data":3053},[],{},"ConsentFix: Analyzing a browser-native ClickFix-style attack that hijacks OAuth consent grants","Analyzing \"ConsentFix\", a new browser-native attack technique we've detected in the wild, combining OAuth consent phishing with a ClickFix-style user prompt. ","2025-12-11T00:00:00.000Z","consentfix",{"items":3059},[3060,3062],{"sys":3061,"name":2190},{"id":2189},{"sys":3063,"name":2194},{"id":2193},{"items":3065},[3066],{"fullName":3067,"firstName":3068,"jobTitle":3069,"profilePicture":3070},"Luke Jennings","Luke","Vice President, R&D",{"url":3071},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/4Hosb4zKi1dA0PUyDLMe1h/27e09d894861f2196ba794037986fb08/T016S22KZ96-U02NVQM7ZD4-57761d542d83-512.jpeg",{"__typename":1223,"sys":3073,"content":3075,"title":3689,"synopsis":3690,"hashTags":62,"publishedDate":3691,"slug":3692,"tagsCollection":3693,"authorsCollection":3699},{"id":3074},"44DXq5ZkL9XQV5Fngto0XZ",{"json":3076},{"data":3077,"content":3078,"nodeType":239},{},[3079,3098,3105,3112,3115,3123,3143,3162,3196,3202,3205,3213,3221,3228,3246,3253,3258,3264,3271,3278,3286,3293,3300,3306,3313,3333,3341,3348,3355,3375,3381,3401,3407,3414,3420,3423,3431,3438,3457,3464,3492,3499,3507,3510,3518,3525,3532,3538,3545,3590,3596,3603,3635,3641,3683],{"data":3080,"content":3081,"nodeType":243},{},[3082,3085,3094],{"data":3083,"marks":3084,"value":29,"nodeType":247},{},[],{"data":3086,"content":3088,"nodeType":268},{"uri":3087},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/scattered-lapsus-hunters/",[3089],{"data":3090,"marks":3091,"value":3093,"nodeType":247},{},[3092],{"type":1310},"Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters",{"data":3095,"marks":3096,"value":3097,"nodeType":247},{},[]," are running a large-scale hybrid vishing plus AiTM phishing campaign across several industry verticals, targeting Okta, Entra, and Google SSO platforms. ",{"data":3099,"content":3100,"nodeType":243},{},[3101],{"data":3102,"marks":3103,"value":3104,"nodeType":247},{},[],"The attacks begin with the attacker calling their victim, impersonating IT staff from their company. They offer to help the employee set up passkeys for logging into the enterprise SSO service, tricking the victim into visiting a specially crafted adversary-in-the-middle phishing site that captures their SSO credentials, MFA codes, and ultimately live session access. ",{"data":3106,"content":3107,"nodeType":243},{},[3108],{"data":3109,"marks":3110,"value":3111,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Once an account is stolen, the attacker logs in to the SSO dashboard to see which platforms they have access to and then proceeds to steal data from them — with the ultimate goal of extorting victims. ",{"data":3113,"content":3114,"nodeType":281},{},[],{"data":3116,"content":3117,"nodeType":285},{},[3118],{"data":3119,"marks":3120,"value":3122,"nodeType":247},{},[3121],{"type":292},"What we know",{"data":3124,"content":3125,"nodeType":243},{},[3126,3130,3139],{"data":3127,"marks":3128,"value":3129,"nodeType":247},{},[],"To date, ",{"data":3131,"content":3133,"nodeType":268},{"uri":3132},"https://www.silentpush.com/blog/slsh-alert/",[3134],{"data":3135,"marks":3136,"value":3138,"nodeType":247},{},[3137],{"type":1310},"100+ companies have been targeted",{"data":3140,"marks":3141,"value":3142,"nodeType":247},{},[],", with infrastructure and domains impersonating their brand to be used in legit-looking campaigns against them. The reality is that the list of targets could be more extensive, and will continue to increase over time. ",{"data":3144,"content":3145,"nodeType":243},{},[3146,3150,3158],{"data":3147,"marks":3148,"value":3149,"nodeType":247},{},[],"SLH ",{"data":3151,"content":3152,"nodeType":268},{"uri":1633},[3153],{"data":3154,"marks":3155,"value":3157,"nodeType":247},{},[3156],{"type":1310},"claims to be using data stolen in previous breaches",{"data":3159,"marks":3160,"value":3161,"nodeType":247},{},[],", such as the widespread Salesforce