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SSO password resets using Push",{"items":230},[231],{"fullName":232,"firstName":233,"jobTitle":234,"profilePicture":235},"Johann Scheepers","Johann","Senior Security Engineer",{"url":236},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/75IEOH93vR0hbvxuqTu1m3/f6222745ee6892ea07bc18727a5a5ae7/T016S22KZ96-U02LU3SKC2D-e1e755770536-512.png",{"json":238,"links":583},{"nodeType":239,"data":240,"content":241},"document",{},[242,251,259,281,301,326,333,349,356,363,370,374,381,401,420,429,449,457,464,470,477,483,516,523,543,546,553,564,571,577],{"nodeType":243,"data":244,"content":245},"heading-1",{},[246],{"nodeType":247,"value":248,"marks":249,"data":250},"text","Preventing credential attacks with automated password resets ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":253,"content":254},"paragraph",{},[255],{"nodeType":247,"value":256,"marks":257,"data":258},"Preventing credential attacks is not an easy task, especially if you’re a member of the security team tasked with protecting some of your organization’s most valued assets: SSO identities.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":260,"content":261},{},[262,266,277],{"nodeType":247,"value":263,"marks":264,"data":265},"IdP accounts such as a user’s Okta, Entra, or Google Workspace login are the most lucrative identities that an attacker can take over. By compromising an SSO identity, attackers not only gain access to the account itself, but also any downstream apps accessed via SSO – and the juicy data and functionality stored there. This was evidenced earlier this year when ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":268,"content":270},"hyperlink",{"uri":269},"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/okta-warns-of-unprecedented-credential-stuffing-attacks-on-customers/",[271],{"nodeType":247,"value":272,"marks":273,"data":276},"Okta users experienced unprecedented levels of credential stuffing attacks",[274],{"type":275},"underline",{},{"nodeType":247,"value":278,"marks":279,"data":280},". ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":282,"content":283},{},[284,288,297],{"nodeType":247,"value":285,"marks":286,"data":287},"You might also be surprised to learn that even these most critical accounts have serious security gaps. For example, ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":289,"content":291},{"uri":290},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/how-many-vulnerable-identities-do-you-have/",[292],{"nodeType":247,"value":293,"marks":294,"data":296},"in a recent study we identified that",[295],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":298,"marks":299,"data":300},":",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":303,"content":304},"unordered-list",{},[305,316],{"nodeType":306,"data":307,"content":308},"list-item",{},[309],{"nodeType":252,"data":310,"content":311},{},[312],{"nodeType":247,"value":313,"marks":314,"data":315},"1 in 5 IdP accounts does not have an MFA method set, leaving them exposed to single-factor compromises using stolen credentials.",[],{},{"nodeType":306,"data":317,"content":318},{},[319],{"nodeType":252,"data":320,"content":321},{},[322],{"nodeType":247,"value":323,"marks":324,"data":325},"10% of IdP accounts share a password that is used to access other identities. (We’re not talking about the actual SSO process here – many users will use the same password as they do to log into their Okta or Entra as they do personal accounts such as shopping or food delivery. Yes, really.)  ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":327,"content":328},{},[329],{"nodeType":247,"value":330,"marks":331,"data":332},"It’s a constant worry that your CFO’s Microsoft, Google, or Okta credentials are going to show up in the next big darkweb password dump. Ideally you’d want to prevent users from reusing passwords across multiple services. That’s why your information security policy is mandating password manager use, right?",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":334,"content":335},{},[336,340,345],{"nodeType":247,"value":337,"marks":338,"data":339},"No matter how many policies you have in place, ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":341,"marks":342,"data":344},"people will inevitably use the same passwords across multiple services",[343],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":346,"marks":347,"data":348},". But who can blame them? Having to remember multiple passwords is a drag, especially when they find they can’t log into their company’s password manager from their home computers… The next best thing is to just reuse your Entra or Okta password across all services, right?!",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":350,"content":351},{},[352],{"nodeType":247,"value":353,"marks":354,"data":355},"At Push we realize that mistakes happen. That's why it's important to look out for when critical credentials are entered into a dodgy ecommerce platform, or the next entry lands on haveibeenpwnd.com.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":357,"content":358},{},[359],{"nodeType":247,"value":360,"marks":361,"data":362},"By quickly forcing a password change when an SSO password is reused or breached, we can minimize the chance of it being abused by attackers. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":364,"content":365},{},[366],{"nodeType":247,"value":367,"marks":368,"data":369},"But how will you know when a password is reused or compromised? ",[],{},{"nodeType":371,"data":372,"content":373},"hr",{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":375,"content":376},{},[377],{"nodeType":247,"value":378,"marks":379,"data":380},"Using Push data to alert on password vulnerabilities ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":382,"content":383},{},[384,388,397],{"nodeType":247,"value":385,"marks":386,"data":387},"Enter the Push browser extension. Push fingerprints passwords (",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":389,"content":391},{"uri":390},"https://pushsecurity.com/help/how-does-the-push-browser-extension-securely-track-reused-passwords",[392],{"nodeType":247,"value":393,"marks":394,"data":396},"in a safe way",[395],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":398,"marks":399,"data":400},") as they are used by employees to access apps in their browsers. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":402,"content":403},{},[404,408,417],{"nodeType":247,"value":405,"marks":406,"data":407},"When a user logs into an app using credentials that they’ve previously used to login to another account, Push fires off an alert. ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":409,"content":411},{"uri":410},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/verified-stolen-credential-detection/",[412],{"nodeType":247,"value":413,"marks":414,"data":416},"We can also detect when an active password is stolen and appears on a criminal forum",[415],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":278,"marks":418,"data":419},[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":422,"content":428},"embedded-entry-block",{"target":423},{"sys":424},{"id":425,"type":426,"linkType":427},"5He3FB0NT3D3lcbwiVtn02","Link","Entry",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":430,"content":431},{},[432,436,445],{"nodeType":247,"value":433,"marks":434,"data":435},"If you’ve ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":437,"content":439},{"uri":438},"https://pushsecurity.com/help/audience/administrators/docs/connect-to-siem-or-soar/#start",[440],{"nodeType":247,"value":441,"marks":442,"data":444},"connected Push to your SIEM or SOAR",[443],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":446,"marks":447,"data":448},", you’ll be able to create a workflow to respond automatically. ",[],{},{"nodeType":450,"data":451,"content":452},"heading-2",{},[453],{"nodeType":247,"value":454,"marks":455,"data":456},"Automating password resets in your SIEM using Push webhooks",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":458,"content":459},{},[460],{"nodeType":247,"value":461,"marks":462,"data":463},"You can automate password resets for accounts by ingesting this information via webhook into a SIEM, generating an alert. This in turn can fire off another webhook or workflow that sets the ‘force password change on next logon’ attribute on the user’s account.",[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":465,"content":469},{"target":466},{"sys":467},{"id":468,"type":426,"linkType":427},"5WFLIVm4DWcuH7a6owQlR1",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":471,"content":472},{},[473],{"nodeType":247,"value":474,"marks":475,"data":476},"Below is some POC python code we use internally. This is specific to Google Workspace, but the general logic should apply to any IdP that allows you to perform these actions via API calls.",[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":478,"content":482},{"target":479},{"sys":480},{"id":481,"type":426,"linkType":427},"4YNirRo8BlRrgGKwwzXE8R",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":484,"content":485},{},[486,490,499,503,512],{"nodeType":247,"value":487,"marks":488,"data":489},"You can perform similar functions in Microsoft Entra ID by modifying the user's ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":491,"content":493},{"uri":492},"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/user-update?view=graph-rest-1.0&tabs=http#:~:text=DisablePasswordExpiration%2C%20DisableStrongPassword.-,passwordProfile,-PasswordProfile",[494],{"nodeType":247,"value":495,"marks":496,"data":498},"passwordProfile",[497],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":500,"marks":501,"data":502}," attribute via Microsoft Graph API, or in Okta via the ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":504,"content":506},{"uri":505},"https://developer.okta.com/docs/api/openapi/okta-management/management/tag/UserCred/#tag/UserCred/operation/expirePassword",[507],{"nodeType":247,"value":508,"marks":509,"data":511},"expire_password",[510],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":513,"marks":514,"data":515}," API endpoint.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":517,"content":518},{},[519],{"nodeType":247,"value":520,"marks":521,"data":522},"You aren’t limited to just IdP accounts either – any app with an API that provides this functionality can be configured for automated password resets using Push data. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":524,"content":525},{},[526,530,539],{"nodeType":247,"value":527,"marks":528,"data":529},"We also use SSO password data to ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":531,"content":533},{"uri":532},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/introducing-sso-password-protection/",[534],{"nodeType":247,"value":535,"marks":536,"data":538},"prevent users from entering their SSO credentials into phishing sites",[537],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":540,"marks":541,"data":542},", providing strong anti-phishing protection that is extremely hard for attackers to bypass. ",[],{},{"nodeType":371,"data":544,"content":545},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":547,"content":548},{},[549],{"nodeType":247,"value":550,"marks":551,"data":552},"Preventing attackers from exploiting vulnerable credentials has never been easier",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":554,"content":555},{},[556,560],{"nodeType":247,"value":557,"marks":558,"data":559},"This is just one of the possible SecOps use cases that Push streamlines and levels up for security teams. ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":561,"marks":562,"data":563},"Push Security is the most powerful AI-native security tool in the browser. Think EDR, but for the browser — high-fidelity telemetry and real-time control across every session, on every device, with no browser migration required.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":565,"content":566},{},[567],{"nodeType":247,"value":568,"marks":569,"data":570},"Security teams use Push to detect and stop advanced browser-based attacks like AiTM phishing, ClickFix, and session hijacking; gain visibility and control over AI tool usage across their workforce; harden identities by surfacing credential reuse, SSO gaps, and shadow IT; and support data loss and insider investigations with browser-layer telemetry that other tools can't see.",[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":572,"content":576},{"target":573},{"sys":574},{"id":575,"type":426,"linkType":427},"11p9wnGrZHqp3XPpThHFk3",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":578,"content":579},{},[580],{"nodeType":247,"value":29,"marks":581,"data":582},[],{},{"entries":584},{"hyperlink":585,"inline":586,"block":587},[],[],[588,596,605,611],{"sys":589,"__typename":590,"type":591,"ctaText":592,"buttonLabel":593,"buttonColour":594,"buttonUrl":595},{"id":425},"CtaWidget","Custom","Learn more about our verified stolen credential detection feature","Read the blog","sea blue","https://pushsecurity.com/blog/automating-sso-password-resets-using-push/",{"sys":597,"__typename":598,"title":599,"caption":600,"layoutMode":62,"file":601},{"id":468},"Image","Automating Password resets with Push","Automating password resets using Push",{"url":602,"width":603,"height":604},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/3xEHX60bfsoM8oC88L5bXs/bd2567087156edcb849ec2dd6286559e/Automating_password_resets__3_.png",3070,1358,{"sys":606,"__typename":607,"name":608,"type":609,"syntax":610},{"id":481},"CodeBlockComponent","Automating password resets code snippet","python","import json\nfrom google.oauth2 import service_account\nfrom googleapiclient.discovery import build\n\n\ndef ssoPasswordReset(event):\n    # extract email from message\n    email_address = event[\"email\"]\n\n    # GWS service account credentials\n    gws_service_account_credentials = \"xxx\"\n\n    SCOPES = [\"https://www.googleapis.com/auth/admin.directory.user\"]\n\n    # Google requires us to associate this activity to a user account\n    DELEGATED_ADMIN_EMAIL = \"user@domain.com\"\n\n    credentials = service_account.Credentials.from_service_account_info(json.loads(gws_service_account_credentials), \n    scopes=SCOPES).with_subject(DELEGATED_ADMIN_EMAIL)\n\n    service = build(\"admin\", \"directory_v1\", credentials=credentials)\n\n    # Set changePasswordAtNextLogin on the account\n    service.users().update(userKey=email_address, body={\"changePasswordAtNextLogin\": True}).execute()\n",{"sys":612,"__typename":590,"type":613,"ctaText":614,"buttonLabel":615,"buttonColour":616,"buttonUrl":62},{"id":575},"Demo","Book a demo to see how Push stops account takeover","Book demo","sunny orange","json",{"items":619},[],{},"Using Push to automate SSO password resets","2024-12-13T00:00:00.000Z",{"items":624},[625,1361,1753],{"__typename":626,"sys":627,"content":629,"title":1339,"synopsis":1340,"hashTags":62,"publishedDate":1341,"slug":1342,"tagsCollection":1343,"authorsCollection":1353},"BlogPosts",{"id":628},"6vCr4d3R1XA1E8dU883l7N",{"json":630},{"nodeType":239,"data":631,"content":632},{},[633,639,642,659,666,673,679,686,707,726,733,739,746,749,756,763,770,777,784,791,824,830,837,840,847,854,971,978,996,1003,1023,1030,1051,1058,1077,1080,1087,1094,1101,1134,1141,1148,1167,1173,1180,1187,1193,1200,1263,1270,1277,1284,1291,1298,1301,1308,1327,1333],{"nodeType":421,"data":634,"content":638},{"target":635},{"sys":636},{"id":637,"type":426,"linkType":427},"HcoxuG8EK0w5uFQlN0hbh",[],{"nodeType":371,"data":640,"content":641},{},[],{"nodeType":252,"data":643,"content":644},{},[645,649,655],{"nodeType":247,"value":646,"marks":647,"data":648},"While ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":650,"marks":651,"data":654},"striking",[652],{"type":653},"italic",{},{"nodeType":247,"value":656,"marks":657,"data":658}," gold sure feels good, mining for gold doesn’t. All that sifting for a few grains of value. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":660,"content":661},{},[662],{"nodeType":247,"value":663,"marks":664,"data":665},"If you’ve ever tried to make use of a TI feed on stolen credentials, you’ll know exactly how this feels. Yet the need to identify signal from noise is obvious. When it matters, it really matters. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":667,"content":668},{},[669],{"nodeType":247,"value":670,"marks":671,"data":672},"While there’s an enormous volume of TI data available on stolen creds, data trustworthiness is much harder to establish. Are these creds still in use? Are they in use on company applications? And without trust in the data, it’s harder to take action.",[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":674,"content":678},{"target":675},{"sys":676},{"id":677,"type":426,"linkType":427},"4unFZadFrWEQsiHsD3YAEo",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":680,"content":681},{},[682],{"nodeType":247,"value":683,"marks":684,"data":685},"We set out to solve this problem at Push and ended up flipping the script on conventional approaches to evaluating TI on stolen credentials. (Lay down your shovel, friend.)",[],{},{"nodeType":687,"data":688,"content":689},"blockquote",{},[690],{"nodeType":252,"data":691,"content":692},{},[693,697,703],{"nodeType":247,"value":694,"marks":695,"data":696},"With our latest release, Push takes TI on stolen credentials sourced from criminal forums and compares it to the actual credentials still being used across customer environments, ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":698,"marks":699,"data":702},"alerting on validated true positives only",[700],{"type":701},"bold",{},{"nodeType":247,"value":704,"marks":705,"data":706},". ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":708,"content":709},{},[710,714,722],{"nodeType":247,"value":711,"marks":712,"data":713},"As of January 2025, you can also bring your own TI to the Push platform. Using the ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":715,"content":717},{"uri":716},"https://pushsecurity.redoc.ly/rest-v1#tag/Stolen-credential-detection",[718],{"nodeType":247,"value":719,"marks":720,"data":721},"Push REST API",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":723,"marks":724,"data":725},", you can share stolen credential reports you receive from your existing vendors and task the Push browser agent with finding the ones still in use by employees.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":727,"content":728},{},[729],{"nodeType":247,"value":730,"marks":731,"data":732},"Call it the “dirt in, gold out” model for TI feeds.",[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":734,"content":738},{"target":735},{"sys":736},{"id":737,"type":426,"linkType":427},"5VtuerdMpP4U9yL7pjrb4P",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":740,"content":741},{},[742],{"nodeType":247,"value":743,"marks":744,"data":745},"In this article, we’ll cover some of the challenges with threat intel on stolen credentials, why the rise of infostealers has added urgency to determining the trustworthiness of this category of threat, and how Push’s approach of validating stolen credentials cuts through uncertainty. ",[],{},{"nodeType":371,"data":747,"content":748},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":750,"content":751},{},[752],{"nodeType":247,"value":753,"marks":754,"data":755},"Why actionable intel on creds is hard",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":757,"content":758},{},[759],{"nodeType":247,"value":760,"marks":761,"data":762},"Both threat actors and security teams have ready access to information on stolen credentials, with obviously opposite goals. There is now a robust economy for this data, driven in part by both the success of attacks using stolen creds, and the SaaS-ification of business software. In the past, security teams could audit their Active Directory passwords. Today, many if not most corporate credentials are stored in apps that do not provide that level of visibility.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":764,"content":765},{},[766],{"nodeType":247,"value":767,"marks":768,"data":769},"So when it comes to stolen credential TI, the challenge is not the availability of data — dozens of vendors already do the hard work of establishing presences in these forums in order to collect and disseminate information on credentials such as usernames, passwords, cookies, and API keys that have been stolen through data breaches, phishing attacks, infostealers, or other methods. ",[],{},{"nodeType":450,"data":771,"content":772},{},[773],{"nodeType":247,"value":774,"marks":775,"data":776},"Too much data, not enough context",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":778,"content":779},{},[780],{"nodeType":247,"value":781,"marks":782,"data":783},"Rather, the difficulty is determining which information to act on. Finding the gold, in other words.