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found Push to be more accurate when compared to competitors and the browser agent offered features that others couldn’t match.","42035571a56940ac98bff4544aa79aa5",{"author":129,"jobTitle":130,"quote":126,"image":131},"Jason Waits","\u003Cp>CISO at Inductive Automation\u003C/p>","https://cdn.builder.io/api/v1/image/assets%2Ff3a1111ff5be48cdbb123cd9f5795a05%2Ff04c0c0689ce4a89ac0f0708d78c0a07",{},1735910703862,1735823501152,{"kind":28,"lastPreviewUrl":29,"breakpoints":136,"hasAutosaves":34},{"small":32,"medium":33},"e8bsg4qrgtu",{},1776247404986,1776247404973,[],{"breakpoints":143,"kind":28,"lastPreviewUrl":29,"hasAutosaves":6},{"xsmall":31,"small":32,"medium":33},"g9lqcuxphw7",{"createdDate":146,"id":147,"name":148,"modelId":113,"published":13,"meta":149,"stageModifiedSincePublish":6,"query":151,"data":152,"variations":178,"lastUpdated":179,"firstPublished":180,"testRatio":23,"createdBy":24,"lastUpdatedBy":24,"folders":181,"rev":144},1776255761419,"05a9322735fc427db12e2740e4302300","Report: 2026 Browser Attack Techniques",{"breakpoints":150,"kind":28,"lastPreviewUrl":29,"hasAutosaves":6},{"xsmall":31,"small":32,"medium":33},[],{"testimonial":153,"link":172,"type":175,"title":148,"description":176,"image":177},{"@type":120,"id":154,"model":117,"value":155},"192acbb1f9ca4cac918c0ec435a8bae3",{"query":156,"folders":157,"createdDate":158,"id":154,"name":159,"modelId":127,"published":13,"data":160,"variations":166,"lastUpdated":167,"firstPublished":168,"testRatio":23,"createdBy":100,"lastUpdatedBy":24,"meta":169,"rev":171},[],[],1728981467463,"Push does for identity what CrowdStrike did for the endpoint",{"video":161,"jobTitle":162,"author":163,"qoute":29,"quote":164,"image":165},"https://cdn.builder.io/o/assets%2Ff3a1111ff5be48cdbb123cd9f5795a05%2F8b30e8ca50064058bbaef0f3c6164575%2Fcompressed?apiKey=f3a1111ff5be48cdbb123cd9f5795a05&token=8b30e8ca50064058bbaef0f3c6164575&alt=media&optimized=true","\u003Cp>Deputy CISO at Microsoft\u003C/p>\u003Cp>Former LinkedIn, Slack, Palantir\u003C/p>","Geoff Belknap","Push does for identity what CrowdStrike did for the endpoint.","https://cdn.builder.io/api/v1/image/assets%2Ff3a1111ff5be48cdbb123cd9f5795a05%2F748f0ad0a5064a00a13f4721fcc8dea1",{},1742902158597,1728981782923,{"kind":28,"lastPreviewUrl":29,"breakpoints":170,"hasAutosaves":34},{"small":32,"medium":33},"ulhc0im1hfo",{"text":173,"url":174},"Download now","/resources/browser-attacks-report","resource","Learn about the latest techniques being used in the wild.","https://cdn.builder.io/api/v1/image/assets%2Ff3a1111ff5be48cdbb123cd9f5795a05%2F7b4a5ebf81d64e8c9d7fc35f6c96c4a9",{},1776255810913,1776255810900,[],[183,205],{"createdDate":184,"id":185,"name":148,"modelId":186,"published":13,"meta":187,"stageModifiedSincePublish":6,"query":189,"data":190,"variations":200,"lastUpdated":201,"firstPublished":202,"testRatio":23,"createdBy":24,"lastUpdatedBy":24,"folders":203,"rev":204},1776256900280,"1f429607996e4e5fae8fe3f9b9610e55","4829faa81e7c4ee8bd2d000e160e8d3c",{"breakpoints":188,"kind":28,"lastPreviewUrl":29,"hasAutosaves":6},{"xsmall":31,"small":32,"medium":33},[],{"testimonial":191,"link":199,"type":175,"title":148,"description":176,"image":177},{"@type":120,"id":154,"model":117,"value":192},{"query":193,"folders":194,"createdDate":158,"id":154,"name":159,"modelId":127,"published":13,"data":195,"variations":196,"lastUpdated":167,"firstPublished":168,"testRatio":23,"createdBy":100,"lastUpdatedBy":24,"meta":197,"rev":171},[],[],{"video":161,"jobTitle":162,"author":163,"qoute":29,"quote":164,"image":165},{},{"kind":28,"lastPreviewUrl":29,"breakpoints":198,"hasAutosaves":34},{"small":32,"medium":33},{"text":173,"url":174},{},1776256937553,1776256937540,[],"xggsv10v1q9",{"createdDate":206,"id":207,"name":208,"modelId":186,"published":13,"stageModifiedSincePublish":6,"query":209,"data":210,"variations":220,"lastUpdated":221,"firstPublished":222,"testRatio":23,"createdBy":24,"lastUpdatedBy":24,"folders":223,"meta":224,"rev":204},1776256949234,"ce043785b71b4ece98eac811ecf4ba10","inductive-automation",[],{"link":211,"type":117,"testimonial":212,"testimonialLink":118},{},{"@type":120,"id":121,"model":117,"value":213},{"query":214,"folders":215,"createdDate":125,"id":121,"name":126,"modelId":127,"published":13,"data":216,"variations":217,"lastUpdated":133,"firstPublished":134,"testRatio":23,"createdBy":100,"lastUpdatedBy":100,"meta":218,"rev":137},[],[],{"author":129,"jobTitle":130,"quote":126,"image":131},{},{"kind":28,"lastPreviewUrl":29,"breakpoints":219,"hasAutosaves":34},{"small":32,"medium":33},{},1776256974140,1776256974130,[],{"breakpoints":225,"kind":28,"lastPreviewUrl":29,"hasAutosaves":6},{"xsmall":31,"small":32,"medium":33},{"id":227,"title":228,"authorsCollection":229,"content":237,"extension":823,"faqItemsCollection":824,"faqTitle":62,"featured":6,"hashTags":62,"meta":826,"metaTitle":827,"ogImage":62,"publishedDate":828,"relatedBlogPostsCollection":829,"slug":2732,"stem":2733,"subtitle":62,"summary":2734,"synopsis":2745,"sys":2746,"tagsCollection":2749,"__hash__":2755},"blog/blog/investigating-a-recent-malvertising-campaign-targeting-onfido-customers.json","Investigating a recent malvertising campaign targeting Onfido customers",{"items":230},[231],{"fullName":232,"firstName":233,"jobTitle":234,"profilePicture":235},"Luke Jennings","Luke","Vice President, R&D",{"url":236},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/4Hosb4zKi1dA0PUyDLMe1h/27e09d894861f2196ba794037986fb08/T016S22KZ96-U02NVQM7ZD4-57761d542d83-512.jpeg",{"json":238,"links":724},{"nodeType":239,"data":240,"content":241},"document",{},[242,253,261,268,277,284,290,297,304,308,316,323,330,355,362,365,373,389,395,402,408,415,422,425,434,456,462,469,475,478,486,506,512,519,525,545,551,557,560,568,575,582,588,591,599,606,613,616,624,631,638,644,651,684,690,698,705],{"nodeType":243,"data":244,"content":245},"heading-1",{},[246],{"nodeType":247,"value":248,"marks":249,"data":252},"text","What happened",[250],{"type":251},"bold",{},{"nodeType":254,"data":255,"content":256},"paragraph",{},[257],{"nodeType":247,"value":258,"marks":259,"data":260},"On April 11th our browser-based phishing detection controls were triggered for a user with the Push extension installed. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":262,"content":263},{},[264],{"nodeType":247,"value":265,"marks":266,"data":267},"The user had visited the url dashboard[.]onfido[.].us[.]com after entering a Google search for ‘onfido’, a site they had previously accessed for work and had an account on. A convincing looking Google ad duped the user into clicking the fake link.",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":270,"content":276},"embedded-entry-block",{"target":271},{"sys":272},{"id":273,"type":274,"linkType":275},"5o1LEkZfeYVjMZmROi3Yh","Link","Entry",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":278,"content":279},{},[280],{"nodeType":247,"value":281,"marks":282,"data":283},"Although the page was not the official login page for Onfido, it appeared legitimate enough at first glance to trick the user. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":285,"content":289},{"target":286},{"sys":287},{"id":288,"type":274,"linkType":275},"4Tp1RJ3eSx7r79wwm9d9DZ",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":291,"content":292},{},[293],{"nodeType":247,"value":294,"marks":295,"data":296},"After clicking the link, the user was blocked from interacting with the malicious page running Evilginx by Push. We then took action to identify other Onfido users within the Push customer base and notify them accordingly of the campaign. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":298,"content":299},{},[300],{"nodeType":247,"value":301,"marks":302,"data":303},"There are a few interesting elements worth exploring. Let’s dive in. ",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":306,"content":307},"hr",{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":309,"content":310},{},[311],{"nodeType":247,"value":312,"marks":313,"data":315},"Why Onfido?",[314],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":317,"content":318},{},[319],{"nodeType":247,"value":320,"marks":321,"data":322},"Onfido is an interesting choice. It’s not your typical phishing target, which points to an interesting trend we’ve observed where attackers are diversifying their phishing targets. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":324,"content":325},{},[326],{"nodeType":247,"value":327,"marks":328,"data":329},"There are two main reasons for this:",[],{},{"nodeType":331,"data":332,"content":333},"unordered-list",{},[334,345],{"nodeType":335,"data":336,"content":337},"list-item",{},[338],{"nodeType":254,"data":339,"content":340},{},[341],{"nodeType":247,"value":342,"marks":343,"data":344},"People are becoming increasingly suspicious of phishing attacks targeting core apps such as Microsoft, Google, Okta, etc. and are much more likely to spot real vs fake pages. ",[],{},{"nodeType":335,"data":346,"content":347},{},[348],{"nodeType":254,"data":349,"content":350},{},[351],{"nodeType":247,"value":352,"marks":353,"data":354},"Because highly targeted apps like IdPs and enterprise cloud platforms are becoming increasingly hardened from an identity perspective, attackers have a lower chance of success relative to accounts on the long tail of internet apps used by an organization — many of which simply cannot be securely configured in the same way (e.g. no passkey/WebAuthn support, limited admin controls to discover and remediate identity security gaps, etc.). ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":356,"content":357},{},[358],{"nodeType":247,"value":359,"marks":360,"data":361},"Onfido is also an interesting example in that it definitely contains valuable data that attackers can take advantage of. As a digital identity solution, it presents a significant risk from both a personal and company perspective if compromised, with plenty of PII that can be leveraged to extort a victim — and clear bad press (and possible regulator scrutiny) if the data is leaked!",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":363,"content":364},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":366,"content":367},{},[368],{"nodeType":247,"value":369,"marks":370,"data":372},"Why Google ads?",[371],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":374,"content":375},{},[376,380,385],{"nodeType":247,"value":377,"marks":378,"data":379},"The attack is a form of ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":381,"marks":382,"data":384},"malvertising",[383],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":386,"marks":387,"data":388}," where attackers distribute malicious links via ads — in this case, via Google. This is just one example of the many non-email phishing channels that attackers have at their disposal today. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":390,"content":394},{"target":391},{"sys":392},{"id":393,"type":274,"linkType":275},"7kfeOKGXEWVL5RW5jFnQBo",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":396,"content":397},{},[398],{"nodeType":247,"value":399,"marks":400,"data":401},"The use of malvertising has a couple of notable advantages here. Namely, because Google ads do not use the same reputation-based checks as an email security provider does, the attacker can use freshly created domains to conduct the attack. Usually, attackers would aim to take over existing domains with a reputation already built up, or spend 6-12 months bedding in their domains so that they pass mail filters. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":403,"content":407},{"target":404},{"sys":405},{"id":406,"type":274,"linkType":275},"499fj1Xark8Bj7iQjv9Vsm",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":409,"content":410},{},[411],{"nodeType":247,"value":412,"marks":413,"data":414},"But in this case, the domain was registered only shortly before being used. We detected it only a few hours after it had been registered — and it’s already been taken down since (no doubt to be replaced with the next one). This means it’s easy for attackers to spin up these malvertising campaigns at will, without any real forward planning. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":416,"content":417},{},[418],{"nodeType":247,"value":419,"marks":420,"data":421},"In fact, malvertising doesn’t require much effort on the attacker’s part whatsoever. As a watering hole, you put the link up and wait for the clicks to roll in. Unfortunately, many people Google search for sites that they frequently use rather than accessing via bookmark, opening them up to these kinds of malvertising attacks. ",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":423,"content":424},{},[],{"nodeType":426,"data":427,"content":428},"heading-2",{},[429],{"nodeType":247,"value":430,"marks":431,"data":433},"No frills ",[432],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":435,"content":436},{},[437,441,452],{"nodeType":247,"value":438,"marks":439,"data":440},"Unlike many of the other campaigns using MFA-bypass phishing kits we’ve seen in the wild, the attacker put very little effort into obfuscating the malicious page. We’ve seen some using things like Cloudflare Turnstile, CAPTCHA, or even ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":443,"content":445},"hyperlink",{"uri":444},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/how-consent-phishing-is-evolving/",[446],{"nodeType":247,"value":447,"marks":448,"data":451},"Consent Phishing for OIDC scopes ",[449],{"type":450},"underline",{},{"nodeType":247,"value":453,"marks":454,"data":455},"to break sandbox detections and prevent security tools from reaching the malicious content to analyze it. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":457,"content":461},{"target":458},{"sys":459},{"id":460,"type":274,"linkType":275},"7csybR6fJlCWsRy91CbNYL",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":463,"content":464},{},[465],{"nodeType":247,"value":466,"marks":467,"data":468},"That said, there was evidence to suggest that the domain required a specific URL path — namely, the page must be accessed via Google ads to load. When the page was accessed without the correct parameters set, we were forwarded to a nonexistent page within the legitimate onfido.com domain, resulting in a 404 error.",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":470,"content":474},{"target":471},{"sys":472},{"id":473,"type":274,"linkType":275},"658fTppp0l1YkoMERiQ1Oj",[],{"nodeType":305,"data":476,"content":477},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":479,"content":480},{},[481],{"nodeType":247,"value":482,"marks":483,"data":485},"What’s interesting about the domain?",[484],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":487,"content":488},{},[489,493,502],{"nodeType":247,"value":490,"marks":491,"data":492},"One of the things that really stood out to us was the hosting domain — ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":494,"content":496},{"uri":495},"http://us.com",[497],{"nodeType":247,"value":498,"marks":499,"data":501},"us.com",[500],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":503,"marks":504,"data":505},". Unlike the official government TLD .us, us.com is designed to look and feel legit but does not require any US affiliation or evidence of a US presence. This isn’t a TLD, it’s just a domain selling subdomains within their domain. This means there’s no WHOIS information available on the domains. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":507,"content":511},{"target":508},{"sys":509},{"id":510,"type":274,"linkType":275},"7HtOWLePxPclyfODqC0oR",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":513,"content":514},{},[515],{"nodeType":247,"value":516,"marks":517,"data":518},"This is incredibly deceptive to the user and will fool many people glancing at the link. It doesn’t look as obviously suspicious as your .xyz or .biz and has the feel of a legitimate domain. It’s also incredibly cheap to pick up .us.com domains right now. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":520,"content":524},{"target":521},{"sys":522},{"id":523,"type":274,"linkType":275},"5CHWwlH2ZFZiVOQWMpkquy",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":526,"content":527},{},[528,532,541],{"nodeType":247,"value":529,"marks":530,"data":531},"You can find additional information on ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":533,"content":535},{"uri":534},"https://urlscan.io/result/0196338c-75ea-720c-a0e4-c2898acc4779/",[536],{"nodeType":247,"value":537,"marks":538,"data":540},"urlscan",[539],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":542,"marks":543,"data":544}," here.",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":546,"content":550},{"target":547},{"sys":548},{"id":549,"type":274,"linkType":275},"6hdBHT8SrC6z7O0gIc7xnh",[],{"nodeType":269,"data":552,"content":556},{"target":553},{"sys":554},{"id":555,"type":274,"linkType":275},"3KxFiCeGlk7fVC8k1oo7cX",[],{"nodeType":305,"data":558,"content":559},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":561,"content":562},{},[563],{"nodeType":247,"value":564,"marks":565,"data":567},"Isn’t Evilginx a red team tool?",[566],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":569,"content":570},{},[571],{"nodeType":247,"value":572,"marks":573,"data":574},"Evilginx is nominally a red team tool, but we frequently spot it being used in phishing campaigns against our customers. Evilginx is a great choice for attackers looking to target non-standard web apps because it is capable of emulating a range of domains — it’s designed to be flexible and work for any page without generating a load of custom JavaScript that might stand out to security tools/analysts. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":576,"content":577},{},[578],{"nodeType":247,"value":579,"marks":580,"data":581},"If you want to see an example of Evilginx being used to phish a user, check out the example below. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":583,"content":587},{"target":584},{"sys":585},{"id":586,"type":274,"linkType":275},"7IuP0mcRZJkL8YGNoZo5Dj",[],{"nodeType":305,"data":589,"content":590},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":592,"content":593},{},[594],{"nodeType":247,"value":595,"marks":596,"data":598},"What can you do about it?",[597],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":600,"content":601},{},[602],{"nodeType":247,"value":603,"marks":604,"data":605},"There’s not a huge amount of impartial advice to give here unfortunately. With malicious Google ads not going away anytime soon, response action is limited. If you are an Onfido user, be sure to block the URL and any related patterns (we noticed that after appearing to have been taken down initially, the site has reappeared at dashboard[.]onfido[.]us[.]com/users/sign_in and no longer appears to require the same URL path). However, it goes without saying that this is a temporary measure and the attacker will no doubt rotate the domain in the near future. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":607,"content":608},{},[609],{"nodeType":247,"value":610,"marks":611,"data":612},"One good option is to encourage your users to bookmark their links rather than Google searching for the page. If you’re using an IdP with an application dashboard like Okta, Microsoft, or Google, this provides a convenient way to find all your apps in one place. ",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":614,"content":615},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":617,"content":618},{},[619],{"nodeType":247,"value":620,"marks":621,"data":623},"Bonus: How Push stopped the attack",[622],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":625,"content":626},{},[627],{"nodeType":247,"value":628,"marks":629,"data":630},"Interested in how we stopped the attack?",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":632,"content":633},{},[634],{"nodeType":247,"value":635,"marks":636,"data":637},"When the user visited the page, Push detected Evilginx running on the page and blocked the user. Check it out.",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":639,"content":643},{"target":640},{"sys":641},{"id":642,"type":274,"linkType":275},"5QavzZPS4siFvHCBhpujEe",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":645,"content":646},{},[647],{"nodeType":247,"value":648,"marks":649,"data":650},"Using our browser-based security platform, you can also see all users with an account on Onfido across your workforce. Using Push, you can:",[],{},{"nodeType":331,"data":652,"content":653},{},[654,664,674],{"nodeType":335,"data":655,"content":656},{},[657],{"nodeType":254,"data":658,"content":659},{},[660],{"nodeType":247,"value":661,"marks":662,"data":663},"Quickly identify which users have a password-based login set for their account (and therefore could be phished). ",[],{},{"nodeType":335,"data":665,"content":666},{},[667],{"nodeType":254,"data":668,"content":669},{},[670],{"nodeType":247,"value":671,"marks":672,"data":673},"Identify users to enable them to be contacted about the attacks targeting Onfido.",[],{},{"nodeType":335,"data":675,"content":676},{},[677],{"nodeType":254,"data":678,"content":679},{},[680],{"nodeType":247,"value":681,"marks":682,"data":683},"Set an app banner for Onfido warning users of the attacks and guiding them to access and login to the app via your SSO solution. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":685,"content":689},{"target":686},{"sys":687},{"id":688,"type":274,"linkType":275},"23B4EHUs1vt0se5r1cUI4t",[],{"nodeType":426,"data":691,"content":692},{},[693],{"nodeType":247,"value":694,"marks":695,"data":697},"We don’t just stop phishing attacks",[696],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":699,"content":700},{},[701],{"nodeType":247,"value":702,"marks":703,"data":704},"It doesn’t stop there — Push provides comprehensive identity attack detection and response capabilities against techniques like credential stuffing, password spraying and session hijacking using stolen session tokens. You can also use Push to find and fix identity vulnerabilities across every app that your employees use like: ghost logins; SSO coverage gaps; MFA gaps; weak, breached and reused passwords; risky OAuth integrations; and more. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":706,"content":707},{},[708,712,720],{"nodeType":247,"value":709,"marks":710,"data":711},"If you want to learn more about how Push helps you to detect and defeat advanced identity attack techniques in the browser, ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":713,"content":715},{"uri":714},"https://pushsecurity.com/demo",[716],{"nodeType":247,"value":717,"marks":718,"data":719},"book some time with one of our team",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":721,"marks":722,"data":723}," for a live demo.",[],{},{"entries":725},{"hyperlink":726,"inline":727,"block":728},[],[],[729,738,745,751,766,774,781,788,794,800,806,812,817],{"sys":730,"__typename":731,"title":732,"caption":733,"layoutMode":62,"file":734},{"id":273},"Image","Onfido malicious google ad","Malicious Google ad mimicking the Onfido login page link.",{"url":735,"width":736,"height":737},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/6Wo4Dnaftaq4kNp7z2Jlkb/9db5606b545d29e5f603ebf86e68756a/image7.png",877,536,{"sys":739,"__typename":731,"title":740,"caption":740,"layoutMode":62,"file":741},{"id":288},"Comparing the legit and fake Onfido ads",{"url":742,"width":743,"height":744},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/1VS5obdMsSI3DPa9FrsXFG/b38bb5a4f17f34a35622ebb1972df585/image10.png",1999,646,{"sys":746,"__typename":731,"title":747,"caption":747,"layoutMode":62,"file":748},{"id":393},"Phishing links can be delivered over various channels",{"url":749,"width":743,"height":750},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/4y9BmDA858RM488qvHlXE8/d03598f89b5c1b991808c7452fd87db8/image5.png",857,{"sys":752,"__typename":753,"content":754,"name":765,"title":62},{"id":406},"InsightTextBlockComponent",{"json":755},{"nodeType":239,"data":756,"content":757},{},[758],{"nodeType":254,"data":759,"content":760},{},[761],{"nodeType":247,"value":762,"marks":763,"data":764},"This is one of the reasons that phishing attacks that bypass email like malvertising are so appealing. Many organizations rely exclusively on phishing controls deployed at the email level. But these are sidestepped entirely by attacks taking place over alternative channels.",[],{},"Onfido blog insight box",{"sys":767,"__typename":731,"title":768,"caption":769,"layoutMode":62,"file":770},{"id":460},"Consent phishing blog image 6","Cloudflare Turnstile is often used to prevent security bots from analysing the attacker's phishing page.",{"url":771,"width":772,"height":773},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/DbEYzQt7m3jY56ALCYWEy/59846e7bd4a3ed204722a9d561e97231/image2.png",938,361,{"sys":775,"__typename":731,"title":776,"caption":776,"layoutMode":62,"file":777},{"id":473},"The phishing page specifies the url path