data theft attacks reported in 2025, to identify and contact employees. This data includes phone numbers, job titles, names, and other details used to make the social engineering calls more convincing.",{"data":3163,"content":3164,"nodeType":243},{},[3165,3169,3174,3178,3183,3187,3192],{"data":3166,"marks":3167,"value":3168,"nodeType":247},{},[],"The group recently relaunched its Tor data leak site, which currently lists breaches at ",{"data":3170,"marks":3171,"value":3173,"nodeType":247},{},[3172],{"type":292},"Betterment",{"data":3175,"marks":3176,"value":3177,"nodeType":247},{},[]," (20 million records containing PII), ",{"data":3179,"marks":3180,"value":3182,"nodeType":247},{},[3181],{"type":292},"Crunchbase",{"data":3184,"marks":3185,"value":3186,"nodeType":247},{},[]," (2 million records containing PII), and ",{"data":3188,"marks":3189,"value":3191,"nodeType":247},{},[3190],{"type":292},"SoundCloud",{"data":3193,"marks":3194,"value":3195,"nodeType":247},{},[]," (30 million records containing PII). ",{"data":3197,"content":3201,"nodeType":252},{"target":3198},{"sys":3199},{"id":3200,"type":257,"linkType":258},"5scKHYJJleNklGAXNKVc7b",[],{"data":3203,"content":3204,"nodeType":281},{},[],{"data":3206,"content":3207,"nodeType":285},{},[3208],{"data":3209,"marks":3210,"value":3212,"nodeType":247},{},[3211],{"type":292},"What’s new?",{"data":3214,"content":3215,"nodeType":592},{},[3216],{"data":3217,"marks":3218,"value":3220,"nodeType":247},{},[3219],{"type":292},"The best of both worlds? Vishing + AiTM phishing",{"data":3222,"content":3223,"nodeType":243},{},[3224],{"data":3225,"marks":3226,"value":3227,"nodeType":247},{},[],"SLH and threat actors affiliated with “The Com” are no stranger to voice phishing (vishing) or the use of MFA-bypassing Attacker-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing kits. ",{"data":3229,"content":3230,"nodeType":243},{},[3231,3234,3242],{"data":3232,"marks":3233,"value":29,"nodeType":247},{},[],{"data":3235,"content":3236,"nodeType":268},{"uri":3087},[3237],{"data":3238,"marks":3239,"value":3241,"nodeType":247},{},[3240],{"type":1310},"SLH and it’s precursor groups",{"data":3243,"marks":3244,"value":3245,"nodeType":247},{},[]," leveraged vishing to great success in the form of help desk impersonation and password/MFA reset attacks as seen in the high profile Marks & Spencer, Co-Op, and Jaguar Land Rover attacks in 2025, as well as the Caesars and MGM attacks in 2023. MFA-bypassing phishing techniques have also long been a part of their arsenal, from the 2022 0ktapus phishing campaign to more recent use of modern AiTM phishing kits. ",{"data":3247,"content":3248,"nodeType":243},{},[3249],{"data":3250,"marks":3251,"value":3252,"nodeType":247},{},[],"But until now, we haven’t seen them used together. ",{"data":3254,"content":3257,"nodeType":252},{"target":3255},{"sys":3256},{"id":1392,"type":257,"linkType":258},[],{"data":3259,"content":3263,"nodeType":252},{"target":3260},{"sys":3261},{"id":3262,"type":257,"linkType":258},"1IDsaYD3H5MjvPS4ekcUhU",[],{"data":3265,"content":3266,"nodeType":243},{},[3267],{"data":3268,"marks":3269,"value":3270,"nodeType":247},{},[],"It makes sense to combine these methods. AiTM phishing kits are flexible, highly customizable, and can be used to target a broad range of apps — including all of the major IdP platforms used for SSO. Vishing on the other hand is proven to increase the effectiveness of social engineering attacks when performed by an effective operator — which SLH are proven to be (helped by predominantly native English speakers making up their membership, along with the use of effective voice phishing tools). ",{"data":3272,"content":3273,"nodeType":243},{},[3274],{"data":3275,"marks":3276,"value":3277,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Both vishing and AiTM phishing are identity-first methods that consciously evade traditional security tools and detection controls at the endpoint and network layer. This makes them highly effective