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":785,"content":786},{},[787],{"nodeType":247,"value":788,"marks":789,"data":790},"TI on stolen credentials often suffers from:",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":792,"content":793},{},[794,809],{"nodeType":306,"data":795,"content":796},{},[797],{"nodeType":252,"data":798,"content":799},{},[800,805],{"nodeType":247,"value":801,"marks":802,"data":804},"Data overload:",[803],{"type":701},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":806,"marks":807,"data":808}," The double bind of TI is especially evident here — once you know about a potential true positive, you feel obligated to investigate, yet the scale of the information and the high incidence of outdated or incomplete information can pose a risk of desensitizing the SOC or wasting dozens of hours of time investigating what turn out to be false positives, especially when that time could have been better spent on in-depth threat hunting.",[],{},{"nodeType":306,"data":810,"content":811},{},[812],{"nodeType":252,"data":813,"content":814},{},[815,820],{"nodeType":247,"value":816,"marks":817,"data":819},"Minimal context:",[818],{"type":701},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":821,"marks":822,"data":823}," Intelligence is often incomplete or out of date. TI feeds may present stolen passwords as new breaches, but the data is actually a recycled combolist (aggregated list of lists) rather than a new incident. In some situations, infostealer threat intel can stem from a personal device that was compromised and once accessed corporate assets, but is no longer active or using that password. Then there are the false negatives, where you get an alert for stolen credentials on a core app following a breach, and the creds are no longer in use there — but they are still being used on a different high-value app. ",[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":825,"content":829},{"target":826},{"sys":827},{"id":828,"type":426,"linkType":427},"40ZWbzJFQLRjCAaFCA0YLS",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":831,"content":832},{},[833],{"nodeType":247,"value":834,"marks":835,"data":836},"Despite these challenges, there is still a strong case for incorporating TI on stolen creds into your cyber defense practice for one important reason: Attackers are increasingly using stolen credentials to compromise organizations.",[],{},{"nodeType":371,"data":838,"content":839},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":841,"content":842},{},[843],{"nodeType":247,"value":844,"marks":845,"data":846},"The commodification of stolen creds in the age of infostealers",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":848,"content":849},{},[850],{"nodeType":247,"value":851,"marks":852,"data":853},"A few headline stats on how ubiquitous stolen credential exploitation has become:",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":855,"content":856},{},[857,880,902,925,961],{"nodeType":306,"data":858,"content":859},{},[860],{"nodeType":252,"data":861,"content":862},{},[863,867,876],{"nodeType":247,"value":864,"marks":865,"data":866},"The ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":868,"content":870},{"uri":869},"https://www.verizon.com/business/en-gb/resources/reports/dbir/",[871],{"nodeType":247,"value":872,"marks":873,"data":875},"2024 Verizon DBIR",[874],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":877,"marks":878,"data":879}," found that 79% of web application compromises were the result of breached credentials.",[],{},{"nodeType":306,"data":881,"content":882},{},[883],{"nodeType":252,"data":884,"content":885},{},[886,889,898],{"nodeType":247,"value":29,"marks":887,"data":888},[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":890,"content":892},{"uri":891},"https://www.ibm.com/reports/threat-intelligence",[893],{"nodeType":247,"value":894,"marks":895,"data":897},"Researchers at IBM",[896],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":899,"marks":900,"data":901}," identified a 71% year-over-year increase in cyberattacks using stolen or compromised credentials. This jump made stolen creds the No. 1 source of initial access for cyberattacks in their study. They also found a 266% uptick in the last year in the use of infostealers — malware designed to capture passwords, cookies, and other credential data.",[],{},{"nodeType":306,"data":903,"content":904},{},[905],{"nodeType":252,"data":906,"content":907},{},[908,912,921],{"nodeType":247,"value":909,"marks":910,"data":911},"Researchers at threat intelligence provider ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":913,"content":915},{"uri":914},"https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2024-0321.pdf",[916],{"nodeType":247,"value":917,"marks":918,"data":920},"Recorded Future",[919],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":922,"marks":923,"data":924}," found a 135% increase last year in the number of harvested credentials among their data sources, and a 166% increase in credentials that included cookies, providing an easy way for attackers to bypass MFA protections.",[],{},{"nodeType":306,"data":926,"content":927},{},[928],{"nodeType":252,"data":929,"content":930},{},[931,935,944,948,957],{"nodeType":247,"value":932,"marks":933,"data":934},"Meanwhile, Mandiant’s last two ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":936,"content":938},{"uri":937},"https://cloud.google.com/security/resources/m-trends",[939],{"nodeType":247,"value":940,"marks":941,"data":943},"M-Trends reports",[942],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":945,"marks":946,"data":947}," found that stolen creds were the third and fourth most-used initial intrusion method of the last two years. Cisco Talos researchers found that the ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":949,"content":951},{"uri":950},"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/cisco-talos-2023-year-in-review/",[952],{"nodeType":247,"value":953,"marks":954,"data":956},"use of valid accounts",[955],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":958,"marks":959,"data":960}," was the second-most common attack technique they observed last year.",[],{},{"nodeType":306,"data":962,"content":963},{},[964],{"nodeType":252,"data":965,"content":966},{},[967],{"nodeType":247,"value":968,"marks":969,"data":970},"Push’s own review of the 25 most notable public identity-related breaches over the last year found that 23 were tied to stolen credentials.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":972,"content":973},{},[974],{"nodeType":247,"value":975,"marks":976,"data":977},"What’s not immediately obvious from these statistics is that not only are credential-based attacks becoming more common, but they’re also becoming easier for attackers to execute.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":979,"content":980},{},[981,984,992],{"nodeType":247,"value":29,"marks":982,"data":983},[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":985,"content":986},{"uri":891},[987],{"nodeType":247,"value":988,"marks":989,"data":991},"IBM X-Force researchers",[990],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":993,"marks":994,"data":995}," have found that credentials for cloud accounts account for 90% of all cloud assets for sale on the dark web, making them readily accessible. Price tags can be as low as $10.",[],{},{"nodeType":450,"data":997,"content":998},{},[999],{"nodeType":247,"value":1000,"marks":1001,"data":1002},"The rise of infostealers has supercharged the stolen credential marketplace",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1004,"content":1005},{},[1006,1010,1019],{"nodeType":247,"value":1007,"marks":1008,"data":1009},"One category of threat — infostealer malware — has emerged as an especially successful avenue of compromise. While infostealers aren’t new, they have developed alongside what is now a robust economy for stolen credentials (think: dedicated Telegram channels advertising stolen data from the most popular infostealers), making them a fruitful option for attackers. For a deeper dive on the rise of infostealers, see our ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":1011,"content":1013},{"uri":1012},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/what-the-rise-of-infostealers-says-about-identity-attacks/",[1014],{"nodeType":247,"value":1015,"marks":1016,"data":1018},"previous article",[1017],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1020,"marks":1021,"data":1022},".",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1024,"content":1025},{},[1026],{"nodeType":247,"value":1027,"marks":1028,"data":1029},"Once attackers gain possession of stolen creds, they have plenty of soft targets. For organizations with a large amount of SaaS — a percentage of which will always be unmanaged shadow IT or freemium — the risk is heightened because all attackers need to do is log in to potentially hundreds of services, dump the data they find (including additional creds in some cases), and profit. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1031,"content":1032},{},[1033,1037,1047],{"nodeType":247,"value":1034,"marks":1035,"data":1036},"In other words, the average attack path for SaaS is shorter and occurs in-app, often using legitimate workflows, making it therefore harder to detect than traditional network exploits. We discuss this phenomenon in our ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":1038,"content":1040},{"uri":1039},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/shifting-detection-left-for-more-effective-itdr/",[1041],{"nodeType":247,"value":1042,"marks":1043,"data":1046},"shifting detection left",[1044,1045],{"type":275},{"type":701},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1048,"marks":1049,"data":1050}," article.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1052,"content":1053},{},[1054],{"nodeType":247,"value":1055,"marks":1056,"data":1057},"Our take: We haven’t yet seen the peak of identity attacks that leverage compromised credentials. The opportunities for attackers are too numerous, and front-line defenses like MFA are still not widely enough enforced, particularly on unmanaged apps used for work.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1059,"content":1060},{},[1061,1065,1073],{"nodeType":247,"value":1062,"marks":1063,"data":1064},"Push Security’s ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":1066,"content":1067},{"uri":290},[1068],{"nodeType":247,"value":1069,"marks":1070,"data":1072},"own research",[1071],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1074,"marks":1075,"data":1076}," has found that 37% of corporate identities are using passwords with no MFA. For attackers in possession of stolen creds, these are easy marks.",[],{},{"nodeType":371,"data":1078,"content":1079},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1081,"content":1082},{},[1083],{"nodeType":247,"value":1084,"marks":1085,"data":1086},"How Push detects stolen creds with high confidence",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1088,"content":1089},{},[1090],{"nodeType":247,"value":1091,"marks":1092,"data":1093},"Now let’s take a look at how Push’s approach to this problem is different.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1095,"content":1096},{},[1097],{"nodeType":247,"value":1098,"marks":1099,"data":1100},"If you’re not familiar with the Push platform, a bit of context will be useful here: Push uses a browser agent deployed to employee browsers (we support all major browsers) to prevent, detect, and block identity attacks. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1102,"content":1103},{},[1104,1108,1117,1121,1130],{"nodeType":247,"value":1105,"marks":1106,"data":1107},"In addition to enforcing ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":1109,"content":1111},{"uri":1110},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/introducing-set-and-forget-controls-that-stop-real-world-identity-attacks/",[1112],{"nodeType":247,"value":1113,"marks":1114,"data":1116},"security controls",[1115],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1118,"marks":1119,"data":1120}," in the browser, Push also assesses the strength of end-user passwords by ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":1122,"content":1124},{"uri":1123},"https://pushsecurity.com/help/10065#start",[1125],{"nodeType":247,"value":1126,"marks":1127,"data":1129},"creating and analyzing",[1128],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1131,"marks":1132,"data":1133}," a truncated, salted SHA256 hash of the password for a given account. This is called a password fingerprint. These k-anonymized fingerprints are never seen by Push’s back-end and exist only in local browser extension storage.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1135,"content":1136},{},[1137],{"nodeType":247,"value":1138,"marks":1139,"data":1140},"This approach gives Push a directly observable source of truth for corporate credentials, and that data point turns out to be the key to flipping the script on how threat intelligence on stolen credentials is typically evaluated.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1142,"content":1143},{},[1144],{"nodeType":247,"value":1145,"marks":1146,"data":1147},"In the past, evaluating TI on stolen creds meant performing traditional intelligence assessments, such as confidence level based on factors like the intel source and whether the data was still current. Only after determining whether the information was high-confidence could you take action.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1149,"content":1150},{},[1151,1155,1163],{"nodeType":247,"value":1152,"marks":1153,"data":1154},"It’s worth noting, too, that the age of TI alone is not enough of an indicator to determine whether to take action. With the ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":1156,"content":1158},{"uri":1157},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/snowflake-retro/",[1159],{"nodeType":247,"value":1160,"marks":1161,"data":1162},"Snowflake breach earlier this year",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1164,"marks":1165,"data":1166},", we saw how even older credentials posed a threat of account takeover where these creds were still in use. In the case of Snowflake, the attacker used credentials sourced from historical infostealer campaigns, some dating as far back as 2020.",[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":1168,"content":1172},{"target":1169},{"sys":1170},{"id":1171,"type":426,"linkType":427},"2lSZ7HbZfLmSFXneCnVJzY",[],{"nodeType":450,"data":1174,"content":1175},{},[1176],{"nodeType":247,"value":1177,"marks":1178,"data":1179},"Forget about time-consuming manual TI validation and get straight to the true positives",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1181,"content":1182},{},[1183],{"nodeType":247,"value":1184,"marks":1185,"data":1186},"With Push, the platform now can analyze threat intelligence on stolen credentials and alert when there’s a validated match among current credentials in use in your environment. This method works regardless of the source of the data or its age. This method also finds the needles in the haystack — situations where threat intel flags a stolen credential on one app, but that credential is also in use on several other apps. ",[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":1188,"content":1192},{"target":1189},{"sys":1190},{"id":1191,"type":426,"linkType":427},"7GSFasHfHb3UgpgF8pZ2N2",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":1194,"content":1195},{},[1196],{"nodeType":247,"value":1197,"marks":1198,"data":1199},"Here’s how it works:",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":1201,"content":1202},{},[1203,1223,1233,1243,1253],{"nodeType":306,"data":1204,"content":1205},{},[1206],{"nodeType":252,"data":1207,"content":1208},{},[1209,1213,1220],{"nodeType":247,"value":1210,"marks":1211,"data":1212},"Push receives TI on stolen credentials from vendor feeds. Use the feeds that Push supplies (at no additional cost for Push customers), or, additionally, bring your own TI by supplying stolen credential reports via the ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":1214,"content":1216},{"uri":1215},"https://pushsecurity.redoc.ly/rest-v1#operation/post-controls-stolenCredentials",[1217],{"nodeType":247,"value":719,"marks":1218,"data":1219},[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":704,"marks":1221,"data":1222},[],{},{"nodeType":306,"data":1224,"content":1225},{},[1226],{"nodeType":252,"data":1227,"content":1228},{},[1229],{"nodeType":247,"value":1230,"marks":1231,"data":1232},"For each customer environment, Push checks for customer domains in the data set.",[],{},{"nodeType":306,"data":1234,"content":1235},{},[1236],{"nodeType":252,"data":1237,"content":1238},{},[1239],{"nodeType":247,"value":1240,"marks":1241,"data":1242},"When suspected stolen creds for a customer environment are present, Push hashes and salts the passwords and then sends those fingerprints to the relevant browser agents for comparison. ",[],{},{"nodeType":306,"data":1244,"content":1245},{},[1246],{"nodeType":252,"data":1247,"content":1248},{},[1249],{"nodeType":247,"value":1250,"marks":1251,"data":1252},"If the stolen credential fingerprint matches a known credential fingerprint observed to be in use by the Push browser agent, the platform returns a validated true positive alert. Note that Push can alert on a validated true positive regardless of which platform the TI source indicated was the source of the stolen cred, allowing you to find those compromised credentials in use across any of your apps.",[],{},{"nodeType":306,"data":1254,"content":1255},{},[1256],{"nodeType":252,"data":1257,"content":1258},{},[1259],{"nodeType":247,"value":1260,"marks":1261,"data":1262},"You can choose to receive alerts for this detection via webhook, ChatOps notification, or in the Push admin console.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1264,"content":1265},{},[1266],{"nodeType":247,"value":1267,"marks":1268,"data":1269},"From there, security teams can take action to reset passwords, identify potentially compromised devices, or perform other investigations.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1271,"content":1272},{},[1273],{"nodeType":247,"value":1274,"marks":1275,"data":1276},"By comparing all possible matches to only those credentials that are still in use, Push eliminates time-consuming validation exercises. In essence, the provenance of the intel no longer matters; only the true positives do.",[],{},{"nodeType":450,"data":1278,"content":1279},{},[1280],{"nodeType":247,"value":1281,"marks":1282,"data":1283},"Bring your own TI",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1285,"content":1286},{},[1287],{"nodeType":247,"value":1288,"marks":1289,"data":1290},"With verified stolen credential detection, you can also extract a lot more value from your existing threat intelligence feeds by sharing stolen creds reports with the Push platform via API. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1292,"content":1293},{},[1294],{"nodeType":247,"value":1295,"marks":1296,"data":1297},"This allows Push to perform the same checks to compare the reports to observed password fingerprints and flag only the true positives — eliminating the time-consuming work of manual triage, investigation, and end-user follow-up for your security team.",[],{},{"nodeType":371,"data":1299,"content":1300},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1302,"content":1303},{},[1304],{"nodeType":247,"value":1305,"marks":1306,"data":1307},"Try Push for yourself",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1309,"content":1310},{},[1311,1315,1324],{"nodeType":247,"value":1312,"marks":1313,"data":1314},"The validated stolen credential detections feature is available at no additional cost for all Push customers. If you’d like to explore the platform yourself, ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":1316,"content":1318},{"uri":1317},"https://pushsecurity.com/demo/",[1319],{"nodeType":247,"value":1320,"marks":1321,"data":1323},"request a demo",[1322],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":278,"marks":1325,"data":1326},[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":1328,"content":1332},{"target":1329},{"sys":1330},{"id":1331,"type":426,"linkType":427},"3tqVk7Vr7pYLOEVukIJM2g",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":1334,"content":1335},{},[1336],{"nodeType":247,"value":29,"marks":1337,"data":1338},[],{},"Eliminate false positives with verified stolen credential detections using Push","Push now compares user passwords with TI feeds to alert you when valid credentials are available on the clearweb and darkweb.","2024-12-03T00:00:00.000Z","verified-stolen-credential-detection",{"items":1344},[1345,1349],{"sys":1346,"name":1348},{"id":1347},"5jk0kqjSdSK2L0YiistQjY","Release notes",{"sys":1350,"name":1352},{"id":1351},"4ksQNCFeBf8H4QIORqpRLw","Detection & response",{"items":1354},[1355],{"fullName":1356,"firstName":1357,"jobTitle":1358,"profilePicture":1359},"Kelly Davenport","Kelly","Product Team",{"url":1360},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/1hi8bEuVfn5sF57LivAq6d/9a3b82426c697d765e2e450e33a18424/kelly_profile_pic.jpeg",{"__typename":626,"sys":1362,"content":1364,"title":1734,"synopsis":1735,"hashTags":62,"publishedDate":1736,"slug":1737,"tagsCollection":1738,"authorsCollection":1746},{"id":1363},"7uLeQ9twNl5RyNaWkkJNjd",{"json":1365},{"nodeType":239,"data":1366,"content":1367},{},[1368,1374,1377,1384,1391,1416,1419,1426,1433,1440,1459,1466,1469,1476,1483,1490,1497,1504,1537,1543,1577,1583,1586,1593,1600,1607,1613,1620,1626,1633,1636,1643,1658,1664,1671,1694,1697,1704,1722,1728],{"nodeType":421,"data":1369,"content":1373},{"target":1370},{"sys":1371},{"id":1372,"type":426,"linkType":427},"2qUzJLoMtI3Uaf3ooGw582",[],{"nodeType":371,"data":1375,"content":1376},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1378,"content":1379},{},[1380],{"nodeType":247,"value":1381,"marks":1382,"data":1383},"Which password managers are my employees using?",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1385,"content":1386},{},[1387],{"nodeType":247,"value":1388,"marks":1389,"data":1390},"Tens of millions of people now use password managers, both at work and at home. And it probably won’t come as much of a surprise that most of Push’s security-savvy customers also provide their users with a corporate password manager. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1392,"content":1393},{},[1394,1398,1403,1407,1412],{"nodeType":247,"value":1395,"marks":1396,"data":1397},"Up until now, Push has been able to show you whether or not your employees are using ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1399,"marks":1400,"data":1402},"a",[1401],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1404,"marks":1405,"data":1406}," password manager to log into their work apps. But now, we can actually show you ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1408,"marks":1409,"data":1411},"which",[1410],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1413,"marks":1414,"data":1415}," password managers they’re using.",[],{},{"nodeType":371,"data":1417,"content":1418},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1420,"content":1421},{},[1422],{"nodeType":247,"value":1423,"marks":1424,"data":1425},"There’s more than first meets the eye with this detection   ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1427,"content":1428},{},[1429],{"nodeType":247,"value":1430,"marks":1431,"data":1432},"There’s a couple of reasons why you’ll want to know which password managers your employees are using.",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1434,"content":1435},{},[1436],{"nodeType":247,"value":1437,"marks":1438,"data":1439},"The obvious one is to make sure all your employees are using, and benefiting from, the password manager you're providing them with. They’re not cheap and you’ll want to get the best bang for your buck. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1441,"content":1442},{},[1443,1447,1455],{"nodeType":247,"value":1444,"marks":1445,"data":1446},"The second reason speaks to a specific concern a lot of security teams have around attackers compromising users’ personal password managers containing corporate passwords, and then being able to pivot into the organization's corporate environment. This is a very valid concern given ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":1448,"content":1449},{"uri":1012},[1450],{"nodeType":247,"value":1451,"marks":1452,"data":1454},"the rise in attacks using infostealers",[1453],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1456,"marks":1457,"data":1458}," following the Snowflake breach earlier this year. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1460,"content":1461},{},[1462],{"nodeType":247,"value":1463,"marks":1464,"data":1465},"Using this feature, you can now detect which password managers are storing credentials for your most sensitive systems and stop this attack scenario from happening.   ",[],{},{"nodeType":371,"data":1467,"content":1468},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1470,"content":1471},{},[1472],{"nodeType":247,"value":1473,"marks":1474,"data":1475},"Why corporate passwords in personal password managers is a big no-no",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1477,"content":1478},{},[1479],{"nodeType":247,"value":1480,"marks":1481,"data":1482},"Remote working, BYOD, and users having both personal and professional accounts on the same platforms (Google, Microsoft etc.) have all blurred the line between people’s work lives and their home lives. It’s not uncommon for one to spill over into the other, and one place we see evidence of this is in password managers. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1484,"content":1485},{},[1486],{"nodeType":247,"value":1487,"marks":1488,"data":1489},"Creds for personal accounts end up getting stored in corporate password managers, and corporate creds end up getting stored in personal password managers. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1491,"content":1492},{},[1493],{"nodeType":247,"value":1494,"marks":1495,"data":1496},"The big risk when the latter happens is that a sensitive corporate asset (a users’ Microsoft account password for example) is effectively being exfiltrated out of the corporate environment by the user, and placed out of reach of your security team. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1498,"content":1499},{},[1500],{"nodeType":247,"value":1501,"marks":1502,"data":1503},"This creates new opportunities for attackers: ",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":1505,"content":1506},{},[1507,1517,1527],{"nodeType":306,"data":1508,"content":1509},{},[1510],{"nodeType":252,"data":1511,"content":1512},{},[1513],{"nodeType":247,"value":1514,"marks":1515,"data":1516},"Your average user’s personal laptop isn't going to be as well protected as their company laptop. So they offer an easier target for attackers using traditional endpoint compromise techniques. ",[],{},{"nodeType":306,"data":1518,"content":1519},{},[1520],{"nodeType":252,"data":1521,"content":1522},{},[1523],{"nodeType":247,"value":1524,"marks":1525,"data":1526},"An attacker can compromise a personal laptop with infostealer malware that targets password managers in the browser. If corporate credentials are stored in that personal password manager then they are also going to be stolen. ",[],{},{"nodeType":306,"data":1528,"content":1529},{},[1530],{"nodeType":252,"data":1531,"content":1532},{},[1533],{"nodeType":247,"value":1534,"marks":1535,"data":1536},"Now the attacker is in possession of the user's Microsoft account credentials, they can potentially pivot from a personal laptop to one of your organization's core platforms over the internet.  ",[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":1538,"content":1542},{"target":1539},{"sys":1540},{"id":1541,"type":426,"linkType":427},"Dw05IslqXVN5unTFuvTZV",[],{"nodeType":450,"data":1544,"content":1545},{},[1546,1550,1555,1559,1564,1568,1573],{"nodeType":247,"value":1547,"marks":1548,"data":1549},"Using Push, you can now make sure that sensitive ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1551,"marks":1552,"data":1554},"corporate credentials",[1553],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1556,"marks":1557,"data":1558}," stay in your ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1560,"marks":1561,"data":1563},"corporate password manager",[1562],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1565,"marks":1566,"data":1567}," and don’t leave your ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1569,"marks":1570,"data":1572},"corporate environment.",[1571],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1574,"marks":1575,"data":1576}," ",[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":1578,"content":1582},{"target":1579},{"sys":1580},{"id":1581,"type":426,"linkType":427},"27d7qit3k7ETS9lemJexIJ",[],{"nodeType":371,"data":1584,"content":1585},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1587,"content":1588},{},[1589],{"nodeType":247,"value":1590,"marks":1591,"data":1592},"All powered by the Push browser extension",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1594,"content":1595},{},[1596],{"nodeType":247,"value":1597,"marks":1598,"data":1599},"Push detects which password managers your employees are using with our browser extension. It observes all your employees logins using their work identities. The telemetry the browser extension generates shows you what employees are logging into, when they’re logging in, how they’re logging in, and if any aspect of that login process is risky or potentially malicious. ",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1601,"content":1602},{},[1603],{"nodeType":247,"value":1604,"marks":1605,"data":1606},"The password managers (and browsers with built-in password managers) supported by this detection are: ",[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":1608,"content":1612},{"target":1609},{"sys":1610},{"id":1611,"type":426,"linkType":427},"7q3CYLPpBhEGyCeP4S0bzJ",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":1614,"content":1615},{},[1616],{"nodeType":247,"value":1617,"marks":1618,"data":1619},"When a login using one of those password managers is observed by Push, it appears in your events feed. This data can be sent to your SIEM using Push’s webhooks. ",[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":1621,"content":1625},{"target":1622},{"sys":1623},{"id":1624,"type":426,"linkType":427},"qDRJ7CYd81L4RUHQBuHvQ",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":1627,"content":1628},{},[1629],{"nodeType":247,"value":1630,"marks":1631,"data":1632},"The password manager user will also appear on the corresponding account on the accounts page. Here you can see every workforce account and the login methods used to access them. ",[],{},{"nodeType":371,"data":1634,"content":1635},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1637,"content":1638},{},[1639],{"nodeType":247,"value":1640,"marks":1641,"data":1642},"Bonus feature — detecting clipboard pasting",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1644,"content":1645},{},[1646,1650,1655],{"nodeType":247,"value":1647,"marks":1648,"data":1649},"The eagle-eyed among you might have seen that in the list of supported “password managers” is one called ",[],{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1651,"marks":1652,"data":1654},"Clipboard paste",[1653],{"type":701},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":278,"marks":1656,"data":1657},[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":1659,"content":1663},{"target":1660},{"sys":1661},{"id":1662,"type":426,"linkType":427},"2ApsFXkrSznhT7cJqSOAIV",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":1665,"content":1666},{},[1667],{"nodeType":247,"value":1668,"marks":1669,"data":1670},"You’ll see this when we observe users pasting a password into the password field. This detection is really useful for a couple of reasons:",[],{},{"nodeType":302,"data":1672,"content":1673},{},[1674,1684],{"nodeType":306,"data":1675,"content":1676},{},[1677],{"nodeType":252,"data":1678,"content":1679},{},[1680],{"nodeType":247,"value":1681,"marks":1682,"data":1683},"Copying passwords from a password manager and pasting them into a login page is bad practice. Password managers typically also store which page the password is for so they won't auto-populate on a phishing page. Pasting your password manually makes you more susceptible to being phished.",[],{},{"nodeType":306,"data":1685,"content":1686},{},[1687],{"nodeType":252,"data":1688,"content":1689},{},[1690],{"nodeType":247,"value":1691,"marks":1692,"data":1693},"Or, it could indicate that the user is storing their passwords in a notes app, word doc, spreadsheet etc. Obviously these are all low hanging fruit for any attacker so you want to get the user to move their passwords into their password manager