must include googleadservices.com",{"url":778,"width":779,"height":780},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/4eh1I88zphKkBgcUNpM1dY/7d82e055d242655bff5de2d956ea82b7/image9.png",512,189,{"sys":782,"__typename":731,"title":783,"caption":783,"layoutMode":62,"file":784},{"id":510},"Us.com website information",{"url":785,"width":786,"height":787},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/5wpGuRMqeZoyUmP0IWfufp/329b132dfcc697a3dee894f7fd97856b/image6.png",1425,785,{"sys":789,"__typename":731,"title":790,"caption":790,"layoutMode":62,"file":791},{"id":523},"Get your Adobe.us.com domain for less than $20!",{"url":792,"width":743,"height":793},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/5MQmlWJIeckRUyUO3nzEk3/01b7b7acbde12fc1e68279f0dbfcd0fb/image4.png",265,{"sys":795,"__typename":731,"title":796,"caption":796,"layoutMode":62,"file":797},{"id":549},"urlscan entry for dashboard[.]onfido[.]us[.]com",{"url":798,"width":743,"height":799},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/6qZbv6gjlctB9vJ9eO4oca/ef26bbdfd01919f2422a77c73064d186/image2.png",895,{"sys":801,"__typename":731,"title":802,"caption":802,"layoutMode":62,"file":803},{"id":555},"Recent urlscan results for .us.com",{"url":804,"width":743,"height":805},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/2GAeZCHOt0JONUlZ2Y7wbX/b2d8d21c79a698b267089b9be6929f95/image8.png",1352,{"sys":807,"__typename":808,"title":809,"arcadeDemoUrl":810,"playText":811},{"id":586},"ArcadeDemo","Evilginx demo","https://demo.arcade.software/2OpOz9hyjfIu5o8KtAmI?embed","1 mins",{"sys":813,"__typename":808,"title":814,"arcadeDemoUrl":815,"playText":816},{"id":642},"Onfido Evilginx Phishing Detection","https://demo.arcade.software/4dLz4mzxZRjgsxfXjWqe?embed","20 secs",{"sys":818,"__typename":731,"title":819,"caption":819,"layoutMode":62,"file":820},{"id":688},"Push app banner guiding users to login via their SSO platform",{"url":821,"width":743,"height":822},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/4TFCJts9lev3A6zaC1kJEp/0eb43be23651aacafbc5569cfe02fb80/image1.png",1064,"json",{"items":825},[],{},"Investigating a recent malvertising campaign against Onfido","2025-04-15T00:00:00.000Z",{"items":830},[831,1299,2094],{"__typename":832,"sys":833,"content":835,"title":1277,"synopsis":1278,"hashTags":62,"publishedDate":1279,"slug":1280,"tagsCollection":1281,"authorsCollection":1291},"BlogPosts",{"id":834},"3uLWz59In1waXGcLB9cnPq",{"json":836},{"data":837,"content":838,"nodeType":239},{},[839,871,891,898,905,908,916,923,929,935,941,948,968,974,977,985,992,999,1006,1012,1019,1026,1032,1039,1059,1064,1071,1074,1082,1089,1095,1102,1148,1154,1161,1164,1172,1179,1186,1192,1198,1204,1207,1215,1222,1228,1235,1242,1245,1252,1259],{"data":840,"content":841,"nodeType":254},{},[842,845,854,858,867],{"data":843,"marks":844,"value":29,"nodeType":247},{},[],{"data":846,"content":848,"nodeType":442},{"uri":847},"https://github.com/pushsecurity/saas-attacks/blob/main/techniques/consent_phishing/description.md",[849],{"data":850,"marks":851,"value":853,"nodeType":247},{},[852],{"type":450},"Consent phishing",{"data":855,"marks":856,"value":857,"nodeType":247},{},[]," was one of the first techniques we added to the ",{"data":859,"content":861,"nodeType":442},{"uri":860},"https://github.com/pushsecurity/saas-attacks?tab=readme-ov-file",[862],{"data":863,"marks":864,"value":866,"nodeType":247},{},[865],{"type":450},"SaaS attacks matrix",{"data":868,"marks":869,"value":870,"nodeType":247},{},[],", where attackers trick users into authorizing malicious OAuth apps. ",{"data":872,"content":873,"nodeType":254},{},[874,878,887],{"data":875,"marks":876,"value":877,"nodeType":247},{},[],"The attacker sends a phishing link to a target that requests permissions to access sensitive data or permissions to perform dangerous actions for an app the victim is using. If the target grants consent for the permissions, the adversary gains that level of access over the target’s account — and certain data and functionality ",{"data":879,"content":881,"nodeType":442},{"uri":880},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/the-risky-terrain-of-oauth-scopes-in-third-party/",[882],{"data":883,"marks":884,"value":886,"nodeType":247},{},[885],{"type":450},"depending on the scopes granted",{"data":888,"marks":889,"value":890,"nodeType":247},{},[],". This attack bypasses MFA entirely (including phishing-resistant MFA) by sidestepping the login process — think of it as an authorization attack, as opposed to an authentication one. Naturally, this means it also persists through typical authentication changes like a password reset. ",{"data":892,"content":893,"nodeType":254},{},[894],{"data":895,"marks":896,"value":897,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Consent phishing has been primarily aimed at getting access to larger cloud platforms like Microsoft Azure or Google Workspace tenants, or more complex apps like GitHub. These apps present an obvious opportunity to attackers in terms of the functionality and and data they contain.  ",{"data":899,"content":900,"nodeType":254},{},[901],{"data":902,"marks":903,"value":904,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Two separate cases of consent phishing have hit the headlines this month representing very different use cases — let’s compare them. ",{"data":906,"content":907,"nodeType":305},{},[],{"data":909,"content":910,"nodeType":243},{},[911],{"data":912,"marks":913,"value":915,"nodeType":247},{},[914],{"type":251},"1. Classic consent phishing",{"data":917,"content":918,"nodeType":254},{},[919],{"data":920,"marks":921,"value":922,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Attackers targeted GitHub users across 12,000 repositories by creating fake security alert issues in GitHub repositories. These legit-looking alerts send the victim to a GitHub authorization page for a \"gitsecurityapp\" OAuth app that requests a lot of very risky scopes granting full access to a user's account and repositories.",{"data":924,"content":928,"nodeType":269},{"target":925},{"sys":926},{"id":927,"type":274,"linkType":275},"7s7VLePAQzhzXJ6cFkSCAe",[],{"data":930,"content":934,"nodeType":269},{"target":931},{"sys":932},{"id":933,"type":274,"linkType":275},"5dppSzNOgffeZTZK2lG6V5",[],{"data":936,"content":940,"nodeType":269},{"target":937},{"sys":938},{"id":939,"type":274,"linkType":275},"1dsYU7bM5mPW1AXyRLnqpp",[],{"data":942,"content":943,"nodeType":254},{},[944],{"data":945,"marks":946,"value":947,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Once authorized, the attacker has extensive access to the account, from which point they can modify repositories to conduct further attacks against users (e.g. by infecting them with malware), poison the repos and services connected to the repository, and exfiltrate any sensitive data the account has access to. ",{"data":949,"content":950,"nodeType":254},{},[951,955,964],{"data":952,"marks":953,"value":954,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Alongside consent phishing, this is an example of ",{"data":956,"content":958,"nodeType":442},{"uri":957},"https://github.com/pushsecurity/saas-attacks/blob/main/techniques/in-app_phishing/description.md",[959],{"data":960,"marks":961,"value":963,"nodeType":247},{},[962],{"type":450},"in-app phishing",{"data":965,"marks":966,"value":967,"nodeType":247},{},[],", which avoids delivering the message via corporate email. Even if the target gets an email notification, the phish isn’t delivered via email directly, and so email-based scanning solutions won’t detect it — they’ll receive a legitimate notification email directly from GitHub. It’s also less likely to raise suspicion as GitHub issue notifications are expected, increasing the click chance. ",{"data":969,"content":973,"nodeType":269},{"target":970},{"sys":971},{"id":972,"type":274,"linkType":275},"6d6MMyPQ7vaY2KrJTHGeO6",[],{"data":975,"content":976,"nodeType":305},{},[],{"data":978,"content":979,"nodeType":243},{},[980],{"data":981,"marks":982,"value":984,"nodeType":247},{},[983],{"type":251},"2. Not really consent phishing?",{"data":986,"content":987,"nodeType":254},{},[988],{"data":989,"marks":990,"value":991,"nodeType":247},{},[],"This example is much more unusual. In this case, the attacker used malicious Microsoft OAuth apps impersonating Adobe and DocuSign. ",{"data":993,"content":994,"nodeType":254},{},[995],{"data":996,"marks":997,"value":998,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Rather than trying to grab lots of juicy permissions for Microsoft, the attacker used consent phishing to prevent automated analysis of their phishing page by security tools. To be served the real phishing page, you need to first authorize the fake OAuth app — meaning that security tools and bots won’t be able to reach the page to determine if it’s malicious or not. ",{"data":1000,"content":1001,"nodeType":254},{},[1002],{"data":1003,"marks":1004,"value":1005,"nodeType":247},{},[],"The attack started with attackers sending phishing emails to target users with a fake password reset lure. ",{"data":1007,"content":1011,"nodeType":269},{"target":1008},{"sys":1009},{"id":1010,"type":274,"linkType":275},"3cLd6EbraN9fKuGgL0kkgC",[],{"data":1013,"content":1014,"nodeType":254},{},[1015],{"data":1016,"marks":1017,"value":1018,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Because the initial phishing link directs to the legitimate login.microsoftonline.com URL, it appears legitimate and bypasses common domain-based security checks. ",{"data":1020,"content":1021,"nodeType":254},{},[1022],{"data":1023,"marks":1024,"value":1025,"nodeType":247},{},[],"After clicking the link, the user signs into their real Microsoft account (this might even happen automatically if the user is already signed in on the device/browser they’re using). They are then redirected to a permissions request page for the fake OAuth app. ",{"data":1027,"content":1031,"nodeType":269},{"target":1028},{"sys":1029},{"id":1030,"type":274,"linkType":275},"6O4CSx1VCoPAIjjsnKzu75",[],{"data":1033,"content":1034,"nodeType":254},{},[1035],{"data":1036,"marks":1037,"value":1038,"nodeType":247},{},[],"The permissions requested by the app (profile, email, openid) are so limited as to be basically unexploitable. They are also the same permissions you would accept if you were authorizing Microsoft to perform a social login (SSO via OIDC) to a third party app.",{"data":1040,"content":1041,"nodeType":254},{},[1042,1046,1055],{"data":1043,"marks":1044,"value":1045,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Clicking the link redirects the victim to the malicious page but masks it using the legit Cloudflare Turnstile service. As well as making the page look more credible (since its fronted by a legit service to block bots) this is a common detection evasion technique we’ve ",{"data":1047,"content":1049,"nodeType":442},{"uri":1048},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/how-aitm-phishing-kits-evade-detection/",[1050],{"data":1051,"marks":1052,"value":1054,"nodeType":247},{},[1053],{"type":450},"blogged about previously",{"data":1056,"marks":1057,"value":1058,"nodeType":247},{},[]," which prevents security solutions from accessing and analysing the malicious page. ",{"data":1060,"content":1063,"nodeType":269},{"target":1061},{"sys":1062},{"id":460,"type":274,"linkType":275},[],{"data":1065,"content":1066,"nodeType":254},{},[1067],{"data":1068,"marks":1069,"value":1070,"nodeType":247},{},[],"After completing the verification, the page (and the malicious phishing kit element) is finally loaded. If the victim authenticates, the session will be stolen by the attacker, along with the captured credentials and MFA code. ",{"data":1072,"content":1073,"nodeType":305},{},[],{"data":1075,"content":1076,"nodeType":243},{},[1077],{"data":1078,"marks":1079,"value":1081,"nodeType":247},{},[1080],{"type":251},"Using consent phishing to evade detection",{"data":1083,"content":1084,"nodeType":254},{},[1085],{"data":1086,"marks":1087,"value":1088,"nodeType":247},{},[],"The attacker is essentially using their fake OAuth app to prevent security analysts and bots from analysing the real phishing page, because the first page loaded is a link to a legitimate Microsoft domain. They’re also layering it with a range of other detection evasion techniques like using Cloudflare Turnstile.  ",{"data":1090,"content":1094,"nodeType":269},{"target":1091},{"sys":1092},{"id":1093,"type":274,"linkType":275},"4Bi9YoMwWVmKoWfkh5tiTA",[],{"data":1096,"content":1097,"nodeType":254},{},[1098],{"data":1099,"marks":1100,"value":1101,"nodeType":247},{},[],"We’ve previously blogged about how attackers are using layered detection evasion techniques to circumvent typical phishing page detections, which are often email-based, including:",{"data":1103,"content":1104,"nodeType":331},{},[1105,1126],{"data":1106,"content":1107,"nodeType":335},{},[1108],{"data":1109,"content":1110,"nodeType":254},{},[1111,1114,1122],{"data":1112,"marks":1113,"value":29,"nodeType":247},{},[],{"data":1115,"content":1116,"nodeType":442},{"uri":1048},[1117],{"data":1118,"marks":1119,"value":1121,"nodeType":247},{},[1120],{"type":450},"Prevent analysis of phishing pages",{"data":1123,"marks":1124,"value":1125,"nodeType":247},{},[]," by security bots, including using legitimate services like Cloudflare Workers and Turnstile (as above), CAPTCHA, and various sandbox-aware techniques to ensure only the intended victim is served the phishing page, such as only providing the correct parameters to load the page if the correct path is followed (rather than attempting to load the malicious page by going directly to the domain). ",{"data":1127,"content":1128,"nodeType":335},{},[1129],{"data":1130,"content":1131,"nodeType":254},{},[1132,1135,1144],{"data":1133,"marks":1134,"value":29,"nodeType":247},{},[],{"data":1136,"content":1138,"nodeType":442},{"uri":1137},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/how-aitm-phishing-kits-evade-detection-p2/",[1139],{"data":1140,"marks":1141,"value":1143,"nodeType":247},{},[1142],{"type":450},"DOM and visual obfuscation",{"data":1145,"marks":1146,"value":1147,"nodeType":247},{},[]," of phishing pages when the victim does land on the page to prevent it from being identified as malicious through signature-based detection of page elements. ",{"data":1149,"content":1153,"nodeType":269},{"target":1150},{"sys":1151},{"id":1152,"type":274,"linkType":275},"2dN8np5odBecf7r1vBr69K",[],{"data":1155,"content":1156,"nodeType":254},{},[1157],{"data":1158,"marks":1159,"value":1160,"nodeType":247},{},[],"This seems a bit overkill and many of the steps here are likely to raise suspicion — like the fact that you’re never asked to provide the original code for the password reset, and are asked to unexpectedly consent to an OAuth app. But clearly, the attacker is more concerned about bypassing technical safeguards than human ones (not a great endorsement for the state of phishing awareness training). ",{"data":1162,"content":1163,"nodeType":305},{},[],{"data":1165,"content":1166,"nodeType":243},{},[1167],{"data":1168,"marks":1169,"value":1171,"nodeType":247},{},[1170],{"type":251},"How Push detects and blocks phishing attacks",{"data":1173,"content":1174,"nodeType":254},{},[1175],{"data":1176,"marks":1177,"value":1178,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Push overcomes the various detection evasion techniques shown here by using in-browser detections based on the phishing page that the user sees. This means that no matter where the user accesses the link from (email, IM platform, social media, or anywhere else on the internet) Push can observe and analyse the page to determine if it's malicious. ",{"data":1180,"content":1181,"nodeType":254},{},[1182],{"data":1183,"marks":1184,"value":1185,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Push uses layered detections based on identifying the phishing kit running on the page itself, whether the page is cloned from a legitimate login page, as well as detecting whether the credentials being entered on the page have been used to log into your SSO account previously. ",{"data":1187,"content":1191,"nodeType":269},{"target":1188},{"sys":1189},{"id":1190,"type":274,"linkType":275},"6B1toQAf44rDzQZijYRd9g",[],{"data":1193,"content":1197,"nodeType":269},{"target":1194},{"sys":1195},{"id":1196,"type":274,"linkType":275},"4ixcEsEW4EyqckOTmP5Pbb",[],{"data":1199,"content":1203,"nodeType":269},{"target":1200},{"sys":1201},{"id":1202,"type":274,"linkType":275},"01musWa3FUiO0CVFNWfwcy",[],{"data":1205,"content":1206,"nodeType":305},{},[],{"data":1208,"content":1209,"nodeType":243},{},[1210],{"data":1211,"marks":1212,"value":1214,"nodeType":247},{},[1213],{"type":251},"Using Push to review OAuth integrations",{"data":1216,"content":1217,"nodeType":254},{},[1218],{"data":1219,"marks":1220,"value":1221,"nodeType":247},{},[],"You can also use Push to discover and remove risky OAuth integrations accepted by your users. ",{"data":1223,"content":1227,"nodeType":269},{"target":1224},{"sys":1225},{"id":1226,"type":274,"linkType":275},"5kJvy5SBcWLrK2EhLyR1ZD",[],{"data":1229,"content":1230,"nodeType":254},{},[1231],{"data":1232,"marks":1233,"value":1234,"nodeType":247},{},[],"This shows which OAuth apps have been added, which apps they are integrated with, what permissions they’ve been granted, as well as other properties that indicate risk (e.g. whether the app’s publisher has been verified). ",{"data":1236,"content":1237,"nodeType":254},{},[1238],{"data":1239,"marks":1240,"value":1241,"nodeType":247},{},[],"If your users are consent phished, you’ll be notified via webhook event that a new integration has been added. These risky integrations can be removed via the Push platform by clicking ‘delete integration’. ",{"data":1243,"content":1244,"nodeType":305},{},[],{"data":1246,"content":1247,"nodeType":243},{},[1248],{"data":1249,"marks":1250,"value":694,"nodeType":247},{},[1251],{"type":251},{"data":1253,"content":1254,"nodeType":254},{},[1255],{"data":1256,"marks":1257,"value":1258,"nodeType":247},{},[],"It doesn’t stop there — Push provides comprehensive identity attack detection and response capabilities against techniques like credential stuffing, password spraying and session hijacking using stolen session tokens. You can also use Push to find and fix identity vulnerabilities across every app that your employees use like: ghost logins; SSO coverage gaps; MFA gaps; weak, breached and reused passwords; risky OAuth integrations; and more. ",{"data":1260,"content":1261,"nodeType":254},{},[1262,1266,1274],{"data":1263,"marks":1264,"value":1265,"nodeType":247},{},[],"If you want to learn more about how Push helps you to detect and defeat common identity attack techniques, ",{"data":1267,"content":1269,"nodeType":442},{"uri":1268},"https://pushsecurity.com/demo?utm_campaign=9983377-FY25Q1_Bleeping-Computer-Organic-Article&utm_source=bleepingcomputer&utm_medium=sponsored-content&utm_content=organic%20article",[1270],{"data":1271,"marks":1272,"value":717,"nodeType":247},{},[1273],{"type":450},{"data":1275,"marks":1276,"value":721,"nodeType":247},{},[],"How consent phishing is evolving to defeat detection controls","Consent phishing is where attackers trick users into authorizing access for malicious OAuth apps. Here's how attackers are using this technique in the wild.","2025-03-31T00:00:00.000Z","how-consent-phishing-is-evolving",{"items":1282},[1283,1287],{"sys":1284,"name":1286},{"id":1285},"6A5RXS31ZQx3PwryGb1IMy","Browser-based attacks",{"sys":1288,"name":1290},{"id":1289},"4ksQNCFeBf8H4QIORqpRLw","Detection & response",{"items":1292},[1293],{"fullName":1294,"firstName":1295,"jobTitle":1296,"profilePicture":1297},"Dan Green","Dan","Threat Research",{"url":1298},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/7jik1VhFgA3kgzXBXTm2Vw/fcd8c171da644903d0827eafcfbcaad0/Dan_Headshot_2025.png",{"__typename":832,"sys":1300,"content":1302,"title":2080,"synopsis":2081,"hashTags":62,"publishedDate":2082,"slug":2083,"tagsCollection":2084,"authorsCollection":2090},{"id":1301},"3RhqaMQEBAQBdfHDQeoELF",{"json":1303},{"nodeType":239,"data":1304,"content":1305},{},[1306,1313,1346,1353,1373,1380,1383,1390,1397,1403,1410,1416,1422,1429,1449,1455,1462,1465,1473,1492,1515,1522,1530,1537,1544,1550,1558,1577,1596,1602,1609,1615,1623,1656,1662,1669,1672,1680,1687,1707,1714,1720,1728,1735,1742,1749,1756,1828,1835,1843,1862,1868,1875,1882,1888,1895,1901,1909,1916,1922,1928,1935,1938,1946,1977,1984,2004,2011,2023,2030,2033,2041,2060],{"nodeType":254,"data":1307,"content":1308},{},[1309],{"nodeType":247,"value":1310,"marks":1311,"data":1312},"Phishing attacks using Attacker-in-the-Middle (AitM) kits are increasingly the default for both credential harvesting campaigns and targeted phishing attacks. It’s easy to see why, too:",[],{},{"nodeType":331,"data":1314,"content":1315},{},[1316,1326,1336],{"nodeType":335,"data":1317,"content":1318},{},[1319],{"nodeType":254,"data":1320,"content":1321},{},[1322],{"nodeType":247,"value":1323,"marks":1324,"data":1325},"They’re very difficult to spot as a user and often function like the real page should, logging the victim into the genuine site once the phish is complete",[],{},{"nodeType":335,"data":1327,"content":1328},{},[1329],{"nodeType":254,"data":1330,"content":1331},{},[1332],{"nodeType":247,"value":1333,"marks":1334,"data":1335},"They’re incredibly scalable, and attackers have an increasing number of options to choose from when it comes to off-the-shelf tools and commercial Phishing-as-a-Service offerings ",[],{},{"nodeType":335,"data":1337,"content":1338},{},[1339],{"nodeType":254,"data":1340,"content":1341},{},[1342],{"nodeType":247,"value":1343,"marks":1344,"data":1345},"And most importantly, they reliably bypass 99% of the MFA methods encountered in the wild, defeating OTP, SMS and push-based authentication",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1347,"content":1348},{},[1349],{"nodeType":247,"value":1350,"marks":1351,"data":1352},"There are basically no downsides to AitM for an attacker. But all the same, they don’t get all that much publicity — probably because traditional phishing prevention solutions are failing to detect them (before the attack succeeds, anyway — and nobody really wants to own up to that). ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1354,"content":1355},{},[1356,1360,1369],{"nodeType":247,"value":1357,"marks":1358,"data":1359},"So, it’s refreshing to see Troy Hunt, creator of the widely used Have I Been Pwned (HIBP) service, ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1361,"content":1363},{"uri":1362},"https://www.troyhunt.com/a-sneaky-phish-just-grabbed-my-mailchimp-mailing-list/",[1364],{"nodeType":247,"value":1365,"marks":1366,"data":1368},"publicly discussing a recent attack he fell victim to",[1367],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1370,"marks":1371,"data":1372},". ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1374,"content":1375},{},[1376],{"nodeType":247,"value":1377,"marks":1378,"data":1379},"Before we consider the significance of Troy failing to spot the phish — the creator of one of the most widely used services for stolen passwords, working with government on phishing prevention guidance — let's start by breaking down the attack itself. ",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":1381,"content":1382},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1384,"content":1385},{},[1386],{"nodeType":247,"value":248,"marks":1387,"data":1389},[1388],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1391,"content":1392},{},[1393],{"nodeType":247,"value":1394,"marks":1395,"data":1396},"Troy received a phishing email appearing to be from MailChimp prompting him to sign into his account, with the lure informing him it had had been restricted due to a spam complaint",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":1398,"content":1402},{"target":1399},{"sys":1400},{"id":1401,"type":274,"linkType":275},"5A4CPvTyKhClC8LgHY5916",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":1404,"content":1405},{},[1406],{"nodeType":247,"value":1407,"marks":1408,"data":1409},"The email matched Mailchimp’s brand, but the sender address was obviously suspicious. Unfortunately, Troy initially accessed the email via mobile, which hid the sender address — which he then missed when accessing from his PC. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":1411,"content":1415},{"target":1412},{"sys":1413},{"id":1414,"type":274,"linkType":275},"1JWw4jO3qxxJeHO3qtMuZc",[],{"nodeType":269,"data":1417,"content":1421},{"target":1418},{"sys":1419},{"id":1420,"type":274,"linkType":275},"1ebM2R90arTKlCmxmtvYjz",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":1423,"content":1424},{},[1425],{"nodeType":247,"value":1426,"marks":1427,"data":1428},"Troy was directed to the page hxxps://mailchimp-sso.com. Troy entered his credentials and MFA token and logged in. The page hung and he realized he had been phished…",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1430,"content":1431},{},[1432,1436,1445],{"nodeType":247,"value":1433,"marks":1434,"data":1435},"The attack then automatically executed, with the attacker exporting 16,000 contact records from MailChimp and creating an API key to provide backdoor access to the app (a form of ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1437,"content":1439},{"uri":1438},"https://github.com/pushsecurity/saas-attacks/blob/main/techniques/ghost_logins/description.md",[1440],{"nodeType":247,"value":1441,"marks":1442,"data":1444},"ghost login",[1443],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1446,"marks":1447,"data":1448},").",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":1450,"content":1454},{"target":1451},{"sys":1452},{"id":1453,"type":274,"linkType":275},"2MDWfQFU69GaiMCxdvvq8U",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":1456,"content":1457},{},[1458],{"nodeType":247,"value":1459,"marks":1460,"data":1461},"Let’s have a look at what makes this attack interesting. ",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":1463,"content":1464},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1466,"content":1467},{},[1468],{"nodeType":247,"value":1469,"marks":1470,"data":1472},"Breaking the attack down",[1471],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1474,"content":1475},{},[1476,1480,1488],{"nodeType":247,"value":1477,"marks":1478,"data":1479},"As far as ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1481,"content":1482},{"uri":1137},[1483],{"nodeType":247,"value":1484,"marks":1485,"data":1487},"some of the AitM attacks we’ve observed in the wild",[1486],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1489,"marks":1490,"data":1491}," go, this wasn’t the most advanced example we’ve seen: ",[],{},{"nodeType":331,"data":1493,"content":1494},{},[1495,1505],{"nodeType":335,"data":1496,"content":1497},{},[1498],{"nodeType":254,"data":1499,"content":1500},{},[1501],{"nodeType":247,"value":1502,"marks":1503,"data":1504},"It didn’t try to obfuscate the notably suspicious sender address or use a legit SaaS service to give the email sender a reputable domain.",[],{},{"nodeType":335,"data":1506,"content":1507},{},[1508],{"nodeType":254,"data":1509,"content":1510},{},[1511],{"nodeType":247,"value":1512,"marks":1513,"data":1514},"It didn’t see the victim access the real login page, and instead terminated the connection at the point the credentials were captured — meaning Troy was immediately suspicious (I guess it doesn’t really matter given the attack executed instantly, automatically).",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1516,"content":1517},{},[1518],{"nodeType":247,"value":1519,"marks":1520,"data":1521},"That said, it did use a few interesting tricks and techniques. ",[],{},{"nodeType":426,"data":1523,"content":1524},{},[1525],{"nodeType":247,"value":1526,"marks":1527,"data":1529},"Enumerating suitable victims",[1528],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1531,"content":1532},{},[1533],{"nodeType":247,"value":1534,"marks":1535,"data":1536},"It’s notable that Troy claims the email he used to access MailChimp wasn’t used anywhere else — meaning the attacker probably guessed it. The domain is partially obscured here but it's likely that this is Troy’s own personal domain. It isn’t too much of a stretch to imagine that organizations frequently set up dedicated email addresses for their MailChimp accounts or newsletters generally (e.g. mailchimp@exampledomain.com). ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1538,"content":1539},{},[1540],{"nodeType":247,"value":1541,"marks":1542,"data":1543},"Undeniably, Troy’s MailChimp account is probably more of a target than most given the success of his newsletter, but it’s still likely that the attacker spammed many possible address and domain combinations to see what stuck. There’s a degree of luck, but also some smart guesswork at play here. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":1545,"content":1549},{"target":1546},{"sys":1547},{"id":1548,"type":274,"linkType":275},"5TgXthj5tsvWX87QHZH1WQ",[],{"nodeType":426,"data":1551,"content":1552},{},[1553],{"nodeType":247,"value":1554,"marks":1555,"data":1557},"Using legit services like Cloudflare to defeat detections ",[1556],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1559,"content":1560},{},[1561,1565,1573],{"nodeType":247,"value":1562,"marks":1563,"data":1564},"The attacker used Cloudflare to host the domain, which is ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1566,"content":1567},{"uri":1048},[1568],{"nodeType":247,"value":1569,"marks":1570,"data":1572},"consistent with what we’ve observed attackers doing in the wild",[1571],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1574,"marks":1575,"data":1576},". Even if this means that Cloudflare will probably take the domain down eventually, they aren’t great at identifying the page right away. Given the rate at which attacker infrastructure is burned and rotated, the pros outweigh the cons for the attacker by giving the site legitimate hosting infrastructure, which can defeat some of the common checks performed by anti-phishing tools.",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1578,"content":1579},{},[1580,1584,1592],{"nodeType":247,"value":1581,"marks":1582,"data":1583},"Troy also mentions seeing a 'Cloudflare anti-automation widget' when accessing the page, which is most likely Cloudflare Turnstile — a creative alternative to CAPTCHA to prevent security bots from accessing and loading malicious pages to analyse them. We've seen attackers use Turnstile ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1585,"content":1586},{"uri":1048},[1587],{"nodeType":247,"value":1588,"marks":1589,"data":1591},"along with a host of other obfuscation techniques",[1590],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1593,"marks":1594,"data":1595}," to defeat common detections by preventing security tools from analysing the malicious page. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":1597,"content":1601},{"target":1598},{"sys":1599},{"id":1600,"type":274,"linkType":275},"2X1r1qbE5CVcJ0xVcESGK7",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":1603,"content":1604},{},[1605],{"nodeType":247,"value":1606,"marks":1607,"data":1608},"Although this page has now been taken down, the campaign undoubtedly continues — another will have been rotated in to take its place. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":1610,"content":1614},{"target":1611},{"sys":1612},{"id":1613,"type":274,"linkType":275},"26wnNFTED2f6O1HtqL3Cgu",[],{"nodeType":426,"data":1616,"content":1617},{},[1618],{"nodeType":247,"value":1619,"marks":1620,"data":1622},"Configuring ghost logins via API keys to backdoor the account ",[1621],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1624,"content":1625},{},[1626,1630,1639,1643,1652],{"nodeType":247,"value":1627,"marks":1628,"data":1629},"The attacker also configured an API key — a smart way to backdoor an app and something we’ve previously ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1631,"content":1633},{"uri":1632},"https://pushsecurity.com/resources/phishing-detecting-evilginx-evilnovnc-muraena-and-modlishka",[1634],{"nodeType":247,"value":1635,"marks":1636,"data":1638},"demonstrated in our webinars",[1637],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1640,"marks":1641,"data":1642}," as a ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1644,"content":1646},{"uri":1645},"https://github.com/pushsecurity/saas-attacks",[1647],{"nodeType":247,"value":1648,"marks":1649,"data":1651},"SaaS-native attack technique",[1650],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1653,"marks":1654,"data":1655}," for persistence. It means that even if the credentials are changed, the attacker can maintain access to the account.",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":1657,"content":1661},{"target":1658},{"sys":1659},{"id":1660,"type":274,"linkType":275},"35GkKL1rXnWHNZa1EBHLyD",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":1663,"content":1664},{},[1665],{"nodeType":247,"value":1666,"marks":1667,"data":1668},"Now, as a security pro, Troy noticed this and deleted it — but many less technical victims wouldn’t know to do this. It’s also not unusual for automated emails from applications to go to spam — meaning some victims potentially wouldn’t spot the notification sent to them. ",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":1670,"content":1671},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1673,"content":1674},{},[1675],{"nodeType":247,"value":1676,"marks":1677,"data":1679},"But — why MailChimp? ",[1678],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1681,"content":1682},{},[1683],{"nodeType":247,"value":1684,"marks":1685,"data":1686},"This was the big question we asked ourselves when looking into this attack. Most phishing attacks targeting businesses tend to focus on core platforms like Microsoft, Google Workspace, etc. — usually Identity Providers (IdPs) that provide both access to email and downstream apps via SSO. It’s the biggest bang for their buck and most tooling is preconfigured to support these platforms. So MailChimp seems an unusual choice at first glance. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1688,"content":1689},{},[1690,1694,1703],{"nodeType":247,"value":1691,"marks":1692,"data":1693},"But, we’ve seen recently that it's getting easier for attackers to ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1695,"content":1697},{"uri":1696},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/darcula-phaas-can-now-auto-generate-phishing-kits-for-any-brand/",[1698],{"nodeType":247,"value":1699,"marks":1700,"data":1702},"impersonate a broader range of brands",[1701],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1704,"marks":1705,"data":1706},". And there’s something to be said for targeting an app like MailChimp — your guard is naturally probably lower than it would be for a Microsoft-based phish, increasing the chance of success. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1708,"content":1709},{},[1710],{"nodeType":247,"value":1711,"marks":1712,"data":1713},"But what’s the payout? The data collected doesn’t seem to be overly valuable — 16k records including email address, IP, and rough geolocation data. Not particularly exploitable by itself…",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":1715,"content":1719},{"target":1716},{"sys":1717},{"id":1718,"type":274,"linkType":275},"OjZtHXit6WO6Zd9tCUYpJ",[],{"nodeType":426,"data":1721,"content":1722},{},[1723],{"nodeType":247,"value":1724,"marks":1725,"data":1727},"Part of a multi stage attack? ",[1726],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1729,"content":1730},{},[1731],{"nodeType":247,"value":1732,"marks":1733,"data":1734},"This gets a lot more interesting when you consider the different things an attacker might do as part of a broader campaign. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1736,"content":1737},{},[1738],{"nodeType":247,"value":1739,"marks":1740,"data":1741},"With access to MailChimp, an attacker can send emails on behalf of the compromised account. These emails are highly trusted and expected from the sender, meaning people receiving them are much more likely to engage with the content, click the links, etc. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1743,"content":1744},{},[1745],{"nodeType":247,"value":1746,"marks":1747,"data":1748},"So what if an attacker compromised an account, inserted a load of malicious links into the newsletter, and used it in itself as a mass-phishing vector, designed to capture user credentials or deliver malware? Pretty devious! If you scale this up across multiple victims (and not all of them realize that they’ve been phished) you’ve suddenly got your hands on an incredibly valuable phishing vector that is much more likely to succeed than your average cold approach. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1750,"content":1751},{},[1752],{"nodeType":247,"value":1753,"marks":1754,"data":1755},"Then, with the additional victims, you could target accounts that are much more inherently valuable to an attacker. You could:",[],{},{"nodeType":331,"data":1757,"content":1758},{},[1759,1795,1818],{"nodeType":335,"data":1760,"content":1761},{},[1762],{"nodeType":254,"data":1763,"content":1764},{},[1765,1769,1778,1782,1791],{"nodeType":247,"value":1766,"marks":1767,"data":1768},"Deploy infostealer malware, which has dominated the headlines since the success of the ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1770,"content":1772},{"uri":1771},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/snowflake-retro/",[1773],{"nodeType":247,"value":1774,"marks":1775,"data":1777},"Snowflake",[1776],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1779,"marks":1780,"data":1781}," attacks last year, and are continually resulting in data breaches via attackers logging into apps using stolen credentials such as the recent attacks on ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1783,"content":1785},{"uri":1784},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/why-attackers-are-targeting-jira-with-stolen-credentials/",[1786],{"nodeType":247,"value":1787,"marks":1788,"data":1790},"Jira",[1789],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1792,"marks":1793,"data":1794}," platforms.",[],{},{"nodeType":335,"data":1796,"content":1797},{},[1798],{"nodeType":254,"data":1799,"content":1800},{},[1801,1805,1814],{"nodeType":247,"value":1802,"marks":1803,"data":1804},"Target personal apps for banking, email, e-com, and other easily monetizable services — which is increasingly easy to do at-scale using ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1806,"content":1808},{"uri":1807},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-atlantis-aio-automates-credential-stuffing-on-140-services/",[1809],{"nodeType":247,"value":1810,"marks":1811,"data":1813},"tooling for hire",[1812],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1815,"marks":1816,"data":1817}," with stolen credentials.",[],{},{"nodeType":335,"data":1819,"content":1820},{},[1821],{"nodeType":254,"data":1822,"content":1823},{},[1824],{"nodeType":247,"value":1825,"marks":1826,"data":1827},"Even attempt to deploy ransomware and other malicious software to progress an attack on user devices and networks (a pretty relevant use case for the many subscribers of Troy’s newsletter accessing it on their corporate device!).",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1829,"content":1830},{},[1831],{"nodeType":247,"value":1832,"marks":1833,"data":1834},"Even grabbing the list of newsletter sign-ups could enable the attacker to perform this attack from a different MailChimp account, so anyone subscribed to Troy’s newsletter should be wary of emails impersonating Troy’s newsletter reaching them from a different sender address than usual. ",[],{},{"nodeType":426,"data":1836,"content":1837},{},[1838],{"nodeType":247,"value":1839,"marks":1840,"data":1842},"Account security limitations",[1841],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1844,"content":1845},{},[1846,1850,1858],{"nodeType":247,"value":1847,"marks":1848,"data":1849},"On the theme of MailChimp, it’s also notable that MailChimp doesn’t appear to offer SAML support. ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1851,"content":1853},{"uri":1852},"https://www.okta.com/integrations/mailchimp/",[1854],{"nodeType":247,"value":1855,"marks":1856,"data":1857},"Okta lists the app as only available for SWA",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1859,"marks":1860,"data":1861}," (where separate credentials are created to access the app, managed through Okta — more like a password manager than genuine SSO via SAML or OIDC).",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":1863,"content":1867},{"target":1864},{"sys":1865},{"id":1866,"type":274,"linkType":275},"7b4RZhUIqJMF1OxmyR0qKH",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":1869,"content":1870},{},[1871],{"nodeType":247,"value":1872,"marks":1873,"data":1874},"This means you’re forced to use a username and password. Your only SSO option is to sign in with Google — which many non-Google Workspace users may not have access to. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1876,"content":1877},{},[1878],{"nodeType":247,"value":1879,"marks":1880,"data":1881},"As Troy points out, MailChimp also fails to offer support for phishing-resistant MFA. This is pretty typical (if disappointing) for the long tail of SaaS apps, which typically leave WebAuthn / passkey support to the IdP. Except in this case, support for SSO in general is limited, meaning you can only use passkeys if you’re logging in with Google. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":1883,"content":1887},{"target":1884},{"sys":1885},{"id":1886,"type":274,"linkType":275},"2lT7fBiOq4JxpMxSLrdUOv",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":1889,"content":1890},{},[1891],{"nodeType":247,"value":1892,"marks":1893,"data":1894},"So it’s possible that attackers have noticed that accounts in MailChimp are far more likely to have insecure accounts than other traditional phishing targets — simply because they cannot be configured as securely. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":1896,"content":1900},{"target":1897},{"sys":1898},{"id":1899,"type":274,"linkType":275},"30APqb65kzTA4ySWJIkxGh",[],{"nodeType":426,"data":1902,"content":1903},{},[1904],{"nodeType":247,"value":1905,"marks":1906,"data":1908},"It might not just be MailChimp",[1907],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1910,"content":1911},{},[1912],{"nodeType":247,"value":1913,"marks":1914,"data":1915},"It looks like the same attackers have previously targeted ActiveCampaign, a marketing email and automation platform, based on GitHub comments from December. A domain previously flagged as malicious relating to ActiveCampaign currently redirects to the malicious MailChimp domain seen in Troy’s attack.",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":1917,"content":1921},{"target":1918},{"sys":1919},{"id":1920,"type":274,"linkType":275},"7M8W9vAYdqPN8NMU8Ug7jq",[],{"nodeType":269,"data":1923,"content":1927},{"target":1924},{"sys":1925},{"id":1926,"type":274,"linkType":275},"7CJfZwc9BpzIL7Fma1Y6o1",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":1929,"content":1930},{},[1931],{"nodeType":247,"value":1932,"marks":1933,"data":1934},"This could point to a broader campaign targeting similar SaaS platforms for marketing automation and email distribution.",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":1936,"content":1937},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1939,"content":1940},{},[1941],{"nodeType":247,"value":1942,"marks":1943,"data":1945},"Closing thoughts",[1944],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1947,"content":1948},{},[1949,1953,1960,1964,1973],{"nodeType":247,"value":1950,"marks":1951,"data":1952},"MailChimp might seem an unusual target but there are a lot of ways that attackers can abuse SaaS services, as we’ve discussed at length in our public research with the ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1954,"content":1955},{"uri":1645},[1956],{"nodeType":247,"value":866,"marks":1957,"data":1959},[1958],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1961,"marks":1962,"data":1963}," and ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1965,"content":1967},{"uri":1966},"https://pushsecurity.com/resources/",[1968],{"nodeType":247,"value":1969,"marks":1970,"data":1972},"many webinars and conference talks",[1971],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1974,"marks":1975,"data":1976},". Account takeover through modern phishing attacks like the one we've analysed here is key to unlocking this attack surface. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1978,"content":1979},{},[1980],{"nodeType":247,"value":1981,"marks":1982,"data":1983},"While the vast majority of phishing attacks that we observe do focus on core platforms like Microsoft, Google Workspace and Okta, it makes sense that attackers are broadening their focus to take advantage of the fact that phishing targeting these accounts is less obviously a target, and these accounts are often much less securely configured. But there are many ways to target the interconnected ecosystem of SaaS apps in creative ways that most organizations (and users) are seriously underprepared for. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":1985,"content":1986},{},[1987,1991,2000],{"nodeType":247,"value":1988,"marks":1989,"data":1990},"Attackers have been targeting consumers and individuals via their sprawl of internet apps for some time — are more business-focused threat groups waking up to the opportunity of targeting SaaS? After all, it’s a ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":1992,"content":1994},{"uri":1993},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/shifting-detection-left-for-more-effective-itdr/",[1995],{"nodeType":247,"value":1996,"marks":1997,"data":1999},"great way to evade established controls elsewhere on the network and endpoints",[1998],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2001,"marks":2002,"data":2003},", and you can achieve your objectives simply by logging in to (often weakly secured) user accounts.  ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2005,"content":2006},{},[2007],{"nodeType":247,"value":2008,"marks":2009,"data":2010},"The moral of the story? Phishing attacks are getting pretty sophisticated (and often much more sophisticated than this). Even security pros get phished sometimes!",[],{},{"nodeType":2012,"data":2013,"content":2014},"blockquote",{},[2015],{"nodeType":254,"data":2016,"content":2017},{},[2018],{"nodeType":247,"value":2019,"marks":2020,"data":2022},"This is clear indicator that we need stronger technical controls to prevent phishing. If even someone like Troy can be phished, the only reasonable conclusion is that humans will always be susceptible to phishing, no matter how much awareness training they receive. ",[2021],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2024,"content":2025},{},[2026],{"nodeType":247,"value":2027,"marks":2028,"data":2029},"A big thanks to Troy for sharing his write-up of the incident!",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":2031,"content":2032},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2034,"content":2035},{},[2036],{"nodeType":247,"value":2037,"marks":2038,"data":2040},"How Push can help",[2039],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2042,"content":2043},{},[2044,2048,2057],{"nodeType":247,"value":2045,"marks":2046,"data":2047},"Push takes a unique browser-based approach to detecting and intercepting phishing attacks that overcomes many of the tricks and techniques attackers use to defeat conventional anti-phishing controls. To learn more, ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":2049,"content":2051},{"uri":2050},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/why-its-time-for-phishing-prevention-to-move-beyond-email/",[2052],{"nodeType":247,"value":2053,"marks":2054,"data":2056},"check out our recent blog post",[2055],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1370,"marks":2058,"data":2059},[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2061,"content":2062},{},[2063,2067,2076],{"nodeType":247,"value":2064,"marks":2065,"data":2066},"And if you want to see how Push helps you to detect and defeat common identity attack techniques like AiTM phishing, credential stuffing, and session hijacking while improving your workforce identity posture, book some time with one of our team for a ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":2068,"content":2070},{"uri":2069},"https://pushsecurity.com/demo/",[2071],{"nodeType":247,"value":2072,"marks":2073,"data":2075},"live demo",[2074],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2077,"marks":2078,"data":2079},".",[],{},"Dissecting a recent MailChimp phishing attack","HIBP creator and well-known security person Troy Hunt recently blogged about a phish he fell for. Here’s what it tells us about how phishing is evolving. ","2025-03-28T00:00:00.000Z","dissecting-a-recent-mailchimp-phishing-attack",{"items":2085},[2086,2088],{"sys":2087,"name":1286},{"id":1285},{"sys":2089,"name":1290},{"id":1289},{"items":2091},[2092],{"fullName":1294,"firstName":1295,"jobTitle":1296,"profilePicture":2093},{"url":1298},{"__typename":832,"sys":2095,"content":2097,"title":2718,"synopsis":2719,"hashTags":62,"publishedDate":2720,"slug":2721,"tagsCollection":2722,"authorsCollection":2728},{"id":2096},"4UgGUvlZNqkJtx9nNprKg0",{"json":2098},{"nodeType":239,"data":2099,"content":2100},{},[2101,2108,2140,2146,2153,2156,2164,2171,2178,2211,2218,2225,2232,2235,2243,2262,2269,2276,2282,2289,2296,2299,2307,2314,2321,2327,2334,2354,2387,2394,2397,2405,2412,2419,2425,2432,2439,2446,2451,2458,2464,2471,2474,2482,2489,2496,2499,2507,2514,2521,2528,2531,2539,2546,2553,2560,2567,2574,2580,2587,2594,2600,2607,2640,2647,2659,2679,2685,2688,2695,2701],{"nodeType":254,"data":2102,"content":2103},{},[2104],{"nodeType":247,"value":2105,"marks":2106,"data":2107},"Most organizations today have invested in an email security solution of some description. But even the most premium tools have significant limitations when it comes to modern phishing attacks. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2109,"content":2110},{},[2111,2115,2124,2128,2137],{"nodeType":247,"value":2112,"marks":2113,"data":2114},"The data speaks for itself — phishing remains as big a problem as it ever was (if not bigger!) despite enormous investment in security products and training. In 2024, identity-based attack vectors involving a human element (phishing and stolen credentials) accounted for 80% of the initial access observed by ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":2116,"content":2118},{"uri":2117},"https://www.verizon.com/business/en-gb/resources/reports/dbir/",[2119],{"nodeType":247,"value":2120,"marks":2121,"data":2123},"Verizon",[2122],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2125,"marks":2126,"data":2127},", while 69% of organizations experienced a phishing incident in 2024 according to ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":2129,"content":2131},{"uri":2130},"https://www.idsalliance.org/white-paper/2024-trends-in-securing-digital-identities/",[2132],{"nodeType":247,"value":2133,"marks":2134,"data":2136},"IDSA",[2135],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1370,"marks":2138,"data":2139},[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":2141,"content":2145},{"target":2142},{"sys":2143},{"id":2144,"type":274,"linkType":275},"4urh9lIuo0ePgVIJZNtP2B",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":2147,"content":2148},{},[2149],{"nodeType":247,"value":2150,"marks":2151,"data":2152},"So, why are phishing attacks still so effective for attackers? ",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":2154,"content":2155},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2157,"content":2158},{},[2159],{"nodeType":247,"value":2160,"marks":2161,"data":2163},"Modern phishing attacks are evading established controls",[2162],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2165,"content":2166},{},[2167],{"nodeType":247,"value":2168,"marks":2169,"data":2170},"Let’s start with the lay of the land: What controls and capabilities do organizations typically rely on when it comes to blocking credential phishing?  ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2172,"content":2173},{},[2174],{"nodeType":247,"value":2175,"marks":2176,"data":2177},"If you’re using an email security solution, you’re relying on the following core capabilities when it comes to detecting malicious phishing pages:",[],{},{"nodeType":331,"data":2179,"content":2180},{},[2181,2196],{"nodeType":335,"data":2182,"content":2183},{},[2184],{"nodeType":254,"data":2185,"content":2186},{},[2187,2192],{"nodeType":247,"value":2188,"marks":2189,"data":2191},"Known-bad blocklists:",[2190],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2193,"marks":2194,"data":2195}," Block users from accessing known-bad or unapproved domains/URLs, and block traffic from known-bad malicious IPs, using Threat Intelligence (TI) feeds.",[],{},{"nodeType":335,"data":2197,"content":2198},{},[2199],{"nodeType":254,"data":2200,"content":2201},{},[2202,2207],{"nodeType":247,"value":2203,"marks":2204,"data":2206},"Malicious webpage detection:",[2205],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2208,"marks":2209,"data":2210}," Inspect webpages by loading them in a sandbox to detect malicious elements.",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2212,"content":2213},{},[2214],{"nodeType":247,"value":2215,"marks":2216,"data":2217},"This also applies to other solutions that rely on these capabilities, such as web-based content filtering (e.g. Google Safe Browsing), CASB, SASE, SWG, etc. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2219,"content":2220},{},[2221],{"nodeType":247,"value":2222,"marks":2223,"data":2224},"But, attackers are now using specific tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) and tooling designed to defeat these solutions. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2226,"content":2227},{},[2228],{"nodeType":247,"value":2229,"marks":2230,"data":2231},"Let’s look at where these controls are falling short. ",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":2233,"content":2234},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2236,"content":2237},{},[2238],{"nodeType":247,"value":2239,"marks":2240,"data":2242},"Attackers are innovating with new tooling and techniques",[2241],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2244,"content":2245},{},[2246,2250,2259],{"nodeType":247,"value":2247,"marks":2248,"data":2249},"The vast majority of phishing attacks today are executed using ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":2251,"content":2253},{"uri":2252},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/phishing-2-0-how-phishing-toolkits-are-evolving-with-aitm/?utm_campaign=9983377-FY25Q1_Bleeping-Computer-Organic-Article&utm_source=bleepingcomputer&utm_medium=sponsored-content&utm_content=organic%20article",[2254],{"nodeType":247,"value":2255,"marks":2256,"data":2258},"AitM phishing kits — otherwise known as “MFA bypass” kits",[2257],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2077,"marks":2260,"data":2261},[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2263,"content":2264},{},[2265],{"nodeType":247,"value":2266,"marks":2267,"data":2268},"These kits use dedicated tooling to act as a proxy between the target and a legitimate login portal for an application. This allows the target to log in successfully with a legitimate service they use and even continue to interact with it. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2270,"content":2271},{},[2272],{"nodeType":247,"value":2273,"marks":2274,"data":2275},"As it’s a proxy to the real application, the page will appear exactly as the user expects, because they are logging into the legitimate site – just taking a detour via the attacker’s device. However, because the attacker is sitting in the middle of this connection, they are able to observe all interactions, intercept authentication material like credentials, MFA codes, and session tokens to take control of the authenticated session and gain control of the user account. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":2277,"content":2281},{"target":2278},{"sys":2279},{"id":2280,"type":274,"linkType":275},"3ZAawfzPVfhb8cmvWNZEVK",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":2283,"content":2284},{},[2285],{"nodeType":247,"value":2286,"marks":2287,"data":2288},"MFA was once widely regarded as the silver bullet for phishing (we all remember the Microsoft stat “MFA prevents over 99% of identity-based attacks”) but this is no longer the case. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2290,"content":2291},{},[2292],{"nodeType":247,"value":2293,"marks":2294,"data":2295},"Not only are these kits incredibly effective at bypassing other anti-phishing controls like MFA, attackers are building them specifically to evade common detection tooling and techniques. ",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":2297,"content":2298},{},[],{"nodeType":426,"data":2300,"content":2301},{},[2302],{"nodeType":247,"value":2303,"marks":2304,"data":2306},"Known-bad blocklists can’t keep up",[2305],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2308,"content":2309},{},[2310],{"nodeType":247,"value":2311,"marks":2312,"data":2313},"The fundamental limitation with known-bad blocklists is that they focus on indicators that are easy for attackers to change, in turn making detections based on them easy to bypass. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2315,"content":2316},{},[2317],{"nodeType":247,"value":2318,"marks":2319,"data":2320},"Attackers have gotten pretty good at disguising and rotating these elements. In modern phishing attacks, every target can receive a unique email and link. Even just using a URL shortener can bypass this. It’s equivalent to a malware hash – trivial to change, and therefore not a great thing to pin your detections on. The kind of detection that sits right at the bottom of the Pyramid of Pain. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":2322,"content":2326},{"target":2323},{"sys":2324},{"id":2325,"type":274,"linkType":275},"6cG2fx3AikwptyEyXKrYCK",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":2328,"content":2329},{},[2330],{"nodeType":247,"value":2331,"marks":2332,"data":2333},"You could look at which IP address the user connects to, but these days it’s very simple for attackers to add a new IP to their cloud-hosted server. If a domain is flagged as known-bad, the attacker only has to register a new domain, or compromise a WordPress server on an already trusted domain. Both of these things are happening on a massive scale as attackers pre-plan for the fact that their domains will be burned at some point. Attackers are more than happy to spend $10-$20 per new domain in the grand scheme of the potential proceeds of crime. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2335,"content":2336},{},[2337,2341,2350],{"nodeType":247,"value":2338,"marks":2339,"data":2340},"For example, ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":2342,"content":2344},{"uri":2343},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/how-aitm-phishing-kits-evade-detection/?utm_campaign=9983377-FY25Q1_Bleeping-Computer-Organic-Article&utm_source=bleepingcomputer&utm_medium=sponsored-content&utm_content=organic%20article",[2345],{"nodeType":247,"value":2346,"marks":2347,"data":2349},"recent examples of Adversary-in-the-Middle phishing kits",[2348],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2351,"marks":2352,"data":2353}," including Tycoon, Nakedpages, Evilginx were seen to rotate the URLs they resolve to (from a continually refreshed pool of URLs), mask the HTTP Referer header to disguise suspicious redirects, and redirect to benign (legitimate) domains if anyone but the intended victims attempted to visit the page. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2355,"content":2356},{},[2357,2361,2370,2374,2383],{"nodeType":247,"value":2358,"marks":2359,"data":2360},"And in many cases, attackers are ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":2362,"content":2364},{"uri":2363},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/campaign-abusing-hubspot-targets-20-000-microsoft-azure-accounts/",[2365],{"nodeType":247,"value":2366,"marks":2367,"data":2369},"leveraging legitimate SaaS services",[2368],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2371,"marks":2372,"data":2373}," to conduct their campaigns (",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":2375,"content":2377},{"uri":2376},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/proofpoint-settings-exploited-to-send-millions-of-phishing-emails-daily/",[2378],{"nodeType":247,"value":2379,"marks":2380,"data":2382},"sometimes even using email protection services themselves!",[2381],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2384,"marks":2385,"data":2386},") making it even harder to filter genuine from harmful links. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2388,"content":2389},{},[2390],{"nodeType":247,"value":2391,"marks":2392,"data":2393},"But there’s a bigger issue here – for defenders to know that a URL, IP, or domain name is bad, it needs to be reported first. When are things reported? Typically after being used in an attack — so unfortunately, someone always gets hurt. ",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":2395,"content":2396},{},[],{"nodeType":426,"data":2398,"content":2399},{},[2400],{"nodeType":247,"value":2401,"marks":2402,"data":2404},"Malicious webpage detections are failing",[2403],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2406,"content":2407},{},[2408],{"nodeType":247,"value":2409,"marks":2410,"data":2411},"Attackers are using various tricks to prevent security tools and bots from reaching their phishing pages to analyse them. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2413,"content":2414},{},[2415],{"nodeType":247,"value":2416,"marks":2417,"data":2418},"Using legitimate services to host their domains is increasingly common, with services like Cloudflare Workers used for the initial gateway, and Cloudflare Turnstile to prevent security bots from advancing to the page. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":2420,"content":2424},{"target":2421},{"sys":2422},{"id":2423,"type":274,"linkType":275},"4XNxLbiZf3xUK1WeFDjjxl",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":2426,"content":2427},{},[2428],{"nodeType":247,"value":2429,"marks":2430,"data":2431},"Even if you can get past Turnstile, then you’ll need to supply the correct URL parameters and headers, and execute JavaScript, to be served the malicious page. This means that a defender who knows the domain name can’t discover the malicious behavior just by making a simple HTTP(S) request to the domain.",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2433,"content":2434},{},[2435],{"nodeType":247,"value":2436,"marks":2437,"data":2438},"And if all this wasn’t enough, they’re also obfuscating both visual and DOM elements to prevent signature-based detections from picking them up — so even if you can land on the page, there’s a high chance that your detections won’t trigger. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2440,"content":2441},{},[2442],{"nodeType":247,"value":2443,"marks":2444,"data":2445},"By changing the DOM structure, attackers are loading functionally equivalent pages that look very different under the hood.",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":2447,"content":2450},{"target":2448},{"sys":2449},{"id":1152,"type":274,"linkType":275},[],{"nodeType":254,"data":2452,"content":2453},{},[2454],{"nodeType":247,"value":2455,"marks":2456,"data":2457},"They’re also randomizing page titles, dynamically decoding text, changing the size and name of image elements, using different favicons, blurring backgrounds, substituting logos, and more… all to defeat common detections. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":2459,"content":2463},{"target":2460},{"sys":2461},{"id":2462,"type":274,"linkType":275},"3hlzM3qIqaZHy3qxtnRS5x",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":2465,"content":2466},{},[2467],{"nodeType":247,"value":2468,"marks":2469,"data":2470},"With all this, it’s no surprise that defenders can’t keep up. ",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":2472,"content":2473},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2475,"content":2476},{},[2477],{"nodeType":247,"value":2478,"marks":2479,"data":2481},"The verdict",[2480],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2483,"content":2484},{},[2485],{"nodeType":247,"value":2486,"marks":2487,"data":2488},"Historically, the industry has seen email security solutions and anti-phishing as the same thing. But it’s clear that email-based phishing protection isn’t really cutting it when it comes to modern credential phishing attacks (the most common and impactful phishing variant today). ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2490,"content":2491},{},[2492],{"nodeType":247,"value":2493,"marks":2494,"data":2495},"This isn’t to say that email-based solutions have no value — far from it. But relying on email scanners to detect phishing pages as a single line of defense isn’t enough anymore. ",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":2497,"content":2498},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2500,"content":2501},{},[2502],{"nodeType":247,"value":2503,"marks":2504,"data":2506},"Building better phishing controls",[2505],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2508,"content":2509},{},[2510],{"nodeType":247,"value":2511,"marks":2512,"data":2513},"The key to solving this problem is, put simply, building better controls. But to do this, we need to move away from email as being the primary (or often the only) place where phishing attacks can be stopped. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2515,"content":2516},{},[2517],{"nodeType":247,"value":2518,"marks":2519,"data":2520},"While email is the main delivery vector for phishing attacks (at least, according to the data we have, which comes primarily from email security solutions) it’s not the only one. Phishing links are increasingly delivered to victims over IM platforms, social media — and generally over the internet. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2522,"content":2523},{},[2524],{"nodeType":247,"value":2525,"marks":2526,"data":2527},"A better solution to the problem would therefore be able to follow the user across the sites they use, and see the actual phishing pages as the user sees them, as opposed to a sandbox (which, as we’ve discussed, attackers are well prepared for). ",[],{},{"nodeType":305,"data":2529,"content":2530},{},[],{"nodeType":426,"data":2532,"content":2533},{},[2534],{"nodeType":247,"value":2535,"marks":2536,"data":2538},"Is browser-based phishing protection the solution?",[2537],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2540,"content":2541},{},[2542],{"nodeType":247,"value":2543,"marks":2544,"data":2545},"While we’ve been conditioned to think about phishing as something that happens over email, it’s actually the browser where most of the action happens, regardless of the initial delivery channel.",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2547,"content":2548},{},[2549],{"nodeType":247,"value":2550,"marks":2551,"data":2552},"And while it’s tempting to view the delivery of a phishing link as the attack itself, the phish can’t succeed unless the victim enters their genuine credentials on the malicious page. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2554,"content":2555},{},[2556],{"nodeType":247,"value":2557,"marks":2558,"data":2559},"Push provides a browser-based identity security solution that stops phishing attacks where they happen — in employee browsers. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2561,"content":2562},{},[2563],{"nodeType":247,"value":2564,"marks":2565,"data":2566},"Being in the browser delivers a lot of advantages when it comes to detecting and intercepting phishing attacks. You see the live webpage that the user sees, meaning you have much better visibility of malicious elements running on the page. It also means that you can implement real-time controls that kick in when a malicious element is detected. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2568,"content":2569},{},[2570],{"nodeType":247,"value":2571,"marks":2572,"data":2573},"There’s a clear difference when you compare a phishing attack with and without Push. ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":2575,"content":2579},{"target":2576},{"sys":2577},{"id":2578,"type":274,"linkType":275},"2CbGMUSJsP1mNeHkmpLl6N",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":2581,"content":2582},{},[2583],{"nodeType":247,"value":2584,"marks":2585,"data":2586},"Here, an attacker hacks a WordPress blog to get a reputable domain and then runs a phishing toolkit on the webpage. They email one of your employees a link to it. Your SWG or email scanning solution inspects it in a sandbox but the phish kit detects this and redirects to a benign site so that it passes the inspection. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2588,"content":2589},{},[2590],{"nodeType":247,"value":2591,"marks":2592,"data":2593},"Your user gets the email with the link and is now free to interact with the phishing page. They enter their credentials plus MFA code into the page and voila! The attacker steals the authenticated session and takes over the user’s account.  ",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":2595,"content":2599},{"target":2596},{"sys":2597},{"id":2598,"type":274,"linkType":275},"77smnID1woCfFJrJPyTvKY",[],{"nodeType":254,"data":2601,"content":2602},{},[2603],{"nodeType":247,"value":2604,"marks":2605,"data":2606},"But with Push, our browser extension inspects the webpage running in the user's browser. Push observes that the webpage is a login page and the user is entering their password into the page, detecting that:",[],{},{"nodeType":331,"data":2608,"content":2609},{},[2610,2620,2630],{"nodeType":335,"data":2611,"content":2612},{},[2613],{"nodeType":254,"data":2614,"content":2615},{},[2616],{"nodeType":247,"value":2617,"marks":2618,"data":2619},"The password the user is entering matches the domain that password is pinned to. Since it doesn't match, based on this detection alone the user is automatically redirected to a blocking page. ",[],{},{"nodeType":335,"data":2621,"content":2622},{},[2623],{"nodeType":254,"data":2624,"content":2625},{},[2626],{"nodeType":247,"value":2627,"marks":2628,"data":2629},"The rendered web app is using a cloned app login page.",[],{},{"nodeType":335,"data":2631,"content":2632},{},[2633],{"nodeType":254,"data":2634,"content":2635},{},[2636],{"nodeType":247,"value":2637,"marks":2638,"data":2639},"A phishing toolkit is running on the web page. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2641,"content":2642},{},[2643],{"nodeType":247,"value":2644,"marks":2645,"data":2646},"As a result, the user is blocked from interacting with the phishing site and prevented from continuing. ",[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2648,"content":2649},{},[2650,2654],{"nodeType":247,"value":2651,"marks":2652,"data":2653},"These are good examples of detections that are difficult (or impossible) for an attacker to evade — ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2655,"marks":2656,"data":2658},"you can’t phish a victim if they can’t enter their credentials into your phishing site! ",[2657],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2660,"content":2661},{},[2662,2666,2675],{"nodeType":247,"value":2663,"marks":2664,"data":2665},"If we look at the Pyramid of Pain again, we can see that these are much harder detections for attackers to get around, ",[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":2667,"content":2669},{"uri":2668},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/shifting-detection-left-for-more-effective-itdr/?utm_campaign=9983377-FY25Q1_Bleeping-Computer-Organic-Article&utm_source=bleepingcomputer&utm_medium=sponsored-content&utm_content=organic%20article",[2670],{"nodeType":247,"value":2671,"marks":2672,"data":2674},"enabling earlier detection and interception of account takeover ",[2673],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2676,"marks":2677,"data":2678},"when compared to static, TI-driven blocklists — stopping attacks before anyone gets hurt.",[],{},{"nodeType":269,"data":2680,"content":2684},{"target":2681},{"sys":2682},{"id":2683,"type":274,"linkType":275},"6q8H7vA8k7mLrSsr5R0TZ1",[],{"nodeType":305,"data":2686,"content":2687},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":2689,"content":2690},{},[2691],{"nodeType":247,"value":694,"marks":2692,"data":2694},[2693],{"type":251},{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2696,"content":2697},{},[2698],{"nodeType":247,"value":1258,"marks":2699,"data":2700},[],{},{"nodeType":254,"data":2702,"content":2703},{},[2704,2707,2714],{"nodeType":247,"value":1265,"marks":2705,"data":2706},[],{},{"nodeType":442,"data":2708,"content":2709},{"uri":1268},[2710],{"nodeType":247,"value":717,"marks":2711,"data":2713},[2712],{"type":450},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":2715,"marks":2716,"data":2717}," for a live demo. ",[],{},"Why it's time for phishing prevention to move beyond email","Modern MFA-bypass phishing attacks are routinely defeating primarily email-based security controls. Why are controls failing and what can we do about it? ","2025-03-20T00:00:00.000Z","why-its-time-for-phishing-prevention-to-move-beyond-email",{"items":2723},[2724,2726],{"sys":2725,"name":1286},{"id":1285},{"sys":2727,"name":1290},{"id":1289},{"items":2729},[2730],{"fullName":1294,"firstName":1295,"jobTitle":1296,"profilePicture":2731},{"url":1298},"investigating-a-recent-malvertising-campaign-targeting-onfido-customers","blog/investigating-a-recent-malvertising-campaign-targeting-onfido-customers",{"json":2735},{"data":2736,"content":2737,"nodeType":239},{},[2738],{"data":2739,"content":2740,"nodeType":254},{},[2741],{"data":2742,"marks":2743,"value":2744,"nodeType":247},{},[],"We recently detected and blocked Push users from interacting with a malicious Attacker-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing site using the phishing kit ‘Evilginx’ targeting Onfido, the digital identity platform. Here’s what we found.","We recently investigated a malvertising campaign using Evilginx to target Onfido customers via Google ads.",{"id":2747,"publishedAt":2748},"51p0V5Vr4I9rapUytBWX0R","2025-04-15T13:09:04.342Z",{"items":2750},[2751,2753],{"sys":2752,"name":1286},{"id":1285},{"sys":2754,"name":1290},{"id":1289},"CpTMHZ9wsvQ32KnaEn1zdxhm87ymJ-EMCgpKQZrmA0c",1784196723889]