in today’s IT environment. ",{"data":3279,"content":3280,"nodeType":592},{},[3281],{"data":3282,"marks":3283,"value":3285,"nodeType":247},{},[3284],{"type":292},"A new kind of operator-driven AiTM kit",{"data":3287,"content":3288,"nodeType":243},{},[3289],{"data":3290,"marks":3291,"value":3292,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Another unique part about this campaign is that it uses a “live phishing panel” — i.e. a customizable phishing page controlled by the attacker in real time. This enables attackers to dynamically change what a victim sees on a phishing site while speaking to them on the phone. This allows them to guide victims through each step of the login and MFA authentication process.",{"data":3294,"content":3295,"nodeType":243},{},[3296],{"data":3297,"marks":3298,"value":3299,"nodeType":247},{},[],"This is principally to increase the victim’s likelihood of engaging with the phishing page. As you can see in the image below, there are several options that can be presented to the victim — including not just the normal phishing stages of entering credentials and passing MFA checks, but also post-compromise actions (e.g. creating a passkey that would then be controlled by the attacker for persistent access even if an account password is reset). ",{"data":3301,"content":3305,"nodeType":252},{"target":3302},{"sys":3303},{"id":3304,"type":257,"linkType":258},"73Y2n3tRkGFtfhrA2AVJyv",[],{"data":3307,"content":3308,"nodeType":243},{},[3309],{"data":3310,"marks":3311,"value":3312,"nodeType":247},{},[],"At the end of the authentication flow, the threat actor can choose to redirect their target to a “support ticket\" closure screen. This allows the threat actor to manually terminate the session once the compromise is complete while providing the targeted user with context that matches the \"IT support\" ruse. This further reduces the likelihood of post-hoc reporting by a suspicious victim.",{"data":3314,"content":3315,"nodeType":243},{},[3316,3320,3329],{"data":3317,"marks":3318,"value":3319,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Given that this modular, operator-controlled phishing kit is reportedly available “",{"data":3321,"content":3323,"nodeType":268},{"uri":3322},"https://www.okta.com/blog/threat-intelligence/phishing-kits-adapt-to-the-script-of-callers/",[3324],{"data":3325,"marks":3326,"value":3328,"nodeType":247},{},[3327],{"type":1310},"as a service",{"data":3330,"marks":3331,"value":3332,"nodeType":247},{},[],"” for criminals, we should expect to see much more of this in future. ",{"data":3334,"content":3335,"nodeType":592},{},[3336],{"data":3337,"marks":3338,"value":3340,"nodeType":247},{},[3339],{"type":292},"0ktapus 2.0?",{"data":3342,"content":3343,"nodeType":243},{},[3344],{"data":3345,"marks":3346,"value":3347,"nodeType":247},{},[],"As we mentioned earlier, Scattered Spider made their reputation launching phishing attacks against Okta accounts in the 2022 0ktapus campaign. ",{"data":3349,"content":3350,"nodeType":243},{},[3351],{"data":3352,"marks":3353,"value":3354,"nodeType":247},{},[],"The vast majority of phishing attacks target IdP accounts because of the widespread access to downstream apps they grant via SSO. ",{"data":3356,"content":3357,"nodeType":243},{},[3358,3362,3371],{"data":3359,"marks":3360,"value":3361,"nodeType":247},{},[],"This comes at the same time as ",{"data":3363,"content":3365,"nodeType":268},{"uri":3364},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fake-lastpass-emails-pose-as-password-vault-backup-alerts/",[3366],{"data":3367,"marks":3368,"value":3370,"nodeType":247},{},[3369],{"type":1310},"attackers running campaigns to target LastPass master passwords",{"data":3372,"marks":3373,"value":3374,"nodeType":247},{},[],". This provides a similar level of access to apps in the form of credentials (and sometimes saved