and set fire to whatever doc they had been using. ",[],{},{"nodeType":371,"data":1695,"content":1696},{},[],{"nodeType":243,"data":1698,"content":1699},{},[1700],{"nodeType":247,"value":1701,"marks":1702,"data":1703},"Try it out for yourself",[],{},{"nodeType":252,"data":1705,"content":1706},{},[1707,1711,1719],{"nodeType":247,"value":1708,"marks":1709,"data":1710},"If you have any question about this feature or any other of our detection use cases, ",[],{},{"nodeType":267,"data":1712,"content":1713},{"uri":1317},[1714],{"nodeType":247,"value":1715,"marks":1716,"data":1718},"book a meeting with one of our team",[1717],{"type":275},{},{"nodeType":247,"value":1020,"marks":1720,"data":1721},[],{},{"nodeType":421,"data":1723,"content":1727},{"target":1724},{"sys":1725},{"id":1726,"type":426,"linkType":427},"6iKFd9Qys2SSuNqKVQB7ka",[],{"nodeType":252,"data":1729,"content":1730},{},[1731],{"nodeType":247,"value":29,"marks":1732,"data":1733},[],{},"Don’t let attackers find the keys to your kingdom in a personal password manager","Make sure sensitive corporate credentials don’t leave your corporate environment and end up in personal password managers with Push.","2024-11-05T00:00:00.000Z","stop-users-saving-corp-creds-into-personal-password-managers",{"items":1739},[1740,1742],{"sys":1741,"name":1348},{"id":1347},{"sys":1743,"name":1745},{"id":1744},"3pjES4THCIfSAwhGdNwBcy","Browser security",{"items":1747},[1748],{"fullName":1749,"firstName":1750,"jobTitle":1358,"profilePicture":1751},"Alex Henshall","Alex",{"url":1752},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/2rz3Pre3b1MexPIQ4hzPUe/0ef8a092b7e7df00fbce3f7d1ccb96d1/Alex_Henshall.jpeg",{"__typename":626,"sys":1754,"content":1756,"title":2549,"synopsis":2550,"hashTags":62,"publishedDate":2551,"slug":2552,"tagsCollection":2553,"authorsCollection":2559},{"id":1755},"PAPJPr3CIB6J20udYyy1r",{"json":1757},{"data":1758,"content":1759,"nodeType":239},{},[1760,1766,1786,1793,1800,1806,1809,1817,1824,1843,1854,1861,1868,1875,1968,1971,1979,2062,2068,2071,2079,2087,2094,2101,2109,2128,2135,2143,2150,2157,2165,2172,2179,2199,2205,2208,2216,2224,2231,2335,2342,2350,2357,2364,2370,2378,2385,2392,2399,2407,2414,2421,2428,2435,2441,2444,2452,2459,2492,2499,2518,2538,2543],{"data":1761,"content":1765,"nodeType":421},{"target":1762},{"sys":1763},{"id":1764,"type":426,"linkType":427},"1eBClNW4NOR66F0tl9h6lD",[],{"data":1767,"content":1768,"nodeType":252},{},[1769,1773,1782],{"data":1770,"marks":1771,"value":1772,"nodeType":247},{},[],"The attacks on Snowflake customers in 2024 collectively constituted the biggest cyber security event of the year in terms of the number of organizations and individuals affected (at least, if you exclude CrowdStrike causing a worldwide outage in July) — certainly, it was the largest perpetrated by a criminal group against commercial enterprises. It has been touted by some news outlets as ‘",{"data":1774,"content":1776,"nodeType":267},{"uri":1775},"https://www.wired.com/story/snowflake-breach-advanced-auto-parts-lendingtree/",[1777],{"data":1778,"marks":1779,"value":1781,"nodeType":247},{},[1780],{"type":275},"one of the biggest breaches ever",{"data":1783,"marks":1784,"value":1785,"nodeType":247},{},[],"’.  ",{"data":1787,"content":1788,"nodeType":252},{},[1789],{"data":1790,"marks":1791,"value":1792,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Snowflake was a watershed moment that signalled the significant opportunity presented by identity attacks on cloud services. It demonstrated how comparatively unsophisticated methods (logging in to user accounts with stolen credentials and dumping the data) can have the same or greater impact as a traditional network or endpoint based cyber attack involving vulnerability exploitation, malware deployment, ransomware, etc. ",{"data":1794,"content":1795,"nodeType":252},{},[1796],{"data":1797,"marks":1798,"value":1799,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Here’s everything you need to know about the Snowflake attacks — and what you can do to protect yourself against the next Snowflake in the future.",{"data":1801,"content":1805,"nodeType":421},{"target":1802},{"sys":1803},{"id":1804,"type":426,"linkType":427},"4QoPUiP5q6Mwj1eWUZT15Q",[],{"data":1807,"content":1808,"nodeType":371},{},[],{"data":1810,"content":1811,"nodeType":243},{},[1812],{"data":1813,"marks":1814,"value":1816,"nodeType":247},{},[1815],{"type":701},"Snowflake: The facts",{"data":1818,"content":1819,"nodeType":252},{},[1820],{"data":1821,"marks":1822,"value":1823,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Cyber criminals associated with the threat group known as ShinyHunters claimed responsibility for breaching multiple organizations using Snowflake, a cloud-based data warehousing and analytics platform. ",{"data":1825,"content":1826,"nodeType":252},{},[1827,1831,1840],{"data":1828,"marks":1829,"value":1830,"nodeType":247},{},[],"ShinyHunters associates targeted ~165 organizations that were subjected to account takeover attacks using stolen credentials harvested from historical infostealer infections dating back as far as 2020, ",{"data":1832,"content":1834,"nodeType":267},{"uri":1833},"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc5537-snowflake-data-theft-extortion",[1835],{"data":1836,"marks":1837,"value":1839,"nodeType":247},{},[1838],{"type":275},"according to Mandiant’s investigation",{"data":1841,"marks":1842,"value":278,"nodeType":247},{},[],{"data":1844,"content":1845,"nodeType":687},{},[1846],{"data":1847,"content":1848,"nodeType":252},{},[1849],{"data":1850,"marks":1851,"value":1853,"nodeType":247},{},[1852],{"type":701},">80% of the compromised accounts belonging to Snowflake customers had prior credential exposure. ",{"data":1855,"content":1856,"nodeType":252},{},[1857],{"data":1858,"marks":1859,"value":1860,"nodeType":247},{},[],"The impacted accounts lacked MFA, meaning successful authentication only required a valid username and password. As the Snowflake credentials found in infostealer malware credential dumps had not been rotated or updated, they remained valid and could be used to authenticate to user accounts on Snowflake tenants belonging to various customers.",{"data":1862,"content":1863,"nodeType":252},{},[1864],{"data":1865,"marks":1866,"value":1867,"nodeType":247},{},[],"As a data warehousing platform integrated with a range of connected cloud services, access to a customer’s Snowflake tenant provided attackers with large quantities of sensitive commercial and personal data that could be stolen and monetized by attackers in a variety of ways — such as by ransoming the victim organization, extorting individual end-customers, and selling the data on to other criminal organizations. ",{"data":1869,"content":1870,"nodeType":252},{},[1871],{"data":1872,"marks":1873,"value":1874,"nodeType":247},{},[],"In total, 9 public victims were named following the breach, collectively impacting hundreds of millions of people. ",{"data":1876,"content":1877,"nodeType":302},{},[1878,1888,1898,1908,1918,1928,1938,1948,1958],{"data":1879,"content":1880,"nodeType":306},{},[1881],{"data":1882,"content":1883,"nodeType":252},{},[1884],{"data":1885,"marks":1886,"value":1887,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Lending Tree: Sensitive data for over 190 million people available online including customer details, partial credit card numbers, insurance quotes and other information, being sold for $2m.",{"data":1889,"content":1890,"nodeType":306},{},[1891],{"data":1892,"content":1893,"nodeType":252},{},[1894],{"data":1895,"marks":1896,"value":1897,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Truist Bank: Information belonging to 65,000 employees being sold online for $1m",{"data":1899,"content":1900,"nodeType":306},{},[1901],{"data":1902,"content":1903,"nodeType":252},{},[1904],{"data":1905,"marks":1906,"value":1907,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Advance Auto Parts: 3TB of data for sale for $1.5 million. Affected 2.3 million people, as well as current and former employees and job applicants.",{"data":1909,"content":1910,"nodeType":306},{},[1911],{"data":1912,"content":1913,"nodeType":252},{},[1914],{"data":1915,"marks":1916,"value":1917,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Pure Storage: Workspace with 11k customer records including company, email, LDAP username and software version numbers.",{"data":1919,"content":1920,"nodeType":306},{},[1921],{"data":1922,"content":1923,"nodeType":252},{},[1924],{"data":1925,"marks":1926,"value":1927,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Los Angeles Unified: Student data, disability information, discipline details, and parent information, being sold online for $150k.",{"data":1929,"content":1930,"nodeType":306},{},[1931],{"data":1932,"content":1933,"nodeType":252},{},[1934],{"data":1935,"marks":1936,"value":1937,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Neiman Marcus: 31m email addresses exposed alongside various personal information.",{"data":1939,"content":1940,"nodeType":306},{},[1941],{"data":1942,"content":1943,"nodeType":252},{},[1944],{"data":1945,"marks":1946,"value":1947,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Santander: 30 million customer details for sale relating to customers of Santander Chile, Spain, and Uruguay.",{"data":1949,"content":1950,"nodeType":306},{},[1951],{"data":1952,"content":1953,"nodeType":252},{},[1954],{"data":1955,"marks":1956,"value":1957,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Ticketmaster: 560 million customer details for sale, disruption to events and ticketing worldwide, increasing in scam ticket production.",{"data":1959,"content":1960,"nodeType":306},{},[1961],{"data":1962,"content":1963,"nodeType":252},{},[1964],{"data":1965,"marks":1966,"value":1967,"nodeType":247},{},[],"AT&T: Call logs stolen for approximately 109 million customers (nearly all of its mobile customers). AT&T paid an undisclosed ransom fee. ",{"data":1969,"content":1970,"nodeType":371},{},[],{"data":1972,"content":1973,"nodeType":243},{},[1974],{"data":1975,"marks":1976,"value":1978,"nodeType":247},{},[1977],{"type":701},"The Snowflake attacks step-by-step",{"data":1980,"content":1981,"nodeType":302},{},[1982,1992,2002,2012,2022,2032,2042,2052],{"data":1983,"content":1984,"nodeType":306},{},[1985],{"data":1986,"content":1987,"nodeType":252},{},[1988],{"data":1989,"marks":1990,"value":1991,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Snowflake users were infected with infostealer malware that harvested credentials from user devices over an extended period via several infostealer malware variants, including; VIDAR, RISEPRO, REDLINE, RACOON STEALER, LUMMA and METASTEALER.",{"data":1993,"content":1994,"nodeType":306},{},[1995],{"data":1996,"content":1997,"nodeType":252},{},[1998],{"data":1999,"marks":2000,"value":2001,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Credentials