passkeys). ",{"data":3376,"content":3380,"nodeType":252},{"target":3377},{"sys":3378},{"id":3379,"type":257,"linkType":258},"1vyu5WvdktTnC24TkVFqfs",[],{"data":3382,"content":3383,"nodeType":243},{},[3384,3388,3397],{"data":3385,"marks":3386,"value":3387,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Not only is this a goldmine for attackers looking to steal data or pivot to other systems to be able to launch further attacks (e.g. pivoting to cloud and on-prem services for ransomware deployment) but it’s a nightmare for incident responders. If an attacker can access an app and create a backdoor login method (AKA. a ",{"data":3389,"content":3391,"nodeType":268},{"uri":3390},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/ghost-logins-when-forgotten-identities-come-back-to-haunt-you/",[3392],{"data":3393,"marks":3394,"value":3396,"nodeType":247},{},[3395],{"type":1310},"ghost login",{"data":3398,"marks":3399,"value":3400,"nodeType":247},{},[],") it can be very difficult for a security team to identify and clean them up. ",{"data":3402,"content":3406,"nodeType":252},{"target":3403},{"sys":3404},{"id":3405,"type":257,"linkType":258},"7tILkroPw9w0WLIo1bVV24",[],{"data":3408,"content":3409,"nodeType":243},{},[3410],{"data":3411,"marks":3412,"value":3413,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Check out the excerpt from one of our recent webinars below for more information. ",{"data":3415,"content":3419,"nodeType":252},{"target":3416},{"sys":3417},{"id":3418,"type":257,"linkType":258},"5IVkapjwLp1Ys14vXagQRD",[],{"data":3421,"content":3422,"nodeType":281},{},[],{"data":3424,"content":3425,"nodeType":285},{},[3426],{"data":3427,"marks":3428,"value":3430,"nodeType":247},{},[3429],{"type":292},"Impact analysis",{"data":3432,"content":3433,"nodeType":243},{},[3434],{"data":3435,"marks":3436,"value":3437,"nodeType":247},{},[],"This combination of methods is likely to increase the success of these malicious campaigns as well as reducing the likelihood of detection. ",{"data":3439,"content":3440,"nodeType":243},{},[3441,3445,3453],{"data":3442,"marks":3443,"value":3444,"nodeType":247},{},[],"It’s well documented that modern phishing attacks use a wide and ever-expanding range of ",{"data":3446,"content":3448,"nodeType":268},{"uri":3447},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/phishing-detection-evasion-launch/",[3449],{"data":3450,"marks":3451,"value":2613,"nodeType":247},{},[3452],{"type":1310},{"data":3454,"marks":3455,"value":3456,"nodeType":247},{},[]," — from implementing legitimate bot protection technologies to prevent analysis, to only loading pages if the correct parameters are met — such as coming through a specific URL redirect path, and adhering to “normal” browser configs (excluding unusual browser window sizes and the presence of security analysis tools).",{"data":3458,"content":3459,"nodeType":243},{},[3460],{"data":3461,"marks":3462,"value":3463,"nodeType":247},{},[],"In this case, the malicious payload will only trigger in the event that the delivery is approved by an operator in real time. This means that anyone attempting to find and proactively block a phishing page based on indicators of known-bad is going to have a tough time finding and flagging them. If you haven’t got a community of security analysts sharing and tagging samples of malicious pages, it makes it really hard to find and block them at scale before they hit a victim. And if these convincing attacks aren’t being reported, they’re even less likely to be investigated. This is what we mean when we say that most phishing attacks today are effectively zero-day. ",{"data":3465,"content":3466,"nodeType":243},{},[3467,3471,3476,3479,3488],{"data":3468,"marks":3469,"value":3470,"nodeType":247},{},[],"In this case, it’s worth pointing out that the phone call is essentially the delivery vector for the phishing page. This means there’s no email to intercept and analyse. This isn’t new — ",{"data":3472,"marks":3473,"value":3475,"nodeType":247},{},[3474],{"type":292},"non-email vectors now account for more than 1 in 3 phishing attacks intercepted by Push",{"data":3477,"marks":3478,"value":675,"nodeType":247},{},[],{"data":3480,"content":3482,"nodeType":268},{"uri":3481},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/2025-top-phishing-trends/",[3483],{"data":3484,"marks":3485,"value":3487,"nodeType":247},{},[3486],{"type":1310},"LinkedIn and Google Search being the top culprits",{"data":3489,"marks":3490,"value":3491,"nodeType":247},{},[],". This effectively cuts out the primary phishing detection surface for most organizations.",{"data":3493,"content":3494,"nodeType":243},{},[3495],{"data":3496,"marks":3497,"value":3498,"nodeType":247},{},[],"All this means that unless you’re able to detect and block these attacks in real time, organizations will find themselves unable to counter this evolving threat. ",{"data":3500,"content":3501,"nodeType":243},{},[3502],{"data":3503,"marks":3504,"value":3506,"nodeType":247},{},[3505],{"type":292},"The best/only way to do that is to be in the browser. ",{"data":3508,"content":3509,"nodeType":281},{},[],{"data":3511,"content":3512,"nodeType":285},{},[3513],{"data":3514,"marks":3515,"value":3517,"nodeType":247},{},[3516],{"type":292},"How Push stops the attack",{"data":3519,"content":3520,"nodeType":243},{},[3521],{"data":3522,"marks":3523,"value":3524,"nodeType":247},{},[],"As a browser-based detection and response tool, Push is perfectly positioned to detect and block attacks like this in real-time. ",{"data":3526,"content":3527,"nodeType":243},{},[3528],{"data":3529,"marks":3530,"value":3531,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Push harnesses deep browser telemetry to detect and block phishing based on behaviors, not static indicators. By analyzing how phishing pages behave and how users interact with them, Push uncovers fake pages, attempted credential theft, and phishing kits the moment they load in the browser — regardless of the delivery mechanism, and even when the attack has never been seen before. ",{"data":3533,"content":3537,"nodeType":252},{"target":3534},{"sys":3535},{"id":3536,"type":257,"linkType":258},"2TAKFM1rpETq4KtTY3FPIs",[],{"data":3539,"content":3540,"nodeType":243},{},[3541],{"data":3542,"marks":3543,"value":3544,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Push's browser-based controls include:",{"data":3546,"content":3547,"nodeType":608},{},[3548,3569],{"data":3549,"content":3550,"nodeType":612},{},[3551],{"data":3552,"content":3553,"nodeType":243},{},[3554,3557,3565],{"data":3555,"marks":3556,"value":29,"nodeType":247},{},[],{"data":3558,"content":3560,"nodeType":268},{"uri":3559},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/introducing-sso-password-protection/",[3561],{"data":3562,"marks":3563,"value":3564,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Fingerprinting high-risk app passwords",{"data":3566,"marks":3567,"value":3568,"nodeType":247},{},[]," so they can only be used on a specific domain. Any attempt to reuse this password elsewhere (such as on a phishing site) results in the attempt being blocked. ",{"data":3570,"content":3571,"nodeType":612},{},[3572],{"data":3573,"content":3574,"nodeType":243},{},[3575,3578,3586],{"data":3576,"marks":3577,"value":29,"nodeType":247},{},[],{"data":3579,"content":3581,"nodeType":268},{"uri":3580},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/detecting-and-blocking-phishing-attacks-in-the-browser/",[3582],{"data":3583,"marks":3584,"value":3585,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Multiple browser-based checks",{"data":3587,"marks":3588,"value":3589,"nodeType":247},{},[]," looking for indicators of bad, such as cloned elements from legitimate websites, and an ever-growing number of detections relating to phishing kit behaviors and attributes as they are rendered on a page. ",{"data":3591,"content":3595,"nodeType":252},{"target":3592},{"sys":3593},{"id":3594,"type":257,"linkType":258},"4ESxxjTjNwNXGEW4DBcMVV",[],{"data":3597,"content":3598,"nodeType":243},{},[3599],{"data":3600,"marks":3601,"value":3602,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Because