appeared on criminal marketplaces e.g. dark web forums and Telegram channels.",{"data":2003,"content":2004,"nodeType":306},{},[2005],{"data":2006,"content":2007,"nodeType":252},{},[2008],{"data":2009,"marks":2010,"value":2011,"nodeType":247},{},[],"ShinyHunters saw the potential in targeting Snowflake users, based on the availability of credentials, number of customer organizations, and the value of the data that can be accessed in Snowflake. ",{"data":2013,"content":2014,"nodeType":306},{},[2015],{"data":2016,"content":2017,"nodeType":252},{},[2018],{"data":2019,"marks":2020,"value":2021,"nodeType":247},{},[],"ShinyHunters embarked on a large-scale campaign targeting Snowflake customer accounts using previously breached credentials. ",{"data":2023,"content":2024,"nodeType":306},{},[2025],{"data":2026,"content":2027,"nodeType":252},{},[2028],{"data":2029,"marks":2030,"value":2031,"nodeType":247},{},[],"ShinyHunters accessed user accounts that lacked MFA, belonging to approximately 165 Snowflake customers. ",{"data":2033,"content":2034,"nodeType":306},{},[2035],{"data":2036,"content":2037,"nodeType":252},{},[2038],{"data":2039,"marks":2040,"value":2041,"nodeType":247},{},[],"ShinyHunters used SQL-based reconnaissance, staging, and data exfiltration techniques, expedited by custom hacker tooling developed specifically for Snowflake, to conduct attacks at scale.",{"data":2043,"content":2044,"nodeType":306},{},[2045],{"data":2046,"content":2047,"nodeType":252},{},[2048],{"data":2049,"marks":2050,"value":2051,"nodeType":247},{},[],"ShinyHunters acquired massive quantities of Snowflake data based on the information that each customer stored in Snowflake or connected apps. ",{"data":2053,"content":2054,"nodeType":306},{},[2055],{"data":2056,"content":2057,"nodeType":252},{},[2058],{"data":2059,"marks":2060,"value":2061,"nodeType":247},{},[],"ShinyHunters began attempts to extort Snowflake and end-customers using the data acquired.",{"data":2063,"content":2067,"nodeType":421},{"target":2064},{"sys":2065},{"id":2066,"type":426,"linkType":427},"2J92gFLs1wAAGC4nQTaiWu",[],{"data":2069,"content":2070,"nodeType":371},{},[],{"data":2072,"content":2073,"nodeType":243},{},[2074],{"data":2075,"marks":2076,"value":2078,"nodeType":247},{},[2077],{"type":701},"Why did the Snowflake breaches happen?",{"data":2080,"content":2081,"nodeType":450},{},[2082],{"data":2083,"marks":2084,"value":2086,"nodeType":247},{},[2085],{"type":701},"Stolen credentials remained valid for years",{"data":2088,"content":2089,"nodeType":252},{},[2090],{"data":2091,"marks":2092,"value":2093,"nodeType":247},{},[],"The credentials used to access Snowflake accounts from historical infostealer infections had not been changed or rotated despite dating back as far as 2020, and remained valid. ",{"data":2095,"content":2096,"nodeType":252},{},[2097],{"data":2098,"marks":2099,"value":2100,"nodeType":247},{},[],"This highlights the potential risk of breached credentials already in the public domain, particularly in the case of cloud services like Snowflake that may not be subject to the same levels of credential hygiene as other traditional enterprise domain accounts. ",{"data":2102,"content":2103,"nodeType":450},{},[2104],{"data":2105,"marks":2106,"value":2108,"nodeType":247},{},[2107],{"type":701},"Local logins lacked MFA ",{"data":2110,"content":2111,"nodeType":252},{},[2112,2116,2125],{"data":2113,"marks":2114,"value":2115,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Even where organizations were primarily encouraging employees to use SSO to access their Snowflake tenant, previously created local logins with a username and password continue to exist even after introducing SSO-based logins. Further, MFA was not globally enforceable at the application level, meaning that MFA was only set when logging into an IdP account for SSO, but not for local logins. We call this problem ",{"data":2117,"content":2119,"nodeType":267},{"uri":2118},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/ghost-logins-when-forgotten-identities-come-back-to-haunt-you/",[2120],{"data":2121,"marks":2122,"value":2124,"nodeType":247},{},[2123],{"type":275},"ghost logins",{"data":2126,"marks":2127,"value":278,"nodeType":247},{},[],{"data":2129,"content":2130,"nodeType":252},{},[2131],{"data":2132,"marks":2133,"value":2134,"nodeType":247},{},[],"This meant that attackers were able to take over Snowflake accounts with only a single authentication factor (username & password). ",{"data":2136,"content":2137,"nodeType":450},{},[2138],{"data":2139,"marks":2140,"value":2142,"nodeType":247},{},[2141],{"type":701},"Snowflake was a high-value target used by many organizations",{"data":2144,"content":2145,"nodeType":252},{},[2146],{"data":2147,"marks":2148,"value":2149,"nodeType":247},{},[],"As a data warehousing platform used by a vast number of organizations, Snowflake represented a high-value target based on the data typically stored within it, and the repeatable way in which Snowflake users could be targeted. ",{"data":2151,"content":2152,"nodeType":252},{},[2153],{"data":2154,"marks":2155,"value":2156,"nodeType":247},{},[],"The attacker followed a near identical process when targeting Snowflake victims, meaning it could be scripted and executed at scale, with attacks taking a matter of minutes. ",{"data":2158,"content":2159,"nodeType":450},{},[2160],{"data":2161,"marks":2162,"value":2164,"nodeType":247},{},[2163],{"type":701},"Infostealer infections are driving credential availability",{"data":2166,"content":2167,"nodeType":252},{},[2168],{"data":2169,"marks":2170,"value":2171,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Infostealers are often seen as a low-priority issue, but are the primary source of stolen credentials used in campaigns like this one. ",{"data":2173,"content":2174,"nodeType":252},{},[2175],{"data":2176,"marks":2177,"value":2178,"nodeType":247},{},[],"EDR is a strong protection but is often bypassed by infostealers as attackers continually modify them to bypass security controls. Further, unmanaged devices such as those used by third-party contractors or BYOD employees often lack the robust controls applied to company-managed devices and are naturally more susceptible to infostealer attacks. And since browser profiles can be synced across devices, even personal device compromises can result in the capture of corporate credentials.  ",{"data":2180,"content":2181,"nodeType":252},{},[2182,2186,2195],{"data":2183,"marks":2184,"value":2185,"nodeType":247},{},[],"There is some suggestion that targeting key third-party suppliers – ",{"data":2187,"content":2189,"nodeType":267},{"uri":2188},"https://www.wired.com/story/epam-snowflake-ticketmaster-breach-shinyhunters/",[2190],{"data":2191,"marks":2192,"value":2194,"nodeType":247},{},[2193],{"type":275},"such as EPAM Systems, a software engineering firm and Snowflake ‘Elite Tier Partner’",{"data":2196,"marks":2197,"value":2198,"nodeType":247},{},[]," – provided some of the access to Snowflake customers needed. It’s unclear what came first, but it’s possible (likely, even) that EPAM was identified as a target specifically because of its lucrative customer base and Snowflake credentials — adding another indicator that Snowflake was potentially a premeditated attack inspired by the availability of Snowflake credentials online.",{"data":2200,"content":2204,"nodeType":421},{"target":2201},{"sys":2202},{"id":2203,"type":426,"linkType":427},"4D0gjt5oJLNKJH8GzjP8Je",[],{"data":2206,"content":2207,"nodeType":371},{},[],{"data":2209,"content":2210,"nodeType":243},{},[2211],{"data":2212,"marks":2213,"value":2215,"nodeType":247},{},[2214],{"type":701},"Key takeaways from the Snowflake attacks",{"data":2217,"content":2218,"nodeType":450},{},[2219],{"data":2220,"marks":2221,"value":2223,"nodeType":247},{},[2222],{"type":701},"Securing your IdP accounts is not enough",{"data":2225,"content":2226,"nodeType":252},{},[2227],{"data":2228,"marks":2229,"value":2230,"nodeType":247},{},[],"SSO can help reduce your identity attack surface, but it's not feasible to get every workforce identity behind it.",{"data":2232,"content":2233,"nodeType":302},{},[2234,2257,2278,2313],{"data":2235,"content":2236,"nodeType":306},{},[2237],{"data":2238,"content":2239,"nodeType":252},{},[2240,2244,2253],{"data":2241,"marks":2242,"value":2243,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Only 1 in 3 apps support SAML SSO, and those that offer it often charge more for it; the “",{"data":2245,"content":2247,"nodeType":267},{"uri":2246},"https://ssotax.org/",[2248],{"data":2249,"marks":2250,"value":2252,"nodeType":247},{},[2251],{"type":275},"SSO tax",{"data":2254,"marks":2255,"value":2256,"nodeType":247},{},[],"”.",{"data":2258,"content":2259,"nodeType":306},{},[2260],{"data":2261,"content":2262,"nodeType":252},{},[2263,2267,2275],{"data":2264,"marks":2265,"value":2266,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Many apps are self-adopted by employees, leaving security teams unaware and unable to enforce SSO.  The typical organization has ",{"data":2268,"content":2269,"nodeType":267},{"uri":290},[2270],{"data":2271,"marks":2272,"value":2274,"nodeType":247},{},[2273],{"type":275},"hundreds of apps and thousands of unmanaged identities outside of SSO",{"data":2276,"marks":2277,"value":1020,"nodeType":247},{},[],{"data":2279,"content":2280,"nodeType":306},{},[2281],{"data":2282,"content":2283,"nodeType":252},{},[2284,2288,2296,2300,2309],{"data":2285,"marks":2286,"value":2287,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Most apps do not prevent users from creating additional \"",{"data":2289,"content":2290,"nodeType":267},{"uri":2118},[2291],{"data":2292,"marks":2293,"value":2295,"nodeType":247},{},[2294],{"type":275},"ghost login",{"data":2297,"marks":2298,"value":2299,"nodeType":247},{},[],"\" methods outside of SSO (especially by default), accounting for around ",{"data":2301,"content":2303,"nodeType":267},{"uri":2302},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/how-many-vulnerable-identities-do-you-have/#id-identity-configurations-and-how-they-can-be-exploited_id-many-accounts-lack-the-most-basic-protections",[2304],{"data":2305,"marks":2306,"value":2308,"nodeType":247},{},[2307],{"type":275},"10% of all identities",{"data":2310,"marks":2311,"value":2312,"nodeType":247},{},[]," observed by Push. ",{"data":2314,"content":2315,"nodeType":306},{},[2316],{"data":2317,"content":2318,"nodeType":252},{},[2319,2323,2331],{"data":2320,"marks":2321,"value":2322,"nodeType":247},{},[],"In total, we identified that ",{"data":2324,"content":2325,"nodeType":267},{"uri":290},[2326],{"data":2327,"marks":2328,"value":2330,"nodeType":247},{},[2329],{"type":275},"37% (2 in 5) accounts have a password login set with no MFA",{"data":2332,"marks":2333,"value":2334,"nodeType":247},{},[],", while 9% have no MFA AND a weak, breached, or reused password.",{"data":2336,"content":2337,"nodeType":252},{},[2338],{"data":2339,"marks":2340,"value":2341,"nodeType":247},{},[],"So, relying on locked-down IdP accounts and maximising the use of SSO is an important pillar of an effective identity security strategy, but there will always be gaps. Unless you recognize this, you may be blindsided by attackers finding them before you do. ",{"data":2343,"content":2344,"nodeType":450},{},[2345],{"data":2346,"marks":2347,"value":2349,"nodeType":247},{},[2348],{"type":701},"The threat of infostealers and stolen credentials needs to be taken seriously",{"data":2351,"content":2352,"nodeType":252},{},[2353],{"data":2354,"marks":2355,"value":2356,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Breached credentials appearing online is not always seen as a top priority for security teams, particularly when there’s so much noise from all of the outdated or simply erroneous findings (anyone that’s ever subscribed to a credential TI feed knows the pain of this). ",{"data":2358,"content":2359,"nodeType":252},{},[2360],{"data":2361,"marks":2362,"value":2363,"nodeType":247},{},[],"But Snowflake serves as a stark reminder that despite all the false positives, stolen credentials are sometimes valid — and when weaponized at-scale they can be a powerful tool for attackers. ",{"data":2365,"content":2369,"nodeType":421},{"target":2366},{"sys":2367},{"id":2368,"type":426,"linkType":427},"4EODpwKsqNivpvP2yMtZCd",[],{"data":2371,"content":2372,"nodeType":450},{},[2373],{"data":2374,"marks":2375,"value":2377,"nodeType":247},{},[2376],{"type":701},"Don’t rely on third-parties to protect your identities for you",{"data":2379,"content":2380,"nodeType":252},{},[2381],{"data":2382,"marks":2383,"value":2384,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Snowflake came under fire following the attacks for not enabling MFA by default, or giving security teams sufficient tools to deal with the incident. ",{"data":2386,"content":2387,"nodeType":252},{},[2388],{"data":2389,"marks":2390,"value":2391,"nodeType":247},{},[],"This is perhaps justifiable, but is hardly the exception. Very few apps enforce MFA by default or provide a global MFA enforcement mechanism. Most don’t even provide audit logs (and when they do, the scope of logging is pretty limited). And we regularly encounter apps that don’t give you any information about account configuration as an admin — like which accounts have MFA, or the login methods that they’re using (e.g. SSO via SAML, SSO via OIDC, password, which IdPs are being used…) which is essential information to be able to secure your identity attack surface. ",{"data":2393,"content":2394,"nodeType":252},{},[2395],{"data":2396,"marks":2397,"value":2398,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Yes, it would be great if app vendors put security first and made controls available by default, for all customers (not just the premium ones). But in the absence of an industrywide shift toward security-first product development, it’s important that organizations don’t just point the finger at service providers — and take matters into their own hands when it comes to securing their user identities. ",{"data":2400,"content":2401,"nodeType":450},{},[2402],{"data":2403,"marks":2404,"value":2406,"nodeType":247},{},[2405],{"type":701},"This isn’t a specific Snowflake problem — it could have been any application",{"data":2408,"content":2409,"nodeType":252},{},[2410],{"data":2411,"marks":2412,"value":2413,"nodeType":247},{},[],"While Snowflake was admittedly a high-value target because of the data it collected, apps with sensitive data (or with integrations connecting them to data collected in adjacent apps) are not in short supply. ",{"data":2415,"content":2416,"nodeType":252},{},[2417],{"data":2418,"marks":2419,"value":2420,"nodeType":247},{},[],"If we accept that many other apps are similarly desirable targets, then we should also consider that it’s unlikely that Snowflake is the only app that has valid credentials sitting around on the internet, waiting to be weaponized by criminals. Equally, it’s not the only app that doesn’t require mandatory MFA for user accounts, as we discussed above. The next Snowflake is likely to lurk in the same breached datasets, possibly even using the same credentials.",{"data":2422,"content":2423,"nodeType":252},{},[2424],{"data":2425,"marks":2426,"value":2427,"nodeType":247},{},[],"There’s been a clear increase in the number of infostealer and stolen credential related breaches and news stories since Snowflake as attackers wise up to the potential opportunity and start seeing the dollar signs. It would be naive to think that this was a one off event — the next Snowflake is probably not too far away. ",{"data":2429,"content":2430,"nodeType":252},{},[2431],{"data":2432,"marks":2433,"value":2434,"nodeType":247},{},[],"For a deep-dive analysis of the impact of Snowflake, check out our on-demand webinar from earlier this year.",{"data":2436,"content":2440,"nodeType":421},{"target":2437},{"sys":2438},{"id":2439,"type":426,"linkType":427},"7LkU5DqE9HJ1PQu9BTg6Mw",[],{"data":2442,"content":2443,"nodeType":371},{},[],{"data":2445,"content":2446,"nodeType":243},{},[2447],{"data":2448,"marks":2449,"value":2451,"nodeType":247},{},[2450],{"type":701},"How to protect yourself from the next Snowflake using Push",{"data":2453,"content":2454,"nodeType":252},{},[2455],{"data":2456,"marks":2457,"value":2458,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Organizations looking to reduce their exposure to account takeover using stolen credentials should look to:",{"data":2460,"content":2461,"nodeType":302},{},[2462,2472,2482],{"data":2463,"content":2464,"nodeType":306},{},[2465],{"data":2466,"content":2467,"nodeType":252},{},[2468],{"data":2469,"marks":2470,"value":2471,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Identify the apps being used across the business and locate vulnerable workforce identities using weak, breached, or reused credentials, and missing MFA. Where SSO is the preferred login method, local username & password logins should ideally be removed. ",{"data":2473,"content":2474,"nodeType":306},{},[2475],{"data":2476,"content":2477,"nodeType":252},{},[2478],{"data":2479,"marks":2480,"value":2481,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Where credentials appear in third-party data breaches, verify where they are still valid and ensure that the credentials are changed. ",{"data":2483,"content":2484,"nodeType":306},{},[2485],{"data":2486,"content":2487,"nodeType":252},{},[2488],{"data":2489,"marks":2490,"value":2491,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Detect unauthorized access to workforce identities where sessions are initiated or resumed from unusual or unexpected locations. It should be noted that while this is a fairly common feature for larger enterprise cloud platforms with configurable access control policies, this is not typically possible for most SaaS applications.  ",{"data":2493,"content":2494,"nodeType":252},{},[2495],{"data":2496,"marks":2497,"value":2498,"nodeType":247},{},[],"All of these use cases can be achieved using Push. The Push browser extension detects all logins performed in employee browsers, capturing granular information about the login method and MFA types used, and enriching this data by integrating with your preferred IdP.",{"data":2500,"content":2501,"nodeType":252},{},[2502,2506,2514],{"data":2503,"marks":2504,"value":2505,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Push’s ",{"data":2507,"content":2509,"nodeType":267},{"uri":2508},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/verified-stolen-credential-detection",[2510],{"data":2511,"marks":2512,"value":2513,"nodeType":247},{},[],"verified stolen credential detection feature",{"data":2515,"marks":2516,"value":2517,"nodeType":247},{},[]," compares a k-anonymized hash of user passwords observed with stolen credential TI feeds to cut through the noise and identify where stolen credentials appearing online represent a genuine vulnerability.   ",{"data":2519,"content":2520,"nodeType":252},{},[2521,2525,2534],{"data":2522,"marks":2523,"value":2524,"nodeType":247},{},[],"On top of this, all logins made in browsers protected by the Push extension, across every app, are verified by ",{"data":2526,"content":2528,"nodeType":267},{"uri":2527},"https://pushsecurity.com/blog/introducing-session-token-theft-detection-why-browser-is-best/",[2529],{"data":2530,"marks":2531,"value":2533,"nodeType":247},{},[2532],{"type":275},"adding a unique marker to the user agent string of the session",{"data":2535,"marks":2536,"value":2537,"nodeType":247},{},[],", which will then appear in your IdP logs. This means that any session occurring outside of the Push-protected estate can be flagged to your security team via SIEM alert — including where an attacker uses stolen credentials to log into an app from a browser without the Push extension running. ",{"data":2539,"content":2542,"nodeType":421},{"target":2540},{"sys":2541},{"id":1331,"type":426,"linkType":427},[],{"data":2544,"content":2545,"nodeType":252},{},[2546],{"data":2547,"marks":2548,"value":29,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Snowflake: Looking back on 2024’s landmark security event","165 Snowflake customers were targeted by criminals using stolen credentials from infostealer infections, impacting hundreds of millions of people. ","2024-11-29T00:00:00.000Z","snowflake-retro",{"items":2554},[2555],{"sys":2556,"name":2558},{"id":2557},"6A5RXS31ZQx3PwryGb1IMy","Browser-based attacks",{"items":2560},[2561],{"fullName":2562,"firstName":2563,"jobTitle":2564,"profilePicture":2565},"Dan Green","Dan","Threat Research",{"url":2566},"https://images.ctfassets.net/y1cdw1ablpvd/7jik1VhFgA3kgzXBXTm2Vw/fcd8c171da644903d0827eafcfbcaad0/Dan_Headshot_2025.png","automating-sso-password-resets-using-push","blog/automating-sso-password-resets-using-push",{"json":2570},{"data":2571,"content":2572,"nodeType":239},{},[2573],{"data":2574,"content":2575,"nodeType":252},{},[2576],{"data":2577,"marks":2578,"value":2579,"nodeType":247},{},[],"Automate password resets for your most critical identities when a password vulnerability is detected, such as when an employee reuses their SSO password outside of SSO, or valid credentials are detected in a compromised credential feed.","Using Push to automate password resets for your most critical identities when a password vulnerability is detected.",{"id":2582,"publishedAt":2583},"75wcCkoZEKwEMl7zBmDMtT","2026-05-15T16:43:01.259Z",{"items":2585},[2586,2588],{"sys":2587,"name":1745},{"id":1744},{"sys":2589,"name":1352},{"id":1351},"wD84TgxGPWkzke3mDsiyGIxW915yQw3bEHZmxE17Fk4",1784196719121]