Push observes every login made in the browser, you can also use Push to find identities susceptible to phishing attacks, such as those not using phishing-resistant authentication methods (e.g. passkeys), to proactively improve your account hygiene and reduce your attack surface. ",{"data":3604,"content":3605,"nodeType":243},{},[3606,3610,3619,3623,3631],{"data":3607,"marks":3608,"value":3609,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Finally, you can also use our ",{"data":3611,"content":3613,"nodeType":268},{"uri":3612},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/employee-identity-verification-codes-release/",[3614],{"data":3615,"marks":3616,"value":3618,"nodeType":247},{},[3617],{"type":1310},"employee verification codes",{"data":3620,"marks":3621,"value":3622,"nodeType":247},{},[]," feature as part of a layered defense — a simple, browser-based identity check that gives your employees a reliable way to confirm they’re talking to another employee from your organization. It enables employees to quickly verify that a caller is who they say they are by relaying a rotating 6-digit verification code displayed in every employee's browser via the Push extension. This is an effective way of combating ",{"data":3624,"content":3625,"nodeType":268},{"uri":1741},[3626],{"data":3627,"marks":3628,"value":3630,"nodeType":247},{},[3629],{"type":1310},"help desk scams",{"data":3632,"marks":3633,"value":3634,"nodeType":247},{},[]," too — another favorite of SLH. ",{"data":3636,"content":3640,"nodeType":252},{"target":3637},{"sys":3638},{"id":3639,"type":257,"linkType":258},"1TEpCjh8UGwmejgYSGC1by",[],{"data":3642,"content":3643,"nodeType":3682},{},[3644],{"data":3645,"content":3646,"nodeType":243},{},[3647,3651,3659,3662,3669,3672,3679],{"data":3648,"marks":3649,"value":3650,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Want to learn more about Push? ",{"data":3652,"content":3653,"nodeType":268},{"uri":1136},[3654],{"data":3655,"marks":3656,"value":3658,"nodeType":247},{},[3657],{"type":1310},"Check out our latest product overview",{"data":3660,"marks":3661,"value":675,"nodeType":247},{},[],{"data":3663,"content":3664,"nodeType":268},{"uri":1147},[3665],{"data":3666,"marks":3667,"value":3668,"nodeType":247},{},[],"visit our demo library",{"data":3670,"marks":3671,"value":1154,"nodeType":247},{},[],{"data":3673,"content":3674,"nodeType":268},{"uri":1159},[3675],{"data":3676,"marks":3677,"value":1162,"nodeType":247},{},[3678],{"type":1310},{"data":3680,"marks":3681,"value":1166,"nodeType":247},{},[],"blockquote",{"data":3684,"content":3685,"nodeType":243},{},[3686],{"data":3687,"marks":3688,"value":29,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Unpacking the latest SLH campaign — combining vishing with AiTM phishing to hijack SSO accounts","Analyzing the latest Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters (SLH) phishing campaign targeting hundreds of organizations.\n","2026-01-28T00:00:00.000Z","unpacking-the-latest-slh-campaign",{"items":3694},[3695,3697],{"sys":3696,"name":2190},{"id":2189},{"sys":3698,"name":2194},{"id":2193},{"items":3700},[3701],{"fullName":232,"firstName":233,"jobTitle":234,"profilePicture":3702},{"url":236},"stryker-handala-report","blog/stryker-handala-report",{"json":3706},{"data":3707,"content":3708,"nodeType":239},{},[3709],{"data":3710,"content":3711,"nodeType":243},{},[3712],{"data":3713,"marks":3714,"value":3715,"nodeType":247},{},[],"The Stryker breach doesn't track with Handala's historical TTPs. This shows just how quickly the default attacker toolkit is evolving, and is a wake-up call for defenders.","Analysing the Stryker breach in line with recent changes to the Iran-nexus cyber playbook.",{"id":3718,"publishedAt":3719},"10hUzI9iiY8fFtmlA0M9Ne","2026-04-20T13:32:58.757Z",{"items":3721},[3722,3724],{"sys":3723,"name":2190},{"id":2189},{"sys":3725,"name":2194},{"id":2193},"o5__Gz5YjAJ3zX8q7fPdybaCDXySe42X5RXs-22vjw